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VSummary
The present thesis attempts to study the current legal 
position of the company directors' function. This involves 
an examination of the legal rules and principles that 
regulate their managerial duties, powers and liabilities.
The thesis is divided into six chapters . The first 
chapter is intended to shed some light on forms of business 
associations and its basic characteristics, by illustrating 
the similarities and the differences which do exist between 
parallel types of companies in both Britain and Algeria. 
The illustration will include sources, classification of 
commercial companies, structure of the board of directors 
in both British public companies and Algerian societe par 
action. Besides the role and qualification of directors 
would be considered.
Chapter Two discusses the issue of corporate power and 
highlights the legal nature of directors' powers to conduct 
the company’s affairs, the scope of these powers and the 
sources from which they are derived.
Chapter three clarifies the question of delegation of 
directors powers by prescribing the legal basis of 
delegation, the nature of powers that can be delegated by 
the board of directors to a managing director or to a 
committee of directors, and finally the protection of third 
parties dealing with the company from the delegates acts.
Chapter four explores the obligations and duties to
which directors are bound to pay due regard when conducting 
the business of the company. This includes first their 
fiduciary duties, namely; the duty to act bona fide in the 
best interest of the company, the duty to act for a proper 
purpose and the duty to avoid a conflict of interest and 
duty. Second, their common law duties of care, diligence 
and skill.
Chapter five is concerned with the legal liability of 
company directors. It considers the separate legal 
personality of a company and its effect on directors 
liability. It also deals with the two ways in which
directors' acts create a liability in the company: first,
where directors are treated as the company's agents and act
for the company, and secondly, where directors acts are 
treated as the company's acts and finally discusses who is 
the alter ego of the company.
The last chapter examines the legal foundations and the 
circumstances under which the directors may be held 
personally liable. This includes their personal liability 
on contracts; in delicts/torts in addition to their
statutory liabilities such as liability for 
misrepresentation (mis-statement), fraudulent trading and 
wrongful trading. Disqualification of directors and its 
grounds are also considered. Finally, the chapter shed some 
light on a number of ways in which directors may be 
relieved from liability, namely; ratification, relief by 
the articles, relief by the court.
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1Introduction
The company is the backbone of the industrial society. 
Whether private or public, large or small, and it 
constitutes the heart of business life. Without it, industry 
and commerce could not function. Accordingly, the manner in 
which this institution is run and the persons who manage it 
is an issue of overwhelming legal, economic and political 
significance.
The established rule is that the management of modern 
companies is carried out by two principal organs, the members 
in general meeting and the board of directors. Through their 
control of the composition of the board of directors and 
their ability to regulate the directors powers by altering 
the companies articles which confer those powers, the members 
may be said to be the supreme body with the ultimate 
authority. However, although this may still be true in the 
case of small size firms with a small number of shareholders, 
it would be impossible for the members in large companies to 
exercise any detailed control over the day-to-day running of 
the company by the directors. This may be attributed to a 
number of factors such as the increasing size, diversity and 
complexity of modern business, growth of the equity interest 
in a company, and the increase in the number of shareholders.
As early as 177 6 Adam Smith stated:
" The trade of a joint stock company is always managed 
by a court of directors. This court, indeed, is 
frequently subject, in many respects, to the control 
of a general court of proprietors. But the greater
2part of those proprietors seldom pretend to understand 
anything of the business of the company; and when the 
spirit of faction happens not to prevail among them,
[they] give themselves no trouble about it, but 
receive contentedly such half-yearly or yearly 
dividend as the directors think proper to make to 
them. This total exemption from trouble and from 
risk, beyond a limited sum, encourages many people to 
become adventures in joint stock companies , who would 
upon no account hasard their fortunes in any private
co-partnery".1
This development is often described as the divorce of 
ownership from management. Indeed, the separation between 
owners and directors become a well recognised fact in modern 
company law. As a result of this separation the managerial 
powers have shifted from the members to the directors. This 
put directors in a much stronger position than the members 
allowing them to dominate the affairs of the company.
Undoubtedly a company’s directorship is seen now as one 
of the top jobs in industrial societies. Indeed, a directors 
position especially in large companies such as ICI, BP, 
G.E.C, and Ferranti International appears to be the same as 
the position of higher rank civil servants and politicians in 
terms of huge amounts of money and assets which they control 
and the number of people they represent. In fact, boards of 
directors now become a very real device for power and status. 
They play a vital role in determining the government economic 
policy since the whole economy looks to their competence and 
ability. It should be noted that no economic reforms can be
1-S m ith , A., An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the wealth of Nations. 
(1776) Book V , Chapter 1, Part | | | , art. 1, p. 232
3achieved without reforming the managerial function. As a 
result of this development the company's directorship has 
become one of the most important issues in company law which 
has received a consistent attention over the last decade as 
pressures for reform have increased.
The subject of management and control comprises a broad 
spectrum of issues. The present thesis, however, focuses 
attention on some important problems that have a close 
correlation with the directors function. In so doing, it 
points out to a variety of specific problems of administering 
companies in different stages of development . The thesis 
analyses the principles of law governing the managerial 
function and prescribing the directors powers and privileges 
that are conferred on them to run the day-to-day company's 
affairs and the duties to which they are bound to pay due 
regard while performing their function; the liabilities and 
responsibilities which they may incur while acting on behalf 
of the company. The study involves a statement of the current 
statutory provisions applicable to the directors as well as 
consideration of the common law principles developed through 
cases. In addition, it is attempted through the thesis to 
demonstrate the Algerian position in some areas of law 
particularly points in respect of which a comparison would be 
useful. As Algeria is a codified civil law system on French 
pattern and so differs in the solutions offered to similar 
problems.
4The thesis begins with a description of business 
associations that exist under British and Algerian law 
illustrating the similarities and differences which do exist
between parallel types of associations in both countries.
$
This includes the classification, the nature, and the 
principle sources of the law applicable to commercial 
companies as well as the main classifications adopted in both 
legal systems. The structure of the board of management in 
both British public company and Algerian societe par action 
is also considered. Furthermore, as the appointment of non­
executive directors in large public companies has increased 
noticeably in recent years, considerations are given to 
highlight the position of this relatively new category of 
directors and their role in managing the company as a whole.
The purpose behind the brief mention of the above 
information is to pave the way for a clear understanding of 
the principal elements which constitute the core of this 
study, namely, Powers, Duties and Liabilities of Management.
The Subject " Powers of Management " covers a wide range 
of legal problems which cannot all be dealt with here. 
Instead some specific legal points will be discussed in 
detail, such as the legal nature of the managerial powers and 
their main sources. This leads us to determine the legal 
position of a director which is one of the unsettled issues 
in British Company law.
Nowadays there is a growing tendency in most company laws 
in different legal systems to concentrate powers of 
management in fewer hands in order to give management an
5independent position and to keep it free from outside 
interference, especially from shareholders. Consequently, the 
present board possess practically all powers of management 
while very few powers are retained by the company in general 
meeting. However, these extensive powers invested in 
directors are not limitless but subject to a number of 
restrictions.
In fact the scope of directors' authority and the extent 
to which a company can be bound by the acts of individual 
directors is a complicated area governed by diverse statutory 
(Section 9 of the European Communities.Act 1972, now section 
35 of the the Companies Act 1985) and judge made rules, such 
as the rule in Royal British v. Turquand (1856) 6 E & B 327, 
The doctrine of constructive notice and the ultra vires rule 
which is one of the landmarks of British law that has no 
place in Algerian or continental law. Although as a general 
rule the directors' powers can only be exercised at board 
meetings. This principle of collective management was 
developed to protect shareholders against ill-considered 
transactions. However, it is realised that directors cannot 
properly perform their functions without delegating certain 
of their discretionary authority to other executives. Thus , 
in practice the articles usually permit extensive delegation 
of power to a committee of directors (consisting of either of 
a single director or several directors) or to managing 
director.
In return for this wide range of powers, directors are 
subject to a number of obligations and duties: Some are laid
6down by statute and the majority are found only in common 
law. However, it has been established that a director owes 
two types of duty to the company; that is, they act within
the scope of powers granted by the internal regulations and
bona fide in what they consider in the best interest of the
company. Thus they are not allowed to act for a "collateral
purpose" or use their powers and position to benifit 
themselves. In addition, They are required to exercise 
whatever skill they possess showing a standard of reasonable 
care they articulate.
Although the director when acting as agent binds the
company and not himself, there are certain circumstances in 
which he becomes personally liable. Indeed, directors can no 
longer rely for protection on the separate personality of 
their company as "lifting the corporate veil" has become a 
more and more common occurrence. Thus a director who fails in
his duty to to the company has unlimited liability for any
resultant loss. There are various grounds on which directors 
may be held personally liable. For instance, statutory 
liabilites contracts, delicts and civil wrongs. According to 
section 310 of the Companies Act any provision in the
internal regulations or elsewhere that purports to exempt 
directors (or other officers) from any other liability 
arising from "negligence, default, breach of duty or breach 
of trust" is void. Nevertheless, there are a number of ways 
under which a director may be relieved from his liability. 
This includes ratification by the shareholders in general
7meeting, a provision in the articles of association or a 
relief by the court if certain requirements are satisfied.
The thesis will conclude with a brief evaluation of the 
practical importance and effectiveness of the rules governing 
the directors function.
8Chapter One 
Some Legal Aspects regarding Business 
Associations British and Algerian Law
A discernible phenomenon in company law is that groups 
of companies take extremely diverse forms as a result of 
the nature and variety of transactions in national and 
international commercial life. Accordingly, the legal forms 
or structures which are adopted for the purpose of 
conducting business activity are in most cases similar in 
many countries.
The legal forms of business organisations in use in 
both Britain and Algeria today, can be arranged into four 
major categories: Sole traders, Partnerships, Companies,
Public Corporations. The first three forms are to found in 
the private sector and the latter form represents the 
public sector; since it is regarded as the preferred form 
of the state intervention in the economy.
This chapter intends to highlight some important 
points regarding private business associations in both 
British and Algerian Company law. This includes:
1. Sources, classification and structures of commercial 
companies;
2. Structure of the Board of Management;
3. The role and qualification of directors.
9Section 1: Sources and Classification of Commercial
Compani.ea
1.1. Sources
In Algeria business associations are governed by the 
commercial code of September 26th, 1975 book 4 under the
title of commercial firms (article 544 to 640) and the 
civil code 1975 that contains general rules that apply to 
all kinds of companies and to civil companies specifically 
(articles from 416 to 449). The new commercial code 1975 
deals with amongst other subjects the formation, structure 
and management of private sector companies. This 
demonstrates some similarities to certain aspects of the 
French commercial codes through a circuitous route. 
However, it constitutes a new body of domestic law. These 
trends are of course not confined to the civil and 
commercial codes but cut across the whole code of 
administrative law as well as private law. Unlike France, 
Algerian judicial organisation does not have separate 
commercial courts with exclusive commercial jurisdictions 
and particular rules of proceedings. However, within each 
tribunal or court and at the supreme court, there are 
commercial chambers ("section commercial" of the tribunal, 
"chambre commercial" of the court and the supreme court) 
which specialise in commercial matters. The civil procedure 
code (code de procedure civile) governs procedures for 
hearing and settling all the cases brought before 
tribunals, courts and the supreme court. Generally speaking 
it can be said that the Algerian Commercial Code 197 5 has
10
retained French legal principles and codifications which 
derive its existence from Roman Law and regional customs. 
In Britain, however, there is no separate system of 
commercial law but it is regarded as part of the general 
law of the country and not as the law of a particular class 
of persons.^ The equivalent body of rules developed as an 
integral part of the common law, although the customs that 
were current among the merchants of the day did play their 
part in shaping it.3 indeed, it can be noticed that many of 
the basic principles of British Company law are not 
embodied in statutes, as the common law influence is still 
strong at the present time.^ However, the development in 
national and international commercial transactions in most 
countries especially in western Europe due to the influence 
of European Community harmonisation programme led to 
reconsider their legislation as the only effective way to 
cope with the current changes. In Britain, there has been a 
whole series of Companies Acts. The current statutes being 
the Companies Act 1989; Insolvency Act 1986; Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986; Financial Services Act 
1986; Business Names Act 1985. The Partnership Act 1890, 
and Limited Partnership Act 1907. Nevertheless, much of the 
law relating to partnership is still to be found in the 
cases, as it is with companies.
1.2. Classification
The two basic forms of business organisation in both 
Britain and Algeria are: The partnership, where either all 
or some of the members are responsible for the liabilities 
of the firm, and the limited company, where none of the 
members is liable for the company's debts.
As with other civil law systems, in Algerian law, 
there is a single classification which comprises both 
partnerships and companies. Thus societe, depending on the 
context in which it is used, may refer to partnership, or 
to a company, or to both. Therefore, the societes en nom 
collectifs (SNC) are general commercial partnerships; the 
partnership governed by the civil code is the societe 
civile; and the limited partnership is the societe en 
commandite simple (SCC); the societe par action and 
societe a responsabilite limitee are public limited company 
and private limited company respectively. The term societe 
is defined under article 416 of the Civil Code 1975 as a 
contract by which two or several persons undertake to 
contribute assets in kind or money to an undertaking of a 
pecuniary nature with the object of sharing profits and 
bearing losses.
"La societe est un contrat par lequel deux ou plusieurs 
personnes s'obligent a contribuer a une enterprise d'ordre 
pecunaire, par la prestation d'apports en nature ou en 
numeraire, en vue de se partager les benefice et de
12
supporter les pertes qui pourront en resulter".
Companies may be civil or commercial depending on 
their form or their object. This classification reflects a 
crucial distinction between the civil law, which is the 
general law embodied in the Civil Code and supplementary 
legislation, and the commercial law whose base is the 
Commercial Code. The latter applies to traders 
(commergants) who are defined as persons who are 
principally engaged in "acts of commerce" (actes de 
com m e r c e ) .5 It differs both substantively and procedurally 
from the civil law. For example, it involves a different 
judiciary; it employs different rules of proof and it 
includes the bankcruptcy law, which does not apply to 
persons not engaged in commerce. Nevertheless, the 
commercial law rests upon and presupposes the civil law 
which is applicable whenever the commercial law is silent 
upon a particular point^. In addition the distinction 
between civil and commercial companies is a practical 
importance and result in the following consequences:
1- Commercial Companies are subject to the rules 
applicable to all traders^ such as the requirements to keep 
certain books and to prepare an annual auditted accounts to 
take each year a balance of the assets and the liabilities 
of the company and all the accounts, in order to establish 
the balance sheet and the profit and loss account. On the 
other hand a civil partnership or company is subject to the 
provisions of the civil code as to the annulment of
13
contracts (e.g for mistake or fraud) and the civil period 
of limitations (5 or 30 years) applies to proceedings for 
annulment (articles 416-449 of the civil code).
2- Civil companies acquire legal status (personality 
morale) as soon as the contract is formed, whereas 
commercial companies acquire legal status on registration 
at the register of commerce.
3- Commercial companies are subject to bankcruptcy 
proceedings; they are under the jurisdiction of the 
commercial section of the tribunal and of the court.
4- Commercial companies are subject to special fiscal 
regulations.
5- Although the Civil Code 197 5 lays down the common 
grounds for dissolution of all types of partnerships and 
companies whether civil or commercial, commercial 
partnerships and companies may additionally be dissolved 
for other reasons which do not apply to civil concerns.
Article 544(1) of the Commercial Code provides that "the 
Commercial character of a partnership or a company is 
determined by its form or by its objects".
"Le caractere commercial d'une societe est determine 
par sa form ou par son objet."
It follows from this that a partnership or a company 
which has neither a commercial form nor commercial objects 
is a civil partnership or company. According to article 
544(2), the following companies are commercial in
14
consideration of their form whatever their object is:
1- Societes par actions (joint stock companies)
2- Societes a responsabilite limitees (SARL) (The 
limited liability company) v'
3- Societes en nom collectifs (general partnerships) 
Since commercial companies are regulated by the
Commercial Code, they must be created under one of the 
three mentioned forms which the commercial code describes.
Furthermore, societes which are commercial by reason 
of their form are further divided into societe de personnes 
(or societes par interets) and societes de capitaux ( or 
societes par actions) . The former category, which 
represented by the societes en nom collectifs (general 
partnerships) are those where the personal characteristics 
of the participants are mutually important and therefore 
their interests in the association (interets) are not 
freely transferable. In this, it is very similar to civil 
companies. These personal elements also dominate the 
relationship between the partnership and third parties, 
because partners are personally and individually liable to 
creditors of the partnership for the whole of its debts and 
obligations.® In British law this also can be noticed in 
the restrictions on the transfer on the individuals' 
interest in the partnership and the provisions concerning 
the dissolution of the partnership in the event of a 
fundamental change in the qualities of any of the partners. 
Moreover, "The foundation stone of the partnership edifice
is mutual confidence and where confidence is reposed equity 
insists that it shall not be abused."  ^ Whereas in the 
societe de capitaux represented by stock companies the 
personality of the individual members (the personal 
elements) is not so important, since its primary purpose 
is to rise capital to attain the companies' objects. 
Consequently, shares (actions) in such entities may usually 
be freely transferable. However, the societes a 
responsabilite limitee incorporate characteristics of each 
class, but in Algerian legislation the balance has been 
tipped somewhat in favour of aligning it more with the 
latter.10
Certain companies are commercial by virtue of their 
objects; any partnership or company which is formed to 
engage in commercial acts repeatedly and continuously as a 
business, is a commercial association under article 1 of 
the commercial code 1975 which defines a trader 
(commergants) in this way. Further, the notion of 
commercial act is itself defined in article 2, 3 4 which 
list the commercial acts by virtue of its nature, form and 
objects respectively.
Unlike Algerian and French law, British law does not 
have this division into the twin regimes of civil and 
commercial law. The only main and relevant classification 
made under British law is that between incorporated and 
unincorporated associations. Although British associations 
do have characteristics of societes de personnes and
societes de capitaux this division seems to be irrelevant 
and of no significance Indeed, it is argued that this 
distinction is not entirely accurate on the grounds that 
individuals (personnes) are needed by the company as well 
as the partnership, and capital (capitaux) is required not 
only by the company, but also by the partnership.12
1.3. Nature and Structure
As seen earlier the term societe is defined by article 
416 of the civil code 1975 as "a contract whereby two or 
more persons undertake to contribute assets in kind or 
money to a concern of a pecuniary nature with the object of 
sharing profits and bearing losses". It follows from this 
article that all business associations are contract-based 
entities. In other words the contract element appears to 
dominate the nature of the societe since it is constituted 
by the members1 agreement. Thus, the contract of societe is 
like any other contract and is subject to the same 
conditions and requirements. It can be entered into only 
with the consent of all the parties. Where the consent is 
lacking, the company never comes into existence; the same 
thing applies in the event of any misunderstanding as to 
the nature of the contract, the purpose of the company, or 
any of the essential elements of the contract.13 Consent 
may be rendered defective by fraud or mistake. In such a 
case the contract of organisation is voidable. In addition, 
this consent to a contract to form a company must be given 
by persons having legal capacity to conclude a contract of
the particular nature involved. In principle, anybody has 
the capacity to enter into a contract unless he has been 
declared by law totally or partially disabled. The civil 
code lays down the rules applicable to minors, to persons 
prohibited under court orders or under the law, and to 
other persons deprived of capacity (e.g., through 
unsoundness of mind). Furthermore, the object of this 
contract must be a lawful one. If the object is contrary to 
law and order or to morality, the contract is void. Article 
96 of the civil code 1975 provides "Le contrat est nul si 
l'objet est contraire a l'ordre public ou aux bonnes 
moeurs".
In addition to the above general conditions that apply 
to all contracts, there are four basic conditions which are 
necessary to the contract by which companies are 
constituted. This includes:
1 - the intention of making profits (i.e., the purpose 
of the partnership or company must be to make profits. 
Therefore, it is necessary that the objects or activities 
which the partnership or company is formed to achieve or 
carry on should be capable of making profits. The word 
'profit1 has a broad meaning which would include anything 
that increases the value of the associates' property or 
decrease in the expenses or losses of the a s s o c i a t e s . ^
2 - the pooling of assets; the persons forming a 
company (participants) are required to make a contribution 
to the company's assets and without this contribution, the 
company cannot exist. This contribution may be in cash, in
1 8
kind or in services, and in some cases it may consist 
simply of a promise of activity in the company's interests 
such as a promise to manage the company's affairs.^
3 - sharing of profits and losses: as the company's 
members are entitled to share profits, they are equally 
required to contribute to the losses that may be incurred 
by the company.^
4 - affectio societatis : this is defined as "the
specific intention to constitute or create a company". 
Indeed, a partnership or company cannot exist without such 
intention on the part of all the members to act together
and on an equal footing to achieve a common goal.
In British law, however, section 1(1) of the
Partnership Act 1890 provides as follows: "Partnership is
the relation which subsists between persons carrying on a 
business in common with a view of profit”. It appears from 
that section that the relationship is a contractual one. As 
Lord Lindley's authoritative work states "Partnership, 
though often called a contract, is a relation resulting 
from a contract. The statutory definition does not state 
from what the relation arises, but that an agreement, 
express or implied, is the source of the relation was 
clearly established before the Act and may be inferred from 
its p r o v i s i o n s " . ^  This can also be seen with companies 
where the contractual element between members seems evident 
from the terms of section 14(1) of the Companies Act 1985. 
The latter provides that the memorandum and articles of
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association (the constitutive document) when registered, 
bind the company and its members to the same extent as if 
they respectively had been signed and sealed by each 
member. It may be deduced from this that the memorandum and 
articles of association constitute a contract between the 
company and each member.
In these circumstances it can be said that the 
contract that lies behind the creation of a partnership or 
setting up a company is subject as is any other contract to 
clauses concerning capacity, object and defects to nullity 
of the contract, and therefore may render the partnership 
illegal or in the case of a company, members may find that 
their individual contracts to suscribe for shares can be 
vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, duress or lack of 
capacity. Nevertheless, it is a r g u e d ^ O  that the contractual 
elements appear partiucularly strong in the case of 
societe, as the contrat de societe has a dual role, it is 
not only one of the formalities required for formation, but 
also a juridical agreement whereby the participants unite 
so as to attain their common objectives. Moreover, the term 
societe means both the contract and also the association 
which created by the contract.21 In other words, the 
contract of societe gives birth to a juridical body that is 
distinct from its participants.
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Section 2: The legal structure &£ the heard— a£ 
management
In most legal systems a company is governed by two 
primary organs: the shareholders and the board of
directors. In theory, ultimate power in the modern company 
resides in the general meeting of shareholders. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that it has power of appointment 
and removal of the members of the board of directors; 
approves financial reports submitted by the board, disposes 
of earnings; and makes management decisions, which exceed 
the authority of the board of directors. In short, although 
it would be possible for the company in a general meeting 
to exercise all the powers of the company (especially in 
the case of one- or two-man companies) , it would not be 
practicable for day-to-day management to be conducted by 
such an organ, particularly in large complex companies. 
This is certainly true in companies that require high 
standards and a well qualified body to run its affairs. 
Hence company legislation in different legal systems 
provide that a business corporation shall be managed by its 
board of directors which is the essential nucleus that 
makes a corporation a workable type of i n s t i t u t i o n ^ # 
Indeed one of the advantages of membership of a company is 
that it enables the individual whose resources to engage 
fully in a certain industry or trade are insufficient, to 
combine with others and form an association or corporation 
in order to share profits and without having to take part
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in its management 3^.
Unlike a company, a general rule in partnership is
that all the partners are entitled to partake in the
management of the firm's affairs unless the partnership
agreement provides otherwise. Clearly, each partner is 
ipso facto a manager^; on the other hand, a shareholder 
of an incorporated company need not concern himself in the 
day-to-day management of the company. As has been stated 
earlier, the board of directors constitutes a necessary 
device to monitor the company's business, and employees' 
activities. However, the size, and structure of this vital 
legal organ differs from one legal systems to another and 
from one type of company to another.
This section will focus on structure of board of 
directors in both public companies and their counterparts 
in Algerian law.
2.1.- Structure of the Board of Directors in B r it iS -k  
£abl.i.c_Companies
Although public companies in Britain are few in number 
by far, with less than 1% of all incorporations in Britain, 
they are highly significant in terms of employment, 
investment and the creation of wealth^S. This type of 
company acts through two main organs, the shareholders and 
the board of directors between whom the powers of the 
company are divided. Although in theory the members in 
general meeting are to be the supreme organ in the company 
by their control of the composition of the board of
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directors and their ability to regulate the directors’ 
powers by altering the articles which confer those powers, 
the members may be said to be the ultimate authority.
However, in practice, the shareholders at a general 
meeting have shown themselves unable to exercise any 
detailed control over the day-to-day running of the company 
especially in large companies^, indeed, one of the main 
economic purposes which the public limited companies have 
fulfilled is the accumulation of capital from different 
numerous sources for the benefit of the investors and of a 
society as a whole. Therefore, it will be in the interest 
of the shareholders to hand over the management of the 
company's affairs to a smaller group better equipped with 
special abilities and skills many shareholders may not 
themselves possess^"? . This places the directors in a 
stronger position than the members to influence the conduct 
of the company's affairs^.
As a general rule, there are close similarities in the 
governance processes and board structures of public 
companies in different areas of activity. However, it can 
be said that there is a considerable variability between 
these companies in their approach to corporate management, 
this seems to be normal since the public companies (PLCs) 
vary from the vast corporate group with many subsidiaries, 
branches and thousands of employees, to a small public 
company whose ownership is in a few hands. In other words, 
in British public companies, the larger the company the 
bigger the board tends to be.^
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The general law in force in the United Kingdom at 
present neither requires nor prohibits the setting up of a 
two-tier board system of administration for limited 
liability companies. The main requirement of the law is 
that every company must have a board of directors. The 
minimum number who must hold office at any time is two in 
the case of a public company incorporated on or after 
November 1 192 9, and one in the case of a private company 
or a public company incorporated before November 1 192 9.3® 
For the rest the matters are largely left to be settled by 
the Articles of Association.
In most cases, companies adopt the articles set out in 
Table A found in Companies ( Table A to F ) Regulations 
1985, modified according to their requirements. Table A 
provides that directors are initially to be appointed by 
the subscribers to the memorandum of association, and 
thereafter by the annual general meeting, except in the 
case of casual vacancies which are to be filled by the 
remaining directors until the next annual general 
meeting^l. in addition, directors must be appointed 
individually on separate resolutions^ so as to prevent the 
combination of directors whom the members wish to appoint 
with those whom they do not want. Table A also provides 
that one or more directors may be appointed managing 
director by the directors as a whole. These appointments 
can be revoked at any time subject to any agreement, and 
are also to terminate on the person ceasing to be a
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director. Furthermore the directors are empowered to confer 
upon a managing director or directors extensive powers to 
such an extent that they can delegate the whole of their 
own powers^. Any such delegation may be made subject to 
any conditions the directors may impose/ and either 
collaterally with or to the exclusion of their own powers 
and may be revoked or altered at any time^ . Consequently, 
it can be said, that the distinction between executive and 
non-executive directors does appear in British company laws 
if only in Table A, and there is no provision in the law 
which prohibits the adoption of articles of association 
which implement the dualist system to a much greater
degree^5.
In practice, most public companies in the United 
Kingdom adopt a unitary board of management and tend to 
avoid the need to form formally two-tier systems of 
organisation. Despite this the fact that the general 
opinion of company lawyers in countries of the European 
Community is that the dual board system providing for a 
supervisory and an executive board, has much to commend 
itself and should be prescribed for large companies in the 
community^. This view was first presented by the European 
Community Fifth Directive 1972 which was concerned with 
board structures and employees participation, and proposed 
that all large companies should have two-tier boards. The 
supervisory board would be responsible for generally 
overseeing the company; monitoring and supervising the 
executive actions of the management board, with the duty,
25
and the sanction, of appointing and if necessary, removing 
the members of the management board who are responsible for 
running the b u s i n e s s ^ .  The attitude of management in the 
United Kingdom, as presented for example, by the 
Confederation of British Industry has been opposed to the 
concept of the two-tier board and its view is that "the 
sense of collective responsibility for the conduct of 
business is best preserved where all the directors meet in 
a single board"^. Nevertheless, it is argued that the view 
of the C.B.I against the dual board system is not an 
accurate one since the latter does not prevent the 
directors, supervisory and executive, from sitting as a 
single board if the occasion demands it^9. Moreover it is 
believed that the British managers have preferred to 
perform their duty of management under a single board 
system on the basis of its simplicity keeping a single 
decision-taking centre at the head of the firm, and 
ensuring a continuity of membership and thinking from 
senior management up to the directorial level^. It has 
been argued that there is no need to operate a two-tier 
system since it can be substituted by dividing the 
functions of different kinds of directors instead, and 
attaining the same goals which are expected to be achieved 
by the former system. Indeed, the managing director, or 
committees of managing directors function in the United 
Kingdom boards is quite similar to that of the management 
board in the German two-tier structure, while non-executive 
directors attend less frequently and exercise a role very
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similar to that of the German supervisory board41.
However, in practice it is quite obvious that an 
informal separation of function does not provide the same 
guarantees as a formal separation (dual system). 
Furthermore, in many cases "non-executive directors do not 
have supervisory functions at all, indeed it may find it 
very difficult to exercise such functioning even if they 
wished to do so, by reason for example of their minority 
position, their lack of time and information, or their 
dependence in fact upon the executive directors' good­
will"42.
As an example it is worthy of note that French company 
law provides two alternative systems of management for 
Societe Annoyme, namely, a unitary board and a two-tier 
system. The latter seems to have many more advantages than 
disadvantages, but it has so far been adopted by only a 
small number of companies42. This tendency may reflect the 
great advantages of the single board system, in which the 
members of the board, executive and non-executive are 
appointed and removed by the general meeting. This gives 
the latter a greater control over the executive members 
than in the case of the two-tier system44. Many British 
companies do operate a two-tier system in functional terms, 
and in some economic areas the two tiers are particularly 
noticeable, for example, Banks and Insurance companies and 
certain very large companies tend towards this structure42. 
The opposition to the general imposition by law of a two-
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management may not possess". . . .Furthermore, the PRO NED 
(the promotion for non-executive directors) explains that : 
"The purpose of appointing non-executive directors is to 
provide the board with knowledge, expertise, judgment and 
balance which may not be available if the board consists 
only of full-time executives"^. Also, the Institute of 
Directors recommends that "every company should have a 
minimum of two non-executive directors who are 
independent" 5 6 . Although the Confederation of British 
Industry (C.B.I) has expressed itself against the dual 
board system, it has formed the view that
"the inclusion on the board of non-executive 
directors is highly desirable....by virtue of the 
fact that unlike executive directors, they are not 
closely involved in the day-to-day affairs of the 
company, and they are in a better position to see 
the company as a whole and to take a critical view 
of it "57.
It has been noticed that most of the discussion about 
non-executive directors in British companies have only 
sought to draw a distinction between the executive 
directors who are described as full-time employees of the 
company, responsible according to the terms of their 
service contract and involved of the managing the business, 
and others who are known as non-executive directors. 
However, at present, no distinction has been drawn under 
British Company law between the types of directors, and 
executive and non-executive directors are not recognised
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and such categories are unknown to the Companies Acts ^8. 
Consequently, they are responsible on equal footing for the 
direction, executive action, supervision and accountability 
of the company^9, and their duties and liabilities regarded 
to be the same, even though an executive may have further 
duties resulting from his service contract but these duties 
are superimposed on his duties as a director 60 ^
It can be concluded that the idea of appointing to a 
board a number of directors who are not full-time salaried 
officials of the company, has long been regarded as one way 
of assuring shareholders, and to a lesser extent, society 
at large, that the senior executives account to someone 
other than themselves. In addition, it is believed that 
they may play an important role as watchdogs61. In practice 
however, it is admitted that non-executive directors 
frequently do not do what is expected of them
(supervision), the fact shows that most of them are
appointed to the board so as to benefit the board with 
their expertise in different areas of business, and in some 
cases, they are in close relationship with the owners of
the company or are retired employees. Therefore it can be
said that non-executive directors cannot do their task 
effectively unless they are provided free access to 
management information and to have an increase in their 
number on the board. This is done in American law62^ in 
order to strengthen their position to exercise a real 
influence which is expected from them, as well as to 
support the British view as a substitute of a two-tier
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board system.
2.2.- Structure of the board of directors__in
soci6t6s par actions
Under Algerian law, the management of societe par
action differs from other types of companies such as 
societe a' responsabilite limitee (SARL) and societe en nom 
collectif (SNC) which are managed by one or more directors. 
Indeed, the intervention of the legislature in regulating 
the societe par action by statutory provisions (from 
article 611 to 684 of the commercial code 1975) seems to be 
wider compared to other kinds of companies.
According to the commercial code 1975, every societe 
par action must have three main organs, namely;
1 - conseil d 'administration (the board of directors) which
is the body of management that ensures the running of 
the company's business (articles 611 to 640);
2 - assemblee generate (general meeting) which is a body of
deliberation (articles 641 to 655);
3 - commissaires aux comptes (auditors) as a body of
control (articles 678 to 684).
The societe en commandite par action, therefore, must 
be managed by a board of directors (conseil
d 'administration) which is composed of at least three 
directors and not more than seven, or not more than 
fourteen, if two or more companies have merged.63
Directors are elected from among the shareholders by
the constitutive general meeting or, in the case of
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directors other than the first, by an ordinary general 
meeting. The actual duration of the tenure of office is 
determined by the company statutes. However, the law 
prescribes a maximum of six years in the case of a director 
elected by the general meeting, or three years if he is 
nominated in the statutes.64 Unless the statutes provide 
otherwise, directors may be reelected. They may also be 
dismissed at any time by the general meeting^, in case of 
a vacancy by reason of the death or resignation of one or 
more of the directors, the board of directors may, in the 
period between two general meetings make provisional 
appointments. If the number of directors falls below the 
legal minimum, the remaining directors must immediately 
convene an ordinary general meeting in ordre to restore 
the full complement of the board.66
Directors must be shareholders of the company. They 
must hold a number of shares representing at least 20% of 
the company's capital.67 These shares (20%) are not 
transferable, since they are regarded as a security for the 
company (actions de guarantie) in the case of directors' 
misconduct. If on the date of his appointment a director 
does not own the required number of shares or if, during 
his term as a director, he ceases to own them, he will be 
deemed to have resigned from office, if he has not 
rectified his situation within three months.68
The board of directors (conseil d'administration) must 
elect one of its members as president and he must be an
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individual (natural person).^  The president is appointed 
for the period laid down in the statutes of the company, 
but this may not exceed the period of his appointment as 
d i r e c t o r . 70 He may also be dismissed by the board at any 
t i m e ^ l .  The president may be assisted by one or more 
general managers (directeurs generaux) who will have the 
same powers with respect of third parties as the 
p r e s i d e n t .  72 jn the event of the president's death, 
resignation or dismissal, the general managers will, unless 
the board decides otherwise, continue in office and retain 
their powers until the new president has been appointed. 
Finally, it must be noted that the Algerian legislature 
adopts a single board system in managing the societe par 
action, and does not provide any alternative system as 
French company law does.
Section 3: Role and Qualification of Directors
In the early stages of evolution of a company, the 
base of ownership tends to be narrow, that is, one or a few 
persons are owners, directors, officers and managers. This 
was primarily due to the small size of the companies and to 
some extent the nature of the relatively simple and narrow 
commercial transactions. In other words, where shares are 
held in a small number of hands, it will be possible for 
shareholders to more or less directly control the decision 
makers (board of directors) Through ratifying and 
monitoring important decisions and fixing incentives and 
rewards. This tendency is still present in small companies.
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Indeed, among many heads of small businesses there is a 
belief that the board of directors serves no useful 
purpose. It has been argued that a board exists solely 
because the law requires it. Thus the board is seen as a 
necessary nuisance^.
In contrast, the most striking feature of modern 
corporations is the principle of separation of ownership 
and managerial control. The reason for separation reflects 
the nature of modern companies which usually takes the form 
of complicated groups of subsidiaries with a substantial 
number of shareholders. Another observation is that growth 
in company size is normally accompanied by growth in the 
number of owners. Clearly, there is a need to provide a 
mechanism whereby, those owners who cannot be active in 
company management, have their rights translated into 
executive action - the board of management (directors).
The size of modern companies likely to make a holder 
of shares experience a loss of control over his/her 
resources because ownership is so broadly dispersed across 
large number of shareholders. This may explain why the 
typical shareholder cannot exercise real power to oversee 
managerial performance in modern c o r p o r a t i o n s 7 ^  . 
Furthermore, shareholders generally have shown themselves 
unable or unwilling to fulfil a monitoring function7 .^ In 
addition lack of sophistication and capacity of management 
on the part of majority of shareholders is a contributing
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factor. The prime reason put forward by Professor 
Axworthy7 6 is that "it is inefficient for most shareholders 
(those with small investments relative to the total shares 
in their corporation) to expand much effort on 
participation and control." Accordingly, in law and 
practice, shareholders entrust the monitoring of agents 
within the corporation to other agents, the directors, to 
act on behalf of them and conduct the company's business 
and affairs. Thus the existence of the Board of directors 
in modern company is not only a requirement of law but is 
clearly a practical necessity to provide a single and 
organised chain of command for effective management. 
Consequently, it is important to note that the directors 
take on a new and increased importance as 'representatives' 
of the shareholders and as custodians of their interests, 
hence if shareholders will not, or cannot, monitor the 
operations of the corporation and its senior employees, the 
directors, may in fact be the only intra-corporation 
monitors, because "according to the legal model of 
corporations, it is the situs of essentially all of the 
corporate power and the responsibility for corporate 
actions"^ . Business corporations in many states, e.g 
Britain, Algeria, France are required ex lege to be 
managed by its board of directors^®. It can be safely 
argued therefore, that the primary responsibility for the 
welfare of a corporation is entrusted to its board which is 
the facilitator for continuing a business enterprise.
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Unlike a partnership, a corporation's existence does 
not terminate with changes in the membership; individual 
members of various groups come and go, but the enterprise 
itself continues if it renders a useful service to its
investors (shareholders) and is properly managed. The legal 
necessity for corporations being governed by a board of 
management becomes apparent. While the number of members in 
boards differ from one legal system to another, the
legislators intention can be seen as uniform.
Section 282 of the Companies Act 1985 requires that 
every private company and every public company registered 
before 1 November 1926 should have one director, and that 
every public company should have two directors. Algerian 
law requires that a stock company (societe en commandite) 
is to be administered by a board of directors (conseil 
d 1administration) of not less than three and not more than 
seven directors.^ Article 576 provides that a limited
liability company shall be managed by one or more 
individuals. The French law of companies states that a 
public company (societe annonyme) must be governed by a 
board of directors comprising not less than three and not 
more than twelve m e m b e r s , ^0 and private companies (societe 
a' responsabilite limitee) are managed by one or more 
managers (gerants) under the direction and control of the 
members.
It is clear therefore that the legislature in 
different legal systems emphasise and attach importance to 
the number of directors of a company.
3 6
It is generally agreed that the effectiveness of a 
board of directors depends upon the abilities of the 
members of the board and their approach to the office. It 
must be noted that "investment in companies constitutes the 
most important single item of property, but whether this 
property brings profit to its owners no longer depends on 
their energy and initiative but on that of the management 
from which they are divorced"®!.
It is obvious that the eligibility and qualification 
of directors is a sensitive legal issue that must be taken 
into consideration before a proper analysis can be made of 
the legal powers and liabilities of management. Although 
company law recognises the vital role played by the board 
of directors, the issue regarding their competency and 
qualification has not received sufficient attention. This 
is rather surprising in spite of the close correlation 
between effective (successful) management and 
qualification. Indeed the relation between management and 
qualification can be regarded as opposite sides of the same 
coin.
As a general rule, company laws contain a limited 
number of statutory inroads on directors qualifications, 
for example, section s.302, 1985 Act provides that a
director cannot be bankrupt, section s.296, 1985 Act must
not be a convicted criminal and section 2 93 provides that a 
person who has attained the age of 7 0 cannot be appointed 
director of a public company or a private company which is
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a subsidiary of a public company, and a director reaching 
that age must vacate office at the conclusion of the next 
annual general meeting, unless the articles provide 
otherwise or the director is appointed or approved by a 
resolution of which special notice stating his age has been 
given. Algerian law requires that a director must have full 
capacity to be eligible for appointment to the office of a 
director, since he is not only an agent of the company but 
he is its legal representative (representent legal)82. 
Similar requirements can be found in French law where it is 
provided that a director must have the capacity to be an 
agent (mandataire) that is to say the civil capacity of 
common law (la capacite civile de droit commun)^ and also 
he must not be deprived from the right to manage a company 
by an order of the court or an administrative authority. In 
addition, a person engaged in certain professions such as 
notary, advocate, accountant cannot be a director.84
British law has consistently adopted the attitude that 
directors need have no special qualifications at all for 
office^. That is to say, no qualifications are required 
for a director; subject to this, anyone can be a director. 
There is no educational requirement nor any other test of 
fitness or character.^ Therefore, it is evident that 
directors need have no special qualification and the 
shareholders are entitled to choose whom they wish.
Neville J. in Re Brazilian Rubber Plantation and 
Estates Ltd87 said
"a director is, I think, not bound to bring any
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qualifications to his office. He may undertake the 
management of a rubber company, in complete 
ignorance of everything connected with rubber 
without incurring responsibility for mistakes which 
may result from such ignorance".
The courts defend their liberal attitude by saying 
that if shareholders appoint bad directors, they must take 
the consequences: "It was the misfortune of the company
that they choose such unwise directors."88 However, there 
is a considerable body of opinion which take the view that 
the modern public company director is no longer an amateur 
but has now acquired, and now asserts, a professional 
status together with professional skills®^. Thus it is 
suggested that directors should be made to conform to 
professional standards of care similar to those attached to 
doctors, surgeons, lawyers, accountants and architects 
etc^O. As Mr Arkel (Chairman of the Council of the British 
Institute of Management) stated 91 "'The bridge1 of an 
industrial company is its board of directors." Accordingly, 
it is necessary that directors should comply with certain 
conditions of qualification requirements. These may include 
having formal educational training in business management, 
or have experience in the field, or at least attending 
special courses and training before being appointed to a 
post of directors. It is possible to argue that failures of 
the company is the first clear sign of a director's 
incompetence; this is supported by Mr. Arkel who stated 
that "managing or supervising, the management of the
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company needs intensive training and experience. In
this context, it is worthy to note that French law had 
attempted to some extent to regulate and overcome the 
problem of competence within the management of the company. 
This included some areas and kinds of companies. This was 
reflected in article 596 of "code de la sante publique" 
decree, of October 5*-k, 1953 which provides that in public
companies (societes annonymes) which are engaged in 
preparation or wholesaling medical products (produit 
pharmaceutique) . The president and the majority of members 
of the board (les administrateurs) must be graduates in 
pharmacy. "Dans les societes annonymes de preparation ou de 
vente en gros des produits pharmaceut iques, que le 
president et la majorite des administrateurs aient le 
diplome de pharmacien. However, it has to be
acknowledged that it is quite unreasonable to expect every 
director, especially in a very large company, dealing with 
many transactions and complex affairs to have equal 
knowledge and expertise in every area of corporation 
management. Professor R. Parssons noted that "reassuring 
observation is offered to the effect so long as the law 
ensures that directors1 hearts are pure it may not matter 
that some directors are incompetent"94, for example, in a 
large car manufacturing company, the role and expertise of 
one director may be in mechanical engineering; 
consequently, if a board reaches a decision on corporate 
marketing, the director (engineer) by virtue of his lack of 
knowledge and experience in such an area will be very
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dependent upon his colleague who is well qualified in this 
branch. However this has no impact on qualification 
requirements since the directors in the board act 
collectively. Thus the individual skills and knowledge of 
members collectively constitute a competent and experienced 
board. \
In contrast to British law, French law requires that 
each director must hold an appropriate number of shares in 
the company as fixed by its articles of association 
(statutes). Therefore all directors must be shareholders. 
Hence if a director does not hold the requisite number of 
shares when he is appointed he must acquire them within 
three months or resign^. These qualifying shares are 
designated directors' fidelity shares (actions de guarantie 
des administrateurs)96 and are not merely a qualification 
holding but they constitute a guarantee deposit from which 
the company can reimburse itself in the event of 
mismanagement or negligence by the members of the board of 
management. Accordingly, the stated shares must be 
deposited in the company's treasury and must personally be 
owned by each director, they must be nominal, and not 
bearer shares and must be stamped to indicate that they are 
not transferable.97 The Algerian legislature goes further 
in emphasising the share qualification requirement; this 
can be noted in article 619 of the commercial code 1975 
which provides that "the board of directors must be 
proprietors of a number of shares representing at least 20% 
of the firm's capital. These shares are affected in their
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totality by a guarantee of all the acts of management, even 
of those which would be exclusively personal to one of the 
directors. Furthermore, they are inalienable. In addition, 
auditors shall ensure and be responsible for compliance 
with the provisions of article 619 and must note any 
violation thereof in their report to the annual 
shareholders meeting^®. The legislature substantiates this 
onerous requirement by describing this shares as an 
incentive for encouraging directors in exercising care in 
running the affairs of the company. A drawback is that a 
share qualification may constitute a stumbling block in 
restricting unreasonably the persons best able to take up 
office. Besides, the percentage required usually is so 
small as not to really influence the situation. 
Consequently, the modern tendency, especially in large 
companies, is to exempt directors from the requirement of 
qualification shares. As stated earlier, the Companies Act 
1985 does not require that a director must be a shareholder 
but the articles of association may require it. Section 291 
of the Companies Act 1985 provides that
"It is the duty of every director who is by the 
company's articles required to hold a specified 
share qualification, and who is not already 
qualified, to obtain his qualification within two 
months after his appointment, or such shorter time 
as may be fixed by the articles".
It is quite obvious from this section that share 
qualification is not a mandatory requirement, but it hinges
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on the articles of association of every company. The object 
of requiring directors to hold qualification shares has 
generally been to ensure that directors have a personal 
interest in the company (Archer's C a s e ) 99. Also a director 
need not devote any particular part of his time or his 
continuous attention to the company's business (Re City 
Equitable Fire Insurance CO LTD)10°, although it has been 
suggested a director should attend most board meetings. 
This did not, though, establish liability in cases such as
Re_.D-Unham & Co.101 and The Marquis of Butes case102, and
only one successful case where directors have been held 
liable for non-attendance is reported - Charit a b 1 e 
Corporation v. Sutton • 103 However, as it is known the main 
reason of appointing a director is to ensure the good 
running of the business and to safeguard the company from 
becoming insolvent. This goal would not be attained without
devoting his full time and attention to the day-to-day
management of the company. Thus, a statutory provision
defining the real role of directors could usefully be
introduced in future legislation.
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Chapter Two 
Directors' Powers
Section 1: Legal Nature of Directors1 Powers
Although a company is regarded in all modern company 
laws as a legal person with rights and duties, it cannot 
act for itself as it is an inanimate entity. Thus, all acts 
and transactions that are attributed to it can only be 
performed through the medium of humans who constitute the 
company's living existence and mind. Generally speaking, a 
company acts through its board of directors or through the 
members in general meeting, and these two bodies are 
entitled between themselves to exercise all the powers of 
the company. As Greer LJ in Shaw John & Sons (Salford) Ltd. 
v Shawl stated^: "A company is an entity distinct alike
from its shareholders and its directors. Some of its powers 
may, according to its articles, be exercised by directors, 
certain other powers may be reserved for the shareholders 
in general meeting."
Although the Companies Act does confer some of the 
company's powers on the board and on the general meeting, 
the distribution of powers between the board and the 
general meeting is still unclear. This may be ascertained 
to the fact that there is no specific provision on how the 
company's powers are distributed between these two bodies. 
Indeed, unlike American law and the laws of most European 
countries, British law does not regard certain powers as
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managerial and therefore inalienable by the board.^ The 
division of company powers and functions between its board 
and its shareholders in general meeting is left to be 
prescribed by the company's memorandum or articles of 
association. Theoretically, the general meeting could 
direct the affairs of the company if the constitution of 
the company so provided, but apart from very small 
companies, this would not be very practicable.^  indeed, it 
would be virtually impossible for a company - especially a 
large one - to run its business efficiently if management 
decisions had to be referred to the general meeting for 
approval. Accordingly, the decision-making process involves 
the executive authority of the company to be vested in its 
board of directors whose duty is to ensure that that the 
business is carried on in compliance with the memorandum, 
articles of association and customary business practices. 
As the Jenkins Report noted: "If directors are to manage
their company efficiently they must, within broad limits, 
have a free hand to do what they consider best in the 
interest of the company".5
Thus, in practice, the articles of association of a 
company commonly delegate to its board of directors, by 
article 70 of Table A 1985 or by other similar provision, 
all the powers of the company not required by the Act or by 
the articles to be exercised by the company in general 
meeting. Article 70 of Table A 1985 which is adopted by 
most British companies provides that: "Subject to the
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provisions of the Act, the memorandum, the articles of 
association, the business of the company shall be managed 
by the directors who may exercise all the powers of the 
company”. Once the articles have given the directors full 
powers to manage the company's affairs, the shareholders 
cannot interfere. In other words, if it appears from the 
proper construction of the articles that a particular power 
is vested in the board of directors only, and the board is 
competent and willing to act, the general meeting cannot 
control, interfere with or direct the board regarding the 
exercise of this power. The only way in which the general 
meeting can control the exercise of these powers vested by 
the articles in the board is by altering the articles, or 
by removing or refusing to re-elect the directors whose 
actions they disapprove. This is expressed by Greer LJ in 
Shaw (John) & Sons (Salford) Ltd v. Shaw6:
"...If powers of management are vested in the 
directors, they and they alone can exercise these 
powers. The only way in which the general body of 
the shareholders can control the exercise of the 
powers vested by the articles in the directors is 
by altering their articles, or, if opportunity 
arises under the articles, by refusing to re-elect 
the directors of whose actions they disapprove. 
They cannot themselves usurp the powers which by 
the articles are vested in the directors any more 
than the directors can usurp the powers vested by 
the articles in the general body of the 
shareholders .1
However, although the members cannot treat the 
directors as their agents and overrule them in the exercise
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of their powers, it is quite possible for the articles to 
vest the same powers in members and directors concurrently, 
in which case in the event of a conflict the members' 
decision would generally prevail over that of the directors 
because the members in general meeting are the superior
authority.7
In Algeria as in the United Kingdom, companies are 
administered and governed by directors called 
"administrateurs". They are vested with all the powers
necessary to carry on the business of the company in a
similar manner to the United Kingdom position. The 
supervision of the shareholders always is present and they 
regularly convene in general meetings. Article 622 of the 
Algerian Commercial Code 1975 provides that: "The board of
directors is vested with the most extensive powers to act
under any circumstances in the name of the company; they 
exercise them within the limits of the firm's objectives 
and subject to powers expressly attributed by law to 
shareholders."
"Le conseil d 'administration est investi des 
pouvoirs les plus etendus pour agir en toute 
circonstance au nom de la societe; il les exerce 
dans la limit de l'objet social et sous reserve de 
ceux expressement attribues par la loi aux 
assemblies d ’actionnaires".
From this it appears clearly that company directors 
both in Britain and Algeria enjoy a wide range of powers to 
act on behalf of the company. However, despite these
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extensive powers vested in them, the shareholders in 
general meeting still retain a strong position in the 
company since they have the ultimate control over the board 
and the affairs of the company. They are able at any time 
to remove the directors, and they also have the right to 
alter the articles of association of the company.
Neither the Algerian Commercial Code nor the British 
Companies Act define a director, although section 741(1) 
provides that "The term director1 includes any person 
occupying the position of a director, by whatever name 
called." It follows from that section that a director is 
recognised not by his title but by his function which 
depends on the nature of the company, the provision of the 
articles and the contents of the director's service 
contract - if he has one. A company may describe its 
directors as, for example, 'governors', 'trustees' or 
'council members' without affecting the legal status as 
directors^.
The nature of the legal relationship between a director 
and the company of which he is a director is not defined by 
the Companies Acts and only appears from an analysis of the 
authorities.9 The nature and position of company directors 
has given rise to considerable debate, which was stimulated 
by the need to regulate the conduct of directors by placing 
them into predetermined legal category and apply the rules 
governing that category.^0 This is reflected in the 
different attempts to describe a director's legal status in 
relation to the company. They have been regarded as
56
agents^-, trustees-^ and fiduciaries.
Lord Johnson in McLintock v. C a m p b e l l 1 ^  stated ” the
director’s functions are in one view those of the agent,
and in another those of the trustee. But the former
predominate over the latter." Similarly in Regal (Hastingsl_
v Gulliver^  Lord Russel said: "Directors of a limited
company are the creatures of statute and occupy a position
peculiar to themselves. In some respects they resemble
trustees, in others they do not. In some respects they
resemble agents, in others they do not." In some respects
they resemble managing partners, in others they do not. It
is believed that directors’ powers derive from a fusion of
Common Law and equitable principles of agency and
*
trusteeship which is now the subject matter of an elaborate 
network of Common Law and Statute Law principles.15 it is 
quite common for the articles of association to provide for 
the company's business to be managed by the board so that 
the acts of directors become the acts of the company i.e. 
when acting for the company, a director legally binds it as 
if he were its agent. The logic is that since directors act 
for a corporate body, they must necessarily be agents of 
that body. Certainly the relationship embodies some legal 
characteristics of agency, for example, directors like any 
other agents incur no personal liability on contracts made 
by them on behalf of the company, within the scope of their 
authority.^6 However, there are some peculiarities in the 
relationship between director and company which strain the
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agency analogy. The artificial nature of the principal 
makes it quite difficult to see the normal agency-principal 
relationship between directors and the company. Even 
assuming that shareholders are the principals, the control 
aspect is very difficult to discern, since the directors 
are not necessarily subject to the wishes of the majority 
shareholders. Therefore, as was pointed out in Northern 
Counties-.Securities Ltd. v. Jackson and Steeple Ltd.17 the 
director is "an agent who casts his vote to decide in what 
manner his principal shall act". With his co-directors a 
director controls the activities of his company so his 
powers are greater than those normally accorded to an 
agent.Furthermore, since the directors are given control 
of the company's affairs and property, their position in 
fact exceeds that of ordinary agents. A link with managing 
partners of an unincorporated firm is sometimes stressed:
"It is a fallacy to say that the relation is that 
of simple principal and agent. The person who is 
managing for himself as well as others... I think 
it is more nearly true to say that [directors] are 
in the position of managing partners, appointed to 
fill that post by mutual arrangement between all
the shareholders"^.
This view is supported by Buckley, L.J. in Gramaphone 
and Typewriter Ltd. v. S t a n l e y 2 0 f
"The directors are not servants to obey directions 
given by the shareholders as individuals; they are 
not agents appointed by and bound to serve their 
shareholders as their principals. They are persons 
who may by the regulations be entrusted with the
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control of the business, and if so entrusted, they 
can be dispossessed from that control only by the 
statutory majority which can alter the articles. 
Directors are not, I think, bound to comply with 
the directions even of all the corporators acting 
as individuals".
As in the United Kingdom, the view that directors are 
agents of the company is still popular in some legal 
systems such as Algeria and many European countries which 
followed the earlier French model (French Companies Act 
1867) now replaced in France in 1966.
Directors are to be described as mere agents of the 
company whose powers are governed by the rules of 'mandate' 
(mandat). However, this concept of mandate is not the exact 
equivalent of the British concept of agency. The French 
Civil Code conceives mandate (mandat) as a contract between 
the principal (mandat) and the agent (mandataire) which 
includes the granting of power to the agent- to represent
the principal. Thus, basically the authority of the agent
to bind his principal in dealings with third parties 
depends on the mandate he has received.21 Under Algerian 
Law, a board of directors is regarded as an important organ 
in the company's body, and empowered ex lege to represent 
the company in its transactions according to the provision 
of law, and not merely as mere agents for the shareholders 
with powers limited by a contract of agency, since if he 
exceeds those limits, he loses his status as an agent and
he will not bind the company. This is because a board of
directors in the view of the Algerian legislature is
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regarded as a legal representative (representant legal) of 
the company and its powers are defined and limited by law.
Another view is to describe directors as trustees of 
the company, its money and property, i.e., they hold the 
company's property in their hands or under their control in 
trust for the company. Accordingly, they are required to 
apply such property for the purpose specified by the 
company's constitution and a misapplication of it 
constitutes of breach of trust.22 as Sealy23 pointed out: 
"The concept had its origin in the fact that in the 
earliest companies, the director was a trustee in the full 
technical sense." This is so especially before 1844 when 
most joint stock companies were unincorporated and the 
property was vested in the trustees of the company, who 
were often directors. During the 19^ century the fiduciary 
duties that were imposed on trustees were extended by way 
of analogy by the Chancery Court to include all persons who 
acted in a fiduciary capacity, such as agents, company 
promoters and directors of companies^ who are often 
described by the court as trustees. However, as Professor 
Pennington said:
"This did not mean that other persons who acted as 
representatives really were trustees, but simply 
that fiduciary duties similar, or in some cases, 
identical to those imposed on trustees were 
imposed on them in equity. The description of 
directors as trustees was metaphorical".25
Indeed, the description of directors as trustees
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seems today to be inaccurate and less convincing. For 
example, although the fiduciary duties owed by a 
director and a trustee tend to be identical. Their 
duties of care and skill breaks this analogy since they 
are fundamentally different.2 9 This is the view of Romer 
J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co.27 who said:
"It has sometimes been said that directors are trustees.
If this means no more than that directors in the 
performance of their duties stand in a fiduciary 
relationship to the company the statement is true enough.
But if the statement is meant to be an indication by way 
of analogy of what those duties are, it appears to me to 
be wholly misleading. I can see but little resemblance 
between the duties of a director and the duties of a 
trustee of a will or of a marriage settlement".
Moreover, the theory regarding directors as trustees 
has limited support in the older textbooks and reports, and 
Sealy^Q argues that the description is wrong for three 
reasons:
1- The earliest cases in which directors were held liable 
on trust principles all concerned Corporations. (Charitable 
Corporation v. Sutton, (1742) 2 A t k 400)
2- It is obvious that the directors of a deed of settlement 
company and the trustees of its property were not usually 
the same group of persons. The directors and trustees had 
been treated as distinct working bodies with distinct 
functions .
3- Finally, it would be clear in the early cases of 
directors' obligations if the directors were in fact,
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trustees. But the contrary is indicated; in some cases an 
incorporated body has no trustee at all (Foss v. Harbottle, 
[1843] 2 Hare 416; Aberdeen Rly v. Blaikie.. Bros. [1854] 1
Macq. 461. It is also submitted that directors are really 
only quasi-trustees or fiduciaries. This is because:
1- The company's money is not vested in them but in the 
company (a trustee is the owner of the property and deals
with it as principal, as owner, and as master).
2- Their duties of care are not as onerous as those of 
trustees.
3- Their functions are not the same as those of trustees. 
Despite the fact that similarities can be found between 
directors and trustees there remain a number of 
differences. A main area of resemblance lies in the 
property concept, where directors and trustees each control 
a fund in which others are beneficially interested. 
However, this analogy breaks down, as ownership or property 
of the company is vested in the company, as a legal person 
and not in the directors themselves as in trusteeship. In 
addition the ordinary rules applicable to trustees do not 
affect d i r e c t o r s . 29 j n  Smith v. A n d e r s o n ^O James, L.J 
clarified this difference by saying:
"A Trustee is a man who is the owner of the
property and deals with it as principal, as owner, 
and as master subject only to an equitable 
obligation to account to some persons to whom he 
stands in the relation of trustee... The office of 
a director is that of a paid servant of the
company. A director never enters into a contract 
for himself, but enters into contracts for his
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principal, that is, for the company of whom he is
a director and for whom he is acting. He cannot
sue on such contracts nor be sued on them unless 
he exceeds his authority."
An appropriate description is that of Professor Lindgren^l 
who observes that "Analysis of the theoretical status of 
directors demonstrates that they are not properly 
classified either as agents or trustees but are sui 
generis ....like the shareholders in general meeting, it 
(the board of directors) is a constitutional organ of the 
body corporate."
The main reason behind the definition of the true
position of directors is that to understand the nature of
their legal powers and duties and consequently the rules 
applicable to them. Indeed, as Sir George Jessel^ mr put 
it:
"...It does not much matter what you call them as 
long as you understand what their true position 
is, which is really that they are commercial men 
managing a trading concern for the benefit of 
themselves and of all the other shareholders.... 
They are bound to use fair and reasonable 
diligence in the management of their company's 
affairs, and act honestly."
Section 2: Scope.,, of the Directors Powers
It is quite common for modern company law to lay down a 
number of regulations or sections to grant to the directors 
all powers except those which are reserved by the Act or 
regulations to the shareholders in the general meeting. A 
norm for such provisions are to be found in both British
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and Algerian law.
Article 622 of the Algerian Commercial Code, 1975 
provides that "the board of directors is invested with the 
most extensive powers to act under any circumstances in the 
name of the company; they exercise them within the limits 
of the firm's objectives and subject to the powers 
expressly attributed by law to the shareholders' 
meeting"33. Article 70 of Table A stipulates: "Subject to
the provisions of the Act, the Memorandum and the Articles
and to any directions given by special resolution, the 
business of the company shall be managed by the directors 
who may exercise all the powers of the company". This 
provision replaces article 80 of 1948 table A.
It is clear from the above articles that the board of
directors can exercise any of the powers of the company 
which have not been vested in the shareholders either by 
the Act, the Articles, or a resolution in general meeting. 
However these delegated powers must be exercised by 
directors acting collectively (not individually as in the 
case of partners). It follows that prima facie neither an 
individual director or any group of directors has any 
powers conferred on him or them, and seems that in the 
absence of an express authorisation in the articles or 
other appropriate constitutional document the board will 
have no power to delegate such powers^ . The reason for 
this is that when they act jointly, viz, as a board, they 
clearly constitute one of the primary organs of the company 
whose powers are expressly defined in the companies
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constitution, i.e, in its Memorandum and Articles of 
Association. Besides, the virtue of acting collectively is 
to benefit the company of their combined wisdom and 
experience^ . As a result of this, decisions of the 
directors must be taken at a meeting properly convened and 
held. However, since commercial life requires greater 
flexibility and simplicity in its procedures because of the 
great importance of time for dealing in their transactions 
such as buying and selling shares or lending or borrowing 
money with interest. Such matters therefore may not be 
decided on as quickly as commercial matters may require if 
any decision upon them involves a directors meeting. Hence, 
it is customary for the Articles of Association to allow a 
resolution in writing signed by all the directors, or all 
the directors resident in the United Kingdom, to be 
effective without a meeting (article 93). Moreover, the 
Articles usually authorise the directors to delegate any of 
their powers to the committee of directors (article 72) and 
to appoint one or more of their body to act as managing 
director (article 72). But as D. G. Rice pointed out: "The 
extent which an agent can bind a company has always been 
hedged about with uncertainty and doubt, particularly so 
where its directors - its principal executive agents - are 
in way concerned"^.
The position is simplest and clearest where directors 
act jointly as a board, since this organ can commit the 
company in respect of any matter. On the face of it when
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any individual director purports to act or to enter into a 
transaction on behalf of the company, questions may arise 
regarding the extent and the degree of authority vested in 
him by the board. Nevertheless, where a director has 
validly been given express authority to enter into a 
contract on behalf of the company, the latter will be bound 
and no difficulty will arise at all. However, the authority 
that can be vested in the director in dealing with third 
parties on behalf of the company is not always clearly set 
out in writing in its constitution i.e the Memorandum and 
Articles of Association. That is to say that the director’s 
power is not always express. In fact a director's authority 
may be actual, apparent, or deemed. (The latter is 
envisaged by the Companies Act 1985, s.35).
2.1.- Actual authority: was described by Diplock L.J. in
Ereeman L L.ctc.Lye.r. v. Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal)
Ltd.37 as follows:
"An actual authority is a legal relationship between 
principal and agent created by a consensual agreement to 
which they alone are parties. Its scope is to be 
ascertained by applying ordinary principles of 
construction of contracts, including any proper 
implications from the express words used, the usages of 
trade, or the course of business between the parties. To 
this agreement the contractor is a stranger; he may be 
totally ignorant of the existence of any authority on the 
part of the agent. Nevertheless, if the agent does enter 
into a contract pursuant to the "actual" authority, it 
does create contractual rights and liabilities between the 
principal and the contractor."
66
Thus, if the director acts as the company's agent and
within the scope of his actual authority, the company will
find itself legally bound to a third party who enters into
a transaction. Furthermore, this actual authority may be
express or implied authority. It is express when it is put
in words, written or otherwise. This means an explicit
conferring of authority on a director. For example in the
Articles^®. As Lord Denning MR described it 3 9 "it is
express when it is given by express words, such as when a
board of directors pass a resolution which authorises two
of their number to sign cheques." The main source of these
express powers are: the Articles of Association,
resolutions of board of directors and to some extent the
main Acts or Statutes that regulate commercial 
3 9(a)companies. v ; However, the latter are usually rather 
vague and tend to describe the directors' powers within the 
corporation in regard to internal matters with less 
clarification to their authority when dealing with third 
parties. It is worth mentioning that it must not be assumed 
that everything is ultra vires if it is not expressly 
written in the company's constitution. Indeed, without such 
wording of powers, a director may be fully vested with 
appropriate authority to act on behalf of his/her company. 
This is known as implied authority (inherent or presumptive 
authority). It is not expressed in Statutes, Articles of 
Association, or board resolutions but it is derived from 
the position which the individual holds. If for example, he 
is appointed managing director, then implied authority will
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vest him with the usual authority of a managing director. 
As Lord Denning MR pointed out in Hely Hutchinson v. 
Brayhead Ltd.40:
"It is implied when it is inferred from the 
conduct of the parties and the circumstances of 
the case, such as when the board of directors 
appoint one of their number to be managing 
director. They thereby impliedly authorise him to 
do such things as fall within the usual scope of 
that office".
However, it is submitted that the director's office or 
position is not the only way to prove the implied authority 
to be vested in the director.
2.2.- Apparent Authority: Although if a director has no 
actual authority, either express or implied he may appear 
to third parties to have authority. For example, a director 
can bind the company in a transaction which would normally 
be within the power of a director of his type, even if his 
powers have been restricted by the articles or the board. 
Thus, a third party can assume that a properly appointed 
managing director has been delegated all the normal powers. 
In dKreditbank Cassel GmbH v. Shenkers41 Atkin LJ said:
"If you are dealing with a director in a matter in 
which normally a director would have power to act 
for the company, you are not obliged to inquire 
whether or not the formalities required by the 
articles have been complied with before he 
exercises that power". 2^
68
Similarly, a dir.ector 'held out1 by the company as 
being the managing director can bind the company even if he 
has not been formally appointed. In Freeman and Lockyer v 
Brockhurst Park Properties (Manaal) Ltd 43, the articles 
contained a power to appoint a managing director, although 
no appointment was made. The board allowed one of the 
directors to undertake the management of the company, in 
the course of which he engaged a firm of architects. The 
company subsequently refused to pay the architects' bill, 
on the grounds that the individual director had exceeded 
his authority. The Court of Appeal held that the company 
was bound by the contract since the director's act in 
engaging the plaintiffs was within the ordinary ambit of 
the authority of a managing director and the plaintiffs did 
not have to inquire whether he was properly appointed, it 
was sufficient for them that under the articles of 
association there was in fact power to appoint him as such 
and accordingly the defendant company were liable for the 
plaintiffs' fees. In the words of W i l l m e r  L J 4 4 ;
"In the present case the plaintiffs do not have 
to rely on the articles of association of the 
defendant company in order to establish their 
claim. They are thus not caught by the ratio of 
the decision in Houghton's Case4 5. The plaintiffs 
here rely on the fact that [K] , to the knowledge 
of the defendant company's board, was acting 
throughout as managing director, and was therefore 
being held out by the board as such. The act of 
[K] in engaging the plaintiffs was clearly one 
within the ordinary ambit of the authority of a 
managing director."
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Thus, it is clear that by applying the doctrine of 
ostensible authority the company is no less bound than it 
would have been had the authority been express. The 
definition of the term 'apparent1 or 'ostensible' authority 
was expressed by Diplock LJ in Freeman's Case as follows:
"An 'apparent' or 'ostensible' authority, is a 
legal relationship between the principal and the 
contractor created by a representation, made by the 
principal to the contractor, intended to be and in 
fact acted upon by the contractor, that the agent has 
authority to enter on behalf of the principal into a 
contract of a kind within the scope of the 'apparent' 
authority, so as to render the principal liable to 
perform any obligations imposed upon him by such 
contract. To the relationship so created the agent is 
a stranger. He need not be (although he generally is) 
aware of the existence of the representation but he 
must not purport to make the agreement as principal 
himself. The representation, when acted upon by the 
contractor by entering into a contract with the agent, 
operates as an estoppel, preventing the principal from 
asserting that he is not bound by the contract. It is 
irrelevant whether the agent had actual authority to 
enter into the contract".
According to Lord Justice Diplock's analysis before 
any company may be held liable or bound by the acts of an 
agent who had no actual authority, four conditions must be 
available:
a- A representation must be made to the contractor that the 
agent had the authority to enter on behalf of the company 
into a contract of the kind sought to be enforced; 
b- That representation must be made by a person or persons
70
who had actual authority to manage the company's business, 
either generally or in respect of those matters to which 
the contract relates;
c- The contractor relied upon this representation; 
d- Finally, a company was not deprived of its capacity, 
i.e, no limitation on the company's Memorandum or Articles 
of Association making the contract ultra vires or 
prohibiting the delegation of authority to enter into a 
contract of that kind to the agent^.
Apparent authority of a director, or any corporate agent 
may be determined from all the facts and circumstances of 
the case. It was held in an American case^ that:
/
"The principal's manifestations giving rise to 
apparent authority may consist of direct statements 
to the third person, directions to the agent to 
tell something to the third person or the granting 
of permission to the agent to perform acts and 
conduct negotiations under circumstances which 
create in him a reputation of authority in the area 
in which the agent acts and negotiates".
Sometimes the term apparent authority seems to be 
ambiguous and gives rise to confusion with implied 
authority. However, it is believed that the two concepts 
are clearly distinct. Apparent or ostensible authority, as 
it is sometimes called, is not really authority at all. As 
Professor Montrose put it^8 "Apparent authority is really 
equivalent to the phrase "appearance of authority". There 
may be an appearance of authority whether in fact or not 
there is authority." It is also submitted that the actual
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authority, unless the language explicitly points to the 
contrary, is confined to acts done for the benefit of the 
principal.^9 Thus, if an agent does an act which is within 
the class of acts set out in the actual authority, it is 
nevertheless not within the actual authority unless done 
for the principal's benefit.50
As far as apparent authority is concerned, if an act is 
within the class of acts to which the apparent authority 
extends, it is within the apparent authority, and binds the 
principal, whether or not done for the principal's 
benefit^, if the directors exercise the above powers 
(express or apparent) bona fide and in the benefit of the 
company as a whole, the company will be bound by their 
acts.
After highlighting the different extensive powers and 
authority that are enjoyed by the directors and agents of 
the company, it should be noted that those powers are not 
absolute or limitless, but they are subject to a number of 
rules and regulations under which they (powers) must be 
exercised. As has already been noted in the previous 
section, the first fiduciary duty imposed on directors is 
that not to exceed the powers and authority lawfully 
conferred upon them. Otherwise they will be liable to 
compensate for any damage suffered by the company in 
consequence. For example, directors who make ultra vires 
payments are liable to make good the loss to the company 
52. Indeed, to bind a company it is not enough that an act 
is within the powers of the company under the statutes, the
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Memorandum and Articles , but it also has to be within the 
scope of authority of the person who performed the act. 
Hence, it is believed that in order to bind the company to 
an act, the act should first be within the capacity of the 
company. Otherwise, the company cannot be bound since it 
lacks the legal capacity to incur responsibility for it. It 
is quite clear that a company registered under the 
Companies Act 1985 does not have the capacity of a natural 
person, but is limited to carrying out the purposes that 
are set out in the objects clause of its constitution^. in 
other words, the company's capacity is determined by its 
objects stated in its Memorandum (constitution). For the 
Companies Acts requires a company on its incorporation to 
specify its objects^ . Lord Cairns said in Ashbury Rlv 
Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche^5 : » The Memorandum of
Association is, as it were, the area beyond which the 
action of the company cannot go. " It follows that the 
statement of the company's objects is of a considerable 
importance. As pointed out by Lord Parker of Waddington in 
Cottman v . Brougham^6:
"The truth is that the statement of a company’s 
objects in its Memorandum is intended to serve a 
double purpose. In the first place it gives 
protection to subscribers who learn from it the 
purposes to which their money can be applied. In 
the second place, it gives protection to persons 
who deal with the company, and who can infer from 
it the extent of the company's powers. The narrower 
the objects expressed in the memorandum, the less 
is the subscribers' risk, but the wider such
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objects, the greater is the security for those who
transact business with the company.1
Hence the objects clause in the memorandum defines the 
extent of a company's capacity, and therefore, transactions 
entered into which do not fall within the scope of a 
company's express objects or powers, or which are not 
reasonably incidental thereto, are ultra vires the 
company. As Buckly J said^7; "A corporation cannot do 
anything except for the purposes of its business.... 
everything else is beyond its power and is ultra vires.1' 
Such transactions are void and cannot be ratified by 
shareholders.
As stated earlier, in Algeria as in Britain, directors 
of companies (les administrateurs) are vested with all 
necessary powers to carry on the business of the company. 
Their powers are only restricted where there is an express 
provision in the statutes (statuts) for the general meeting 
to authorise a particular transaction. However, an 
important difference can be noticed between Algerian law 
and British law in respect of powers which can be exercised 
by directors. In Britain, those powers are restricted to 
the objects stated in the Memorandum of Association (e.g 
the funds of the company can only applied in carrying out 
its authorised objects) . Everything that does not come 
within the objects or reasonably incidental thereto, is 
ultra vires the company and cannot be ratified even by 
every member in general meeting^. Conversely, any act 
ultra vires the director but intra vires the company,
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is regarded as invalid, unless and until it is ratified by 
the shareholders. On the other hand, such a limitation on 
the powers of directors does not exist in Algeria and 
France since the company there is regarded as having the 
same legal capacity as any individual being. This is due to 
the adoption of the notion of juristic personality. 
Therefore no contract can be deemed void just because it is 
outside the scope of objects stated in the articles of 
association. Indeed, directors can be held liable for 
mismanagement, but there is no question as to the validity 
of the contract as such. It will bind the company unless it 
has been specifically stated in the articles of association 
that it was beyond the powers of directors to so bind the 
company in that way. Clearly, it can be said that some 
contracts may be ultra vires the powers of directors and need to be 
ratified by the general meeting of the shareholders but they can 
never be ultra vires the company.
It is widely recognised that the ultra vires doctrine 
is a special aspect of the British system of law and 
creates a fundamental difference between the British and 
the continental conception of juristic personality^.
The original attraction of the ultra vires rule was 
that by limiting the powers of the company itself the 
shareholders could limit the powers of the directors and 
ensure that the company engaged only in the activities for 
which it was set up 60 anci it is also believed that the 
rule protect the shareholders of the company so that they
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know the objects in which their money is to be employed; 
and to protect creditors by ensuring that the company’s 
funds are not dissipated in unauthorised activities^!.
A short definition of the doctrine of ultra vires is 
given in G o w e r 6 2  which states:
"A company which owes its incorporation to 
statutory authority cannot effectively do anything 
beyond the powers expressly or impliedly conferred 
upon it by its statute or memorandum of Association 
- any purported activity in excess will be 
ineffective even if agreed to by all members."
The strict sense of ultra vires means the acts done 
beyond the powers of the company. In the case of registered 
companies this means acts outside the scope of the objects 
of the company set forth in the 'objects clause' of its 
memorandum of association^. However, the expression ultra 
vires is used in many different contexts. It is sometimes 
used to describe acts which are not beyond the capacity of 
the company, but simply beyond the powers of the directors 
or a simple majority of the shareholders64 . The term is 
also used in its wider sense to describe transactions 
which, although within the scope of the powers of the 
company, are entered into for unauthorised purpose, or they 
are illegal as being prevented by the provisions of the 
Companies Acts. However, it is submitted that the term 
ultra vires should be used only in its strict sense and 
other uses are to be avoided since they can cause confusion 
between the principle of ultra vires and other distinct 
legal principles 65# as an established rule at common law
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any act beyond the company's powers is void and directors 
who engage in ultra vires transactions may become liable 
either to third party who enters into a void contract or to 
their company for breach of their duty to it. Furthermore, 
as agents of the company the directors who induce the other 
party to enter into a contract beyond the capacity of the 
company, may be liable for breach of warranty of authority 
■6 6 . As against the company "an ultra vires agreement 
cannot become intra vires by reason of estoppel, lapse of 
time, ratification, acquiescence or d e l a y " 6 7 # jn Ashbury 
Rly Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche 68 a case which was 
concerned with the contract to purchase a concession for 
making a railway in Belgium, it was held that the contract 
was ultra vires the company and void so that not even the 
subsequent assent of the whole body of shareholders could 
ratify it. However, even though the ultra vires 
transaction cannot be enforced the other party may use 
certain consequential remedies either against the company 
or against the directors or others. For example, when a 
loan is ultra vires (but not illegal) the guarantor of 
the company's obligation may be sued on this contract of 
guarantee even though the principal obligation is void^. 
It is suggested that a distinction must be made between 
contracts which are ultra vires a company and contracts 
which are intra vires and within the director's powers but 
entered into for an improper purpose. In the latter case, 
the transaction will be invalid only against an outsider
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who has actual knowledge of that purpose^Q.. The reason is 
because the company has the capacity and the fault lies not 
in the absence of power but in the use of power^ . In 
contrast, an ultra vires contract is void at its 
b e g i n n i n g " ^  since the company has no power or capacity at 
all. Consequently the transaction will be void irrespective 
of knowledge. This is pointed out by Vaughan Williams LJ in
Re David Payne & Co. Ltd. [1904] 2 Ch. 608, "The question
of knowledge would be absolutely immaterial if the 
transaction was void in the sense that nothing could put it 
right”. It is therefore submitted that a transaction made 
under an express power for some purpose outside the scope 
of the company's authorised activities should not be 
considered to fall within the ultra vires doctrine as 
generally understood.
Although such transactions will, where the outsider has 
knowledge of the purpose, be treated by the courts in the 
same way as a 'true' ultra vires contract, their 
invalidity arises from a different cause.^3
The main justification of the ultra vires rule is 
that the third party knows or has the opportunity of 
knowing that the act done on behalf of the company is 
ultra vires the company. In order to achieve this result 
the 1985 Companies Act provided that the Memorandum of the 
company must state the objects of the company^, and must 
be delivered to the registrar of c o m p a n i e s * ^ .  Hence, the 
constructive notice principle is regarded as an assumption 
of the law which provides that third parties dealing with a
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company are deemed to have notice of the company's objects 
and certain other public documents concerning the company, 
in particular special resolutions. ^ 6 The main grounds for 
this principle is that the company has disclosed its 
memorandum. This is a judge made rule deduced from the 
requirement of registration and the right to public 
inspection. It is submitted that this doctrine operates to 
cut down the authority which an outsider might otherwise 
think a director possesses. It does not, however, operate 
as a positive doctrine. Thus when a transaction is an 
unusual one, the outsider cannot rely on the doctrine in 
order to bind the company even though the transaction in 
question might have been authorised by the articles.77 The 
harshness of this doctrine is, however, mitigated by the 
rule in Turquand's Case. T h i s  rule is designed to protect 
"outsiders dealing with the seemingly authorised agents of 
the company"^9 by providing that such outsiders are not 
required to inquire into the internal proceedings of the 
company but can assume that all has been properly complied 
with. Lord Hatherly pointed out in Mahony v. Liquidator of 
East Holyford Mining Co . 80
"...When there are persons conducting the affairs 
of the company in a manner which appears to be 
perfectly consonant with the articles of 
association then those dealing with them, 
externally, are not to be affected by any 
irregularities which may take place in the internal 
management of the company".
Prior to the 1972 Act the powers of the company's
79
officers to bind it were subject to the rule (Royal British 
Bank v. Turquand which can be summarised as follows:
1- A company will be bound to acts done by its officers if:
a- The act appears to be in accordance with the 
memorandum, articles of association and other public 
documents, even if certain internal regulations which ought 
to be complied with as regards the exercise and delegation 
of authority were not complied with.81
b- A document purported to be sealed by or signed on 
behalf of the company was held out as genuine by an officer 
acting within his actual, usual or apparent authority. 82 
Of similar effect but based on agency rather than 
Turquand as strictly applied is:
c- An act, though outside the scope of authority, was done 
by an officer who is or is held out by the company as a 
particular type of officer who usually has the power to do 
such an act. Further, even if this particular type of 
officer does not usually have the power to do such an act, 
a company is still bound if it held the officer out as 
having such authority by an officer acting within his 
actual, usual, or apparent authority.
2_ A— company— will not bs bound to acts done by its
officers if:
a- The act is contrary to the memorandum or articles of 
association or to any other public document 83e
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b- The act is contrary to other documents and the internal 
regulations of the company (not public documents) and the 
person dealing with the company knows, or because of 
suspicious circumstances was bound to inquire, that the act 
is contrary to other documents and internal regulations, 
c- The act was done by an officer who is, or is held out by 
the company as a particular type of officer and the person 
dealing with the company knows, or because of suspicious 
circumstances was bound to inquire^, that the officer had 
not been appointed as that particular type of officer, or 
that he had no actual authority to do such an act. 
d- A document purporting to be sealed or signed on behalf 
of the company, by an officer who did not have actual, 
usual, or apparent authority, is proved to be a f o r g e r y ^ .  
It is believed that British law is well in advance of other 
legal systems in providing the protection of third parties 
afforded by the rule in Royal British Bank v. Turquand86. 
The latter has been regarded as the most efficient rule of 
company law for ensuring that persons dealing with the 
company are fairly treated by producing common sense 
solutions and reducing the negative effects and the 
injustices worked by the ultra vires rule87 which is 
described as one of the most controversial rules of Company 
Law. 88
There appears to be a general agreement, that a strict 
application of ultra vires rule may constitute a stumbling 
block in conducting business with a company. Consequently, 
the doctrine has been eroded in modern company law,
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particularly in favour of third parties dealing with the 
company in good faith. Furthermore, it can be noticed 
nowadays that objects clauses are usually drafted in such 
wide terms that enable the company to engage in any 
activity it might conceivably want®9. All this has led to a 
suggestion that the ultra vires is no longer desirable and 
should be abolished so as to give companies all the powers 
of a natural person.
As early as 1945 the Cohen Committee commented that the 
doctrine served "no positive purpose" and was a cause of 
unnecessary prolixity and vexation"90. Professor Gower also 
expressed the view that the doctrine had become "...merely 
a trap for the unwary third party and a nuisance to the 
company itself". 91 Similarly, in a recent report^, pr 
Prentice suggested that the doctrine should be totally 
abolished, and a company should have capacity to do any act 
whatsoever. He concluded that the doctrine as it now 
stands: "...imposes an unnecessary burden on companies and 
those with whom they deal without there being any 
compensatory advantages." In addition to the abolition of 
the ultra vires rule, Dr Prentice has recommended that the 
concept of constructive notice insofar as it relates to the 
memorandum and the articles of association should also be 
abrogated:
"A fully effective abrogation of the doctrine of 
ultra vires must obviously go hand in hand with 
the repeal of the doctrine of constructive notice. 
Otherwise, the effects of the doctrine of ultra 
vires could be achieved indirectly by inserting in
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a company’s articles limitations on the authority
of a company's organ or agent to bind the
company".93
In spite of a number of critics, suggestions and 
recommendations, the ultra vires rule (doctrine) is still 
in existence. However, although not abolished, it was 
limited by article 9 (1) of the European Communities Act
1972 which is now equivalent to section 35 of the Companies 
Act 1985 which in turn has been replaced by new sections of 
the Companies Act 1989, (part v ss 108-112) . The original
provisions provide as follows:
1- In favour of a person dealing with a company in good 
faith, any transaction decided upon by the directors is 
deemed to be one which it is within the capacity of the 
company to enter into, and the power of the directors to 
bind the company is deemed to be free of any limitation 
under the Memorandum or Articles of Association.
2- A party to transaction so decided on is not bound to 
enquire as to the capacity of the company to enter into or 
as to any such limitation on the powers of the directors, 
and is presumed to have acted in good faith unless the 
contrary is proved.
It is clear that this provision does not abolish the 
ultra vires doctrine but it modifies it in favour of third 
parties dealing with a company in good faith. In other 
words, it does not render an ultra vires contract intra 
vires the company but simply enables a person dealing with 
a company to enforce an ultra virescontract. The provision
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also applies to the situation where, even though the 
transaction is intra vires, the directors themselves lack 
authority to enter into it^4 . in addition, section 35 
abolishes the doctrine of constructive notice in so far as 
it relates to transactions entered into by the board of 
directors.95 However, it is submitted that section 35 by 
its wording could give rise to a number of important legal 
issues that have to be clarified. For example it would seem 
that by its wording that the scope of section 35 concerns 
only "transactions decided on by the directors" and 
therefore does not apply to transaction entered into by a 
managing director on behalf of the company unless it is a 
transaction that has also been "decided on by the 
directors"^. This will also be the case when a transaction 
is entered into by the company's other directors and 
officers as individuals or indeed by a committee of the 
board.^ Furthermore, there have been difficulties in 
deciding whether section 35 or its predecessor covers 
gratuitous transactions^® . Thus as Collier^ noted, 
although section 35 gives some protection to persons 
dealing with the company, it still does not answer some 
important questions such as the exact meaning of the phrase 
"good faith", does it include someone who has been put on 
inquiry ? Who exactly is a "person dealing with a company"; 
Does it include a member? When is a transaction "decided 
upon by directors" and when is it not?
However, it seems that the British legislature has
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realised the importance of the above points and the 
necessity of providing a clear interpretation of section 
35. This is embodied in the very recent Companies Act 1989 
under which a number of amendments are made. Unlike the 
former section 35 the phrase " decided on by the directors 
" is no longer found. The new section 35(1) states that 11 
The validity of an act done by a company shall not be 
called into question on the ground of lack of capacity by 
reason of anything in the company's memorandum." However, 
according to section 35(2) a member of the company may 
still bring an action to restrain the doing of an act 
which, but for s.35(l), would be beyond the company's 
capacity. Section 35(3) preserves the duty of directors to 
observe any limitations on their powers as a result of 
limitations placed in the company's memorandum.
An action by the directors which, but for s. 35(1) would 
be beyond the company's capacity may only be ratified by 
the company by special resolution. A resolution which 
ratifies such action does not affect any liability incurred 
by the directors or any other person, but a further special 
resolution is necessary to relieve directors from personal 
liability.
The power of directors to act on behalf of the company 
has now been clarified by section 35 A of the Companies Act 
1989 which expressly states that: "In favour of a person
dealing with a company in good faith, the power of the 
board of the directors to bind the company, or authorise 
others to do so, shall be deemed to be free of any
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limitation under the company's constitution". This section 
makes it clear, that when the directors delegate their 
authority, for example to managing director, then decisions 
taken by the managing director are in fact decisions by the 
board of directors. In addition, section 35 A (2) gives a 
wide interpretation to the word "dealing". It now includes 
a transaction or other act to which the company is a party. 
Thus, the doubts about (as to) whether gratuitous promises 
was a transaction for the purpose of section 35 is removed, 
and gratuitous promises may now be covered, and a 
beneficiary may be able to rely on section 35 A. Finally, 
section 35 A (2) makes it clear that knowledge that the 
directors are acting beyond their powers does not 
necessarily imply bad faith. "A person shall not be 
regarded as acting in bad faith by reason only of his 
knowing that an act is beyond the powers of the directors 
under the company's constitution". The position therefore 
will be when the recent reforms, following Dr Prentice's 
recommendations are brought into force into the Companies 
Act 1989:
Any challenge to the companies capacity by the contents 
of its memorandum is prevented. However, a member has the 
right to prevent the company acting out with the 
memorandum, but cannot (1) restrain an act done in 
implementation of a prior contract which would otherwise be 
ultra vires or (2 ) which has been ratified by a special 
resolution (Companies Act 1985, s.35 (1) (2) .
The board, or any person authorised by it, is freed
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from any restriction which is contained in the memorandum 
or articles on their powers to bind the company. This is 
only in favour of a person dealing with the company and 
acting in good faith. Mere knowledge of the restriction 
does not of itself create bad faith. (Companies Act 1985 
s.35 A (1) (2)
A similar right to restrain such unauthorised acts is 
given to the members, but here ratification can be given by 
ordinary resolution to validate the transaction but a 
special resolution is required to free the directors from 
liability for their breach of duty.
Linked to this is s. 711 A of the 1985 Act (inserted by 
s,142 of the 1989 Act) which attempts to abolish the 
constructive notice rule, although s711 A (2) may create so 
much uncertainty as to make the attempt ineffectual.
Finally, directors of the company or any holding 
company including any person connected with that director 
is subject to s.322 A of the 1985 Act. That section makes 
any transaction carried out in excess of the board's 
authority with such a person voidable at the instance of 
the company, irrespective of its avoidance the person in 
question is liable to account for any gain or compensate 
for any loss. Again, conditions apply which (1) prevent ratification, 
(by special resolution if the directors liability is to be 
cancelled) or (2) exclude avoidance on the grounds: restitution is 
impossible; indemnity against loss is given; or bona fide third 
party rights have been acquired on the property.
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Section 3: - Sources of Directors1 Powers.
Although the recent years have witnessed a great deal 
of discussion and analysis on the subject of managerial 
powers by company lawyers and academics in most legal 
systems of the world, the source of these powers is still 
unclear and ambiguous. Despite the importance of this legal 
issue, little work has been done on it. Therefore, it would 
be worthwhile at this stage to annalyse the source from 
which the directors' powers derive. This necessarily 
involves throwing light on a number of different legal 
theories and views regarding the source of directors' 
powers.
There are three views which attempt to explain the 
source of directors' powers. The first view submits that 
the powers of management are conferred on directors by the 
company; the second view believes that the 'purpose' (objet 
social) is the basis and the main source of powers since 
these powers are vested in directors mainly to enable them 
to attain the company's objects and can never be used for 
any other purpose beyond the company's objects. The third 
view is that the nature of the director's function implies 
these powers, the origin being legal not conventional.^00
3.1.- Shareholders SS a source of power
There is a considerable body of opinion which suggests 
that directors derive their managerial powers from the 
shareholders, i.e they posses their powers by virtue of
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the general delegation made by the collective body of 
shareholders. This is based on the number of statutory 
rights and powers that can be exercised by the company in 
general meeting.
Indeed, by examining these powers we can clearly see 
that the Companies Act confers exclusive control on the 
general meeting. It is also submitted that "the directors1 
powers of management are derived from the shareholders' 
right to manage their company's affairs, and therefore to 
be found in the company's articles. The extent of the power 
to manage is therefore a question of construction.^0^
It is well recognised that the general meeting, more 
than any organ or officer of a company, holds a very 
powerful position. In fact, up to the nineteenth century 
the courts' attitude was that the general meeting was the 
company!02# Furthermore, in theory, although not in 
practice, it is regarded as a supreme body in the company. 
Under the Companies Acts^-03 the shareholders in general 
meeting are empowered to choose and appoint directors to 
manage the company. In like manner they are vested with the 
power to remove directors from office at any time by an 
ordinary resolution requiring special notice. The
shareholders in general meeting own the company, determine 
what its constitution shall be. One of the most important 
statutory powers of the shareholders is that the power to 
alter the Memorandum and Articles of Association that is 
provided by section 9(1) of the Companies Act 1985. 
"Subject to the provision of this Act and the conditions
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contained in its Memorandum, a company may, by special 
resolution, alter its articles." This quotation of powers 
is reinforced by their right to ratify directors actions 
and to relief them from breach of duty.
The same section can be found in the Algerian 
Commercial Code 1975, article 641 provides "The 
extraordinary general meeting of shareholders alone has the 
power to amend any of the provisions of the statutes 
(statuts) ; any clause to the contrary shall be of no 
effect".
0
It is indeed an important power. It provides the 
shareholders with different channels to exercise their 
control on directors' functions. For example, by altering 
or adding to the Articles, the general meeting can delegate 
the company's powers to the persons they choose. They are 
also able to make changes to the scope of powers that may 
be exercised by the company for example by widening the 
extent of the directors' powers or imposing certain 
limitations to restrict them [e.g. to make some changes to 
the company's objects]. Moreover, it enables the 
shareholders to control the means that determines who 
should exercise the powers of the company and control the 
manner in which such powers must be exercised. From the 
fact that directors are legally required to act within the 
company’s objects and exercise their powers in accordance 
to them, it can be said that their powers are subject to 
the shareholders' will, since the company's objects are 
fixed and can be altered by them.
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The French authors of the nineteenth century went 
further. They argued that the contract of mandate (le 
contrat de mandat) concluded between the director 
(representant) and the shareholders (associes) constituted 
the source and legal foundation of the directors' powers. 
The same position can be found under Algerian law, for 
example in societe a responsabilite limitee, the Algerian 
Company Law expressly confers on the shareholders the right 
to fix the extent of the powers of the mangers (gerants). 
Article 577(1) "In relation between shareholders, the 
powers of the mangers are determined by the statutes; where 
the statutes are silent, they are determined by article 
554".
"Dans les rapports entre associes, les pouvoirs 
des gerants sont determines par les status, et dans 
le silence de ceux-ci, par 1'article 554".
In addition, some of the directors acts are subject to 
prior approval of the shareholder, such as creating 
mortgages which exceeds a certain amount of money fixed by 
the company. This emphasises clearly the extent of the 
shareholders authority over directors.
3.2.- Company ' S object (obiet social) as a source
 powers.
Although directors' function (functional theory) 
stipulates the vestment of directors with a wide range of 
powers to act on behalf of the company, i.e. directors are
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vested with extensive powers by virtue of their function, 
it is quite clear, however, that their function is to run 
the day-to-day management of the company's business, and 
the main reason (cause) of this attribution of powers is to 
realise the company's objects (objet social) for which the 
company is incorporated, since the latter is the raison 
d'etre of the company, i.e. the main reason of the 
directors company's existence, and shareholders' 
unification. Indeed, even the scope of the directors' 
powers as stated in the previous section is limited by the 
company's objects. Thus, as Jean Paillussea^-^^ pointed out: 
"The object of the company (objet social) command the 
attribution of powers to the organs of management". 
Therefore, it may be said that the company’s object is the 
source of directors' powers.
3.3.- Functional Theory (directors function as_a
source of powers) :
In spite of the arguments stated above, supporters of 
the 'functional' theory reject the idea of shareholders as 
a source of directors' powers. They argue that "it is wrong 
to say that directors (representants) receive these powers 
by a voluntary concession of the shareholders since this 
function itself supposes the existence of the powers."107 
Clearly from this view the origin of power is rather legal 
than contractual. For example, in America the powers were 
considered original, and "derivative" only in the sense of
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being received from the state in the act of incorporation
(Hoyt v. Thompson1s Executor, 19 N.Y.207 (1859)10®. As
Harry G. Hennl09 pointed out: "Under the concession theory,
directors' powers are derived from the state, not delegated
by shareholders. Most statutes vest in the board of
directors the management of the corporation". In France,
the partisans of the above theory (functional theory) argue
that despite the fact that the board of directors in theory
is subject to the control of the shareholders' assemblies
and receives power by delegation. However, as the board is
legally responsible for the management of a company, it
must be admitted that the board has certain powers by the
nature of its office and is not dependent upon a delegation 
1 1 0 . .theory . This view was adopted by the French Supreme 
Court, in a landmark case:
"The company is an organisation whose organs are 
hierarchical, and in which the administration is 
exercised by a board of directors elected by the 
general assembly; It is not within the competence
Ql iJifi general assembly to encroach upon the
prerogatives of the board of directors"111.
Currently, the directors' powers are determined either 
by the articles or internal regulations of the company. 
[This is the position in Britain, article 70 of Table A, 
Companies Act 1985], or the relevant statute (code) 
regulating corporate bodies [the position in Algeria, 
article 622 of the Commercial Code 1975].
Under British law, most of the company's powers are
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conferred by Table A on the board of directors. While some 
of these powers are expressly entrusted to them by 
individual articles, the major part of these powers are 
vested in them by the general delegation of article 70 of 
the Companies Act 1985 that provides: "Subject to the
provisions of the Act, the Memorandum and the Articles and 
to any direction given by special resolution, the business 
of the company shall be managed by the directors who may 
exercise all the powers of the company."
Such an article vests the board with very wide powers, 
leaving to the company in the general meeting only the 
statutory powers, such as the amendment of the Memorandum 
and Articles (ss. 4 and 9), alteration of the share capital 
(ss. 121 and 135), or removal of directors (s. 303), and 
any special powers reserved by the articles for the general 
meeting viz. the power to determine the directors' 
remuneration (Table A, article 82), and to determine the 
number of directors. (Table A article 64).
S u l l i v a n H 2  a r g U e s  that Table A, in addition grants to 
the directors some specific powers in relation to liens, 
calls, sharetransfers, borrowing and dividends, the most 
recent of their powers have to be deduced from article 80 
(now article 70) . He adds: "Thus it is not a residual 
regulation supplementing a range of powers specifically 
conferred but the prime resource of directors authority 
within the company." Identical general delegation of powers 
can be found in Algerian law. Article 622 equivalent to 
article 70 of Table A. It provides:
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"The board of directors is invested with the most 
extensive powers to act under any circumstances in 
the name of the company; they exercise them within 
the limits of the company's objectives and subject 
to the powers expressly attributed by law to 
shareholders meeting."
The above articles show clearly the extent of the 
legislature's intervention to regulate the directors powers 
by legal provision in both Britain and Algeria. Therefore, 
it can be easily argued that the law is a primary or main 
source of powers for directors.
The clarification of the source of director's powers 
is one of the important issues. The difference between the 
theories and views stated above have certain repercussions 
in practice. Indeed, the situation of the director 
(representant) and third parties changes by adopting one 
view or another. For example, by adopting the classic 
conception!^ Qf powers proceeding from the principal, the 
third party who wants to contracts with the representant is 
required to consult the statutes (statuts) to ensure that 
the representant is competent and vested with necessary 
powers to bind the company, otherwise the third party will 
face the risk of dealing with an incompetent person.
In contrast, under the functional conception the 
protection of third parties is completely assured, and they 
are under no obligation to check the statutes since any act 
or contract that has a relationship with the company's 
objects is legally binding on it.!!^
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Finally it can be deduced from what has been said, 
that the attribution of powers to one particular source is 
inaccurate and incomplete. In fact, directors derive their 
powers from different sources, such as Companies Act and 
regulations, shareholders, company's objects. All these 
sources constitute a legal foundation of the general 
investment of managerial powers in the board of directors.
In conclusion it can be noted that the general vesting 
of powers in the directors is effective and expedient to 
directors to cope with their heavy tasks and promoting the 
company's business whose prosperity and failure hinges on 
their progress. The general vesting of powers also provides 
the company with sufficient legal status and third parties 
dealing with the company will no longer be required to look 
outside the Acts and Memorandum and Articles of Association 
to ensure that the directors are competent to enter into a 
particular transaction. It is unlikely that a precise 
specification of directors' powers would necessarily better 
protect third parties since the law provides sufficient 
protection against abuse of directors' powers. Indeed, it 
would be an impossible task to enumerate the powers of 
directors since the number and variety of transactions 
which might be undertaken defy a complete categorisation.
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Chapter Three 
Delegation of Directors' Powers
The previous chapters have shown how both British 
Companies Acts 1985 and the Algerian Commercial Code 1975 
entrust the management of the company's affairs and 
business in the board of directors, regarding the latter as 
the appropriate and the competent organ to operate such an 
important function.
As a general rule the powers of directors can only be 
exercised by them collectively or collegiately as a board, 
and therefore no individual director or board of directors 
has inherent power to delegate any of its powers to one or 
more of its members or to other persons-*-, unless there is 
authorisation in the Memorandum^ or Articles. However it is 
quite common to insert in the Articles of Association 
power for the directors to appoint one or more of their 
body to be managing director or directors, or a president 
(president___du conseil d'administration) in the case of an 
Algerian company (Societe en commandite par action)3, and 
to pay him or them special remuneration, delegating to him 
or to them such powers as are necessary^. Indeed, Articles 
of Association usually vest the board with the power to 
appoint any persons, whether directors or members of the 
company or not, to be the attorneys of the agents of the 
company for such period as the board thinks fit with the 
authority to exercise any of the directors powers during
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that time 5.
The adoption of the provisions stated above by most 
modern companies may be attributed to the exigencies of 
business and commercial life in the 20th century, and 
particularly to the complexity of transactions carried on 
by such companies. Furthermore, the running of a large 
company would be practically impossible if all decisions 
required a board meeting. Therefore the board's function is 
usually confined to the formulation of general policy 
leaving the day-to-day decision making to the executive or 
managing directors or committee of directors.
As Goel said: "The main task rather is formulation and 
direction of the board, basic and general business policy 
as a ’management tool1, co-ordination of the executive 
functions and exercise of overall control and supervision 
of the corporate affairs"6 . Consequently, the delegation 
of directors' powers and functions, all or part of it, 
become as a matter of necessity especially in the case of 
large companies with substantial shareholdings and 
branches.
As Dickson M. Sounders pointed out:
"From the very beginning of the use of the company 
structure as a device for carrying of the business 
and activities of man, it has been apparent that 
the nominal brain, the board of directors, could 
not feasibly run the affairs of the inanimate 
entity unless certain powers could be delegated to 
officers and agents".^
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This chapter examines:
1- Legal Basis of directors' powers to delegate; and
2- The Extent and scope of the directors' authority to 
delegate; and
3- Delegate's acts and protection of third parties at 
common law.
Section 1-___ Legal basis of_directors' powers_
delegate
One of the important characteristics of British
Company law regarding company management is that a board of
directors must act collectively or collegiately as one 
unit. Consequently, neither an individual director nor any 
group of directors has any power conferred on him or them, 
and in the absence of an express authorisation in the 
Articles of association or other appropriate constitutional 
document the board will have no authority to delegate its 
powers®. Unlike U S A ^ a  ^, in Britain directors do not 
receive their powers from the state in the Act of
incorporation but derive them mainly from the shareholders 
under the Articles of Association^, which are adopted and 
can be freely altered by the shareholders themselves in 
general meeting by passing a special resolution (Companies 
Act 1948, s. 66). Like any other power, in the absence of 
any proper authorisation in the Articles of Association the 
board of directors is not allowed to delegate any of its 
powers to any person or persons even if that person is a 
member of the board. This rule is justified on the grounds
107
that the directors' powers have been delegated to them by 
the shareholders and by applying the maxim: "Delegatus non
potest delegare" - they could not delegate these powers. 
This maxim applies because the directors' powers are 
derivative or that they are delegates within the meaning of 
the maxim. The rule applied in the maxim is that "no 
delegation without permission". It is submitted in D e 
Bussche v Alt. that:
"this maxim when analysed merely imports that an 
agent cannot without authority from his principal, 
devolve upon another obligations to the principal 
which he has himself undertaken to personally 
fulfil; and that, inasmuch as confidence in the 
particular persons employed is at the root of the 
contract of agency, such authority cannot be 
implied as an ordinary incident in the contract"^.
In Howard's Case^ f regarding the right of the board 
of directors to delegate their power of allotting shares to 
a manager and two private directors. Turner L.J. affirmed 
the decision of Kindersley V.C who said^2:
"I think they are precluded from doing it, because, by the 
terms of the deed of settlement, they are the body to whom 
is delegated by the shareholders at large the office to deal 
with shares. Having that office delegated to them by the 
body of shareholders, the persons interested in it, they 
have no power, without special authority from the persons 
who had given them that delegated office, to delegate it to 
a.different body themselves".
On the same point Trebilcock noted: "If specific
powers or discretions are delegated to directors under a
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company's articles, then they will not normally be entitled 
to sub-delegate those powers or discretions"-^. However the 
board of directors like an ordinary agent, they may
delegate their routine or non-discretionary powers
(functions) to the executive agents or servants and no 
authorisation is required-^ . in sum, it can be said that 
the board of directors cannot delegate its powers unless 
allowed to do so by the Memorandum or Articles of 
Association. In practice, however, it is usual for a 
company's Articles to contain clauses empowering the 
directors to delegate their powers. Article 72 of Table A 
provides that "The directors may delegate any of their 
powers to any committee consisting of one or more
directors. They may also delegate to any managing director 
or any director holding any other executive office such of 
their powers as they consider desirable to be exercised by 
him. Any such delegation may be made subject to any 
conditions the directors may impose, and either 
collaterally with or to the exclusion of their own powers 
and may be revoked or altered. Subject to any such 
conditions, the proceedings of a committee with two or more 
members shall be governed by the articles regulating the 
proceedings of directors so far as they are capable of 
applying".
It is quite clear from the above articles that the
board of directors in running the day-to-day management of 
the company can delegate its powers either to a committee
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or to a managing director.
1.1.- Delegation  CPmmi.tfce.ft
It is quite common for the articles to allow the board 
to delegate any of their powers to committees consisting of 
such director or directors as the board thinks fit (art. 
72)15. According to this Article, such a committee may 
consist of one d i r e c t o r ^ ,  in Re. T a u r i n e  C o m p a n y ! 7 , ^he 
question was whether the directors may delegate their power 
to a committee of one. In this case the board delegated all 
their powers to one person according to article 4318 of the 
articles of Association of the company. Cotton L.J. while 
examining this question saidl^:
"There is nothing in my opinion, in the articles to 
prevent the appointment of a committee of one. It 
is very unusual but still it may be done. As was 
pointed out, Table A recognizes the fact that one 
person may be appointed a committee. A committee 
means a person or persons to whom powers are 
committed which would otherwise be exercised by 
another body."
Where powers are delegated to a committee they may be 
general, including all the powers of the board, or limited 
to a particular function, as examining and passing 
transfers for registration and sealing share 
certificates.20 a power to delegate does not mean that the 
delegate is to part with his powers in a manner to exclude 
his further authority, so a board which delegates powers to 
a committee may revoke the delegations at any time, either
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expressly, or impliedly, by the board exercising the 
delegated powers itself . 21 in addition, the board may 
revoke the appointment of any member of the committee at 
any time, even though the member of the committee was 
appointed for a fixed period^ and the responsibility for 
performance of their duties remains with the board.^3
1.2.- Delegation to a managing director
A managing director may be defined as "an executive 
director appointed by the board and to whom the board has 
delegated certain powers of management under the Articles 
of Association ' ' ^ 4 . Currently, the managing director 
constitutes an important organ in the modern company where 
most of the company's powers which have been primarily 
delegated to the board are sub-delegated to him or them^S. 
Indeed, in some companies the managing director is largely 
responsible for the general management and control of the 
company, rather than the board, and nowadays the term 
'managing director' may denote the most senior management 
post in the c o m p a n y ^ .  The purpose of appointing a managing 
director or directors is to ensure that the day-to-day 
management of the company's business is conducted by one or 
a few persons who may be required to devote their whole 
time and attention to the company a f f a i r s . A s  already 
said the general rule is that directors cannot appoint one 
of themselves to an office of profit or delegate power to a 
managing director unless expressly empowered by the 
Articles or by a resolution of the c o m p a n y 2 8 .  por example,
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in Nelson v. James Nelson & Sons29, Swinfen Eady L.J in 
the Court of Appeal said:
"Unless there is a power given to the directors by 
the articles to appoint a managing director it is 
not competent for them to make such an 
appointment.... The articles may give a power to the 
directors to appoint one of their number to be 
managing director, but no power to revoke or cancel 
the appointment. The company may keep that power in 
its own hands to be exercised in general meeting".
However, in practice the articles often allow the
directors to appoint one or more of their body to be 
managing director or directors and to pay him or them 
special remuneration, delegating to him or them such powers 
as necessary. Such a power is conferred by Table A, article 
72 and 84 of Table A, Companies Act 1985-30.
Article 84 of Table A provides "Subject to the
provisions of the, the directors may appoint one or more of 
their number to the office of managing director ...any such 
appointment ...may be made upon such terms as the directors 
determine and they may remunerate any such director for his 
services as they think fit". When the articles empower the 
directors to appoint a managing director, the company in 
general meeting cannot interfere and cannot itself make 
such an appointment without first altering the Articles-^.
A managing director has two functions and two
capacities^ ^ , those of a director and managing director
and holds a very different office to other executive 
directors. Unlike the latter, the managing director's
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function is to exercise powers delegated to him by the 
directors as well as powers of management. Whereas, for 
example, the secretary or manager who is also a director 
occupies an office as an executive in conjunction with, 
but separately from, his directorship33. The managing 
director has no specific powers accorded to him by law-33 
but depend both upon the articles which confer a power on 
the board to appoint a managing director and upon the terms 
of the contract by which he is employed3 ^- jn Newspaper 
Proprietary Syndicate Ltd.35, Cozens-Hardy, J. said: "A
managing director is only an ordinary director entrusted 
with some special powers". These special powers are derived 
from the terms of his appointment and may, in fact, turn 
him into an extraordinary director.
Although the exact legal position of managing director 
in relation to their company is rather hard to define. 
However, there are a number of cases which form a chain of 
authority supporting the general proposition that a 
managing director, apart from context, was not in the 
employment of the company. For example, in Duns ton v. 
Imperial Gas Light and Coke Co36, it was pointed out that a 
director is not a servant but a manager, and in Hutton v. 
West Cork Railway Co.3  ^ a dictum of Lord Bowen that a 
director is not a servant was relied on. Again in Normandy 
v. Ind. Coope & Co33 it was decided in the judgment of Mr 
Justice Kekewich that no managing director or other 
director fell within the phrase "Persons in the employment 
of the company" mentioned in the articles. The same view
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was adopted by the Scottish judges. In M m  v. Walker^ ,  
they treated the managing director as a director and not an 
employee of the company. In the latter case Lord Fleming 
said: "I quite accept the view that a director is an agent 
and not a servant of a company and I think it follows that 
a managing director must be regarded not as a servant of 
the company but as an agent with managerial functions". The 
last case in this line is Re Anderson v. James Sutherland 
(Peterhead) Ltd40, where the question regarding the 
managing director’s position again raised i.e, is a 
managing director employed by the company?4  ^Lord Stevenson 
answers in the negative. He submits that: "In my opinion, a 
managing director is in the position of a master. He is the 
director appointed by the board of directors to carry out 
the duties of conducting the business of the company... He 
conducts the business as the appointee of the directors and 
subject to their supervision. "In my opinion, he is not a 
servant of the company, nor in the employment thereof, and 
is not subject to the provisions of Article 14 . . . "
Due to the important role entrusted to the managing 
director, his usual authority has a wide scope and extends 
to the management of the ordinary business of the 
c o m p a n y ^  . in addition, he is invested with apparent 
authority to ensure the running of the company's business 
in the usual way and it is his responsibility to manage the 
company's affairs within the framework of policy determined 
by the board. The same view can be found under Algerian
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Company law, e.g. Article 367 of the Commercial Code 1975 
provides that the president carries out "on his own 
responsibility, the general management of the company". It 
is also submitted that a managing director also often makes 
company policy. As Willett notes:
"the board cannot make the whole of the policy 
itself; it cannot have adequate information to 
enable it to do so. Top managers do not merely run 
the company from day to day within a framework of 
policy, but to a significant extent they initiate 
and determine that policy"^
The managing director therefore, can perform all acts, 
enter all transactions and conclude all contracts necessary 
to ensure a successful management. However, it was 
submitted that the managing directors1 apparent authority 
is confined to commercial matters. 4^ For example, he has no 
authority to approve transfer of shares in the company or 
to alter its register of members, or to sell the company's 
business^, under Algerian law, the president is invested 
with the most extensive powers to act on behalf of the 
company in all circumstances, subject to two limitations.46 
However, in dealing with third parties, the president is 
regarded as the legal representative of the company. As a 
matter of practice it may happen that the person dealing 
with the company, because of certain circumstances such as 
time, place^, find it very difficult to check the 
Commercial Register to ensure that the president is acting 
within the limits of his legal powers. Moreover, to provide 
a sufficient protection to third parties dealing with the
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company and to strengthen the company's trust, the Algerian 
legislature submits that the company must be bound by acts 
of the President even outside the company's objects, unless 
it can prove that the third party knew that the act was 
outside the company's purpose, or he must have known that 
this was so from the circumstances. The mere publication of 
the company's statutes is not sufficient and cannot 
constitute such proof^Q- This legal rule was previously 
approved by the doctrine and jurisprudence. Indeed, the 
modern French jurisprudence went further in widening the 
extent of this rule. For example, it was submitted that the 
company must be bound by the acts of the president even if 
his membership or presidency was void^9.
According to article 624 of the Algerian commercial 
code 1975 the board of directors may delegate the power to 
give guarantees on behalf of the company, or the power to 
create mortgages or changes over its assets up to a maximum 
limit fixed by the board in respect of each transaction or 
globally. 50 in the absence of such delegation, any such 
transactions requires the specific authority of the 
board^l. a delegation cannot be given to the president for 
more than one year at a time^. if a transaction is entered 
into which which exceeds the limit fixed by the board for 
an individual transaction, the company can repudiate it, 
and will not then be responsible to the other party to the 
transaction, even if he was unaware that a limit had been 
imposed.53 as a result of this, a third party dealing with
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the president such as a creditor who intends taking a 
guarantee or security from the president should ensure that 
the transaction has been expressly authorised by the 
board.54
Despite the wide range of powers enjoyed by the 
managing director (Britain) and the president (Algeria), 
the board of directors still has the last word and the 
widest power of curtailing the range of managing director's 
activities. rCaddies v. (Harold) Holdsworth and Co. 
(Wakefield)Ltd).55 indeed, directors may have discretionary 
power to dismiss a managing director. However, this power 
must be exercised bona fide in the interests of the 
company and not for some ulterior purpose such as 
appropriation of the managing director's shares THindle v. 
John Cotton Ltd.1 5 6. it is also held in a number of cases57 
that if this power (removal) is exercised in breach of his 
contract of service, the company will be liable to pay 
damages. In Algeria however, the president may be removed 
by the conseil d 'administration at any time without notice 
or dismissal or assigning reasons. Such removal cannot give 
rise to any action for damages on his part or to any 
indemnity whatever, any stipulation in the statutes 
(articles of association) to the contrary shall be of no 
affect^®. Lastly, article 84 of table A provides that a 
managing director shall not retire by rotation, but shall 
cease to be managing director if he ceases to be a director 
for any other reason. Although the Articles may provide 
otherwise, but cannot preserve a managing director in
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office when he has become disqualified from being a 
director or has been removed from office under the 
provisions of the Companies Act 1985.
Section 2 : Scope of Delegation &£ Foyers,
Like any other power of management, the directors' 
authority to delegate depends on the articles adopted by a 
company. In other words, the right of delegation of powers 
conferred on the board of directors by the articles of 
association is subject to express permission in the 
articles, or by a general m e e t i n g ^ .  Thus the rule is that 
if under the Memorandum and Articles of association the 
board of directors is allowed to delegate all or any of its 
powers, the board may delegate any of its powers vested in 
it by the Memorandum and Articles of association. However, 
an interesting question in the law of corporations is to 
what extent a board of directors may entrust their powers 
to an executive committee or agent?
As noted earlier, under British law, the directors may 
delegate any of their powers to any committee consisting of 
one or more directors or to any managing director or any 
director holding any other executive office such of their 
powers as they consider desirable to be exercised by him. 
Any such delegation may be made subject to any conditions 
the directors may impose, and either collaterally with or 
to the exclusion of their own powers and may be revoked or 
altered^O . it follows therefore, that the validity of 
delegation of directors' powers depends upon the true
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construction of the articles of association or the service 
agreement made in pursuance of the articles61. indeed, this 
agreement may be designed and worded so as to enable the 
directors to deprive the managing director of his wide 
powers of management while letting him retain his title and 
remuneration^ # This is the case in Holdsworth (Harold) and 
. C o (Wakefield) U l&. v. Caddies in which Caddies was 
appointed as a managing director of the company for a 
period of five years by an agreement which provided that he 
should be 'appointed a managing director of the company and 
as such managing director he shall perform the duties and 
exercise the powers in relation to the business of the 
company and the businesses of its exiting subsidiary 
companies at the date hereof which from time to time be 
assigned to or vested in him by the board of directors of 
the company.' After Caddies had acted for some time as 
managing director of both the appellant company and its 
subsidiary, differences having arisen between Caddies and 
the board of directors, the latter resolved, while the five 
year period was still running, that he should confine his 
attention to one particular subsidiary company only. 
Caddies claimed that this deprived him of the powers of 
managing director of the parent company and was a 
repudiation of his agreement and he brought an action of 
£25 000 damages for breach of contract by the company but 
his action was dismissed on the grounds that no breach had 
occurred and the resolution limiting his attention to a 
subsidiary was consistent with the agreement concluded
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between him and the company. The decision in the above case 
shows clearly the governing character of the articles as 
well as determining the real position of managing director 
and his legal relation vis a vis the board of directors.
Although it is well recognised that directors should be 
permitted to delegate their powers and functions so as to 
facilitate their managerial task, it is argued that some 
directors powers are delegable and some others are non­
delegable. However, in practice this categorisation seems 
to be rather difficult and vague since the clear line 
between the two types of powers is usually uneasy to draw. 
As Delforge put it: This confusion "probably due to the
vagueness of the terms "ministerial" and "discretionary", 
and their application in the business world^. For example, 
in the United States the distinction tends to be made on 
the basis of identification and determination of the nature 
of matters or the functions that purported to be delegated 
by the directors. The general tendency there, in respect of 
ministerial or routine matters, is that the board of 
directors should be given a free hand in choosing delegates 
or subordinates to exercise them, and in determining the 
extent of such delegation on the grounds that these matters 
belong to the management of the ordinary commercial 
matters, and the performance of these matters by persons 
other than the board of directors cannot harm the company. 
Indeed, its confinement in the board of directors may lead 
to unnecessary delays that may have negative effects on the
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company's business development. Further, it was held that 
the designation of certain officers to exercise a 
particular ministerial or routine act or function does not 
prevent the board of directors from authorising another 
person to perform the same act^. on the face of it, it is 
believed that discretionary powers that require to some 
extent an exercise of judgment and discretion or involve 
the exercise of executive functions such as deciding the 
"policy" of the corporation or generally overseeing its 
affairs, are classified as non-delegable powers on the 
basis of its sensitivity and its importance to the 
company's business as a whole. For example, in Ames v. 
Goldfield Mines C o . 6 6, the court expressed strongly against 
the the delegation of the discretionary powers, although in 
one previous case (Jones v. Williams)67 it was held that 
"the directors have the power, without statutory authority, 
to delegate to officers, agents or executive committees the 
power to transact, not only the ordinary and routine 
business, but business requiring the highest degree of 
judgment and discretion". However, it can be argued that 
the determination of the validity of a particular 
delegation by the board using the discretionary-ministerial 
test adopted in U.S.A. seems to be ineffective since the 
line between the routine or ordinary matters and 
discretionary ones is difficult to understand as their 
interpretation differs from one case to another. One clear
instance is the case of He Lojie Star Shipbuilding Co . 68
where it was held that the power to file a voluntary
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petition in bankruptcy by a certain time (delegated by the 
board to two directors) was held to be merely 
m i n i s t e r i a l ^ *  Although it is quite obvious that these kind 
of acts have a great impact on the continuity and existence 
of the company's business. In Britain, however, as 
previously mentioned, the validity of delegation depends 
upon the construction of the articles of association. Hence 
no ministerial-discretionary controversy would a r i s e ^ O .  The 
Cartmell's case (Re County Palatine Loan and Discount
C o  . ) *71 appears to be the only case in Britain that
attempted to distinguish between ministerial or routine 
matters and discretionary ones. This can be deduced easily 
from the words of Mellish L.J. who said:
"It appears to me that a mere power to appoint a 
general manager would not authorise the directors 
to transfer to him the power to purchase shares; 
because that power is by the articles expressly 
given to the directors themselves; whilst the only 
duties which they could delegate to the general 
manager are those which belong to the management
of the ordinary commercial business of such a
company".
For a clear understanding of the delegation of powers 
issue, it would be necessary to examine and highlight three 
hypothesis; assumptions in connection with the directors' 
right to delegate their powers. Firstly, the rule is that 
if the articles provide that the board may delegate "all 
its powers" or "any of its powers" the board may do so as 
the validity of delegation is subject to express permission
122
in the articles of association. In other words, where, 
under the articles the board of directors is empowered to 
delegate all its powers, it would be intra vires the 
directors to delegate a power though specifically vested in 
them. For example, in Re Taurine Company, 72 although an 
article of the company provided "A transfer of a registered 
share, except a fully paid up share, shall not be made 
without the the approval of the board, who shall have an 
absolute discretion as to accepting or rejecting the 
transfer..." nevertheless, the power to approve the 
transfers was held to have been properly delegated to a 
one-director - Committee appointed by the board. Secondly, 
if the articles of association provide that certain powers 
are specifically vested in the board of directors and must 
be exercised by them; The general belief seems to be that 
directors cannot delegate that particular power or 
function. This is the judgment in Howard's Case^  where it 
was held that the allotment of shares made by the manager 
and two directors was invalid, on the basis that the 
delegation by the directors was unwarranted, as they had no 
authority to perform such an act, since under the deed^, 
the power to allot shares was expressly vested in them^S. 
Moreover it is submitted that certain powers may expressly 
be reserved to the board as a whole, e.g. borrowing money 
on behalf of the company, incurring capital expenditure 
beyond a defined limit, and other matters and functions of 
special importance^, such as the power to declare 
dividends, to make calls, to adopt or amend or repeal the
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corporate enactments, to issue or float debentures or other 
securities, to appoint, remove, or fix the renumeration of 
the executive committee members and other officers. All 
these should only be exercised by the board of directors 
and not delegated to others. This is because as Goel^^ 
pointed out such matters "often involve the conflict of 
interests between the operating management and the 
shareholders that they require the prudent, wise and 
unbiased decision of the whole board".
Lastly, having shown that directors are often empowered 
by their companies to delegate their managerial powers and 
duties to other persons as they think fit, another 
important question which still remains to be examined is 
whether the directors can divest themselves or be divested 
otherwise of their own powers and escape all responsibility 
for the proper discharge of matters so delegated? Although, 
in usual practice the managing director is appointed on the 
terms that he will perform the duties and exercise the 
powers which, from time to time, may be assigned to or 
vested in him by the board of directors and that he will in 
all respects obey and conform to the orders and 
instructions given by the board from time to t i m e ^ • 
Nevertheless, the board may, if so empowered by the 
company's articles, delegate to the managing director its 
powers of management or some of them to the exclusion of 
its own powers. This may clearly be seen in article 72 of 
Table A Companies Act 1985 which reads thus:
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"...They may also delegate to any managing director or
any director holding any other executive office such of
their powers as they consider desirable to be exercised by
him. Any such delegation may be made subject to any
conditions the directors may impose, and either
collaterally with or to the exclusion of their own powers
and may be revoked or altered."
(79)Pursuant to article 72 Professor Gower suggested
that:
"There seems to be no reason why a delegation to a 
managing director under an Article worded like 
Table A, art 109 (now 72) should not be so 
expressed as to deprive the board of the right to 
interference. The wording of the article, with its 
express reference to a delegation 'to the exclusion 
of their own powers', appears to imply that the 
directors may effectively divest themselves of 
their own powers in favour of the managing 
director."80
According to Professor Gower the board may delegate to 
the managing director exclusive powers without reserving 
the right of supervision or revocation and therefore 
disable itself of the right to interfere with his exercise 
of such powers or to vary them during the subsistence of 
the service agreement.81 Another suggestion was made by 
Palmer82f which stated that the board does retain the right 
to interfere in so far as it has, as a matter of 
construction of its own powers to delegate, the right to 
revoke at any time. Some judicial support for Gower's point
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of view can be found in Rq. Bulawayo Market and Officers Co. 
Ltd83, in which one of the company's articles empowered the 
directors to delegate to a manager "to the exclusion, or in 
substitution for" their own powers, and Warrington, J. 
submitted that such a provision "enabled the directors to 
divest themselves of all powers and responsibilities in 
the management of the c o m p a n y . . .
It appears, therefore, that a company's regulations may 
entitle the board to relinquish all of its managerial 
powers and functions. However, Gower's suggestion was 
criticised by Goel8 3 . He argues that it appears 
"inconsistent with what is ordinarily implied by the term 
'delegation' because as a rule, the delegated powers are 
always subject to resumption by the delegating authority."
Although it is true that some limitations imposed upon 
the directors power to delegate their duties and functions 
may result sometimes in unnecessary delays and could 
deprive the company of a number of transactions, it can be 
justified on the basis of preventing any abuses of the 
company's powers or misusing its assets by the delegates. 
Furthermore the permission of the board of directors to 
divest themselves of their powers completely seems to be 
exaggeration and would contravene the statutory requirement 
that the board manage or supervise management of the 
company's affairs as it is the competent and the 
appropriate body to act. Indeed, it will lead to the 
creation of sterilised boards. This is the view adopted in 
the United States where the board of directors is regarded
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as "the exclusive executive representative of the 
corporation^", and therefore cannot abdicate all their 
authority and responsibility by delegating their duties and 
functions to the exclusion of their own powers. This is 
based on the fact that although by delegation the exercise 
of a power or function may shift to the delegate concerned, 
the overriding control and the ultimate supervision and 
responsibility must rest upon the board itself by retaining 
the power to supervise, review and interfere.^
Section 3: Delegates Acts and the Protection of 
Third Parties
Before leaving the subject of delegation of director's 
powers, it is necessary to throw some light on the legal 
effects that may flow from from the exercise of these 
delegated powers. Some concern the company and whether it 
is bound by the acts of its director or directors^, and 
others concern the third party who deals with this 
delegated director or directors. One of the important 
questions concerning the delegation rule is that whether 
the person seeking to rely upon it need have any actual 
knowledge of the existence of the power of delegation?^ 
The answer to this question involves a clear distinction 
between two different situations, namely, where there is an 
express delegation in the articles of association and where 
there is no provision permitting a delegation of the 
board's authority or they expressly preclude its being
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conferred. Regarding the first assumption, the established 
rule in company law provides that where the articles of 
association contain a power of delegation and some person 
purports to exercise such delegated authority on behalf of 
the company, that a proper delegation can be assumed by a 
person dealing bona fide with the company if the act in 
question could be said to be ordinarily within the powers 
of that person who purports to act as the company’s 
a g e n t . T h i s  rule is of course, only a special application 
of the rule in Royal British Bank v. Turquand91 which 
establishes in effect that a person dealing with the 
company is not put upon notice as to its indoor 
management9^ . In addition, the general rule of agency 
provides that a principal is liable for all the acts of his 
agent within the agent's apparent authority, i.e the 
authority usually possessed by agents of that class or the 
authority which the principal has 'held out' the agent as 
having. For example, where a managing director is appointed 
under provisions in the articles of association of the 
company and unless the party dealing with him has been put 
upon inquiry by the circumstances, the third party is 
entitled to assume that he (managing director) has power to 
act on behalf of the company and to enter into a particular 
transaction in dispute. Similar views, can be noticed in a 
few early cases9  ^ where it was held that a person dealing 
with one director might assume under the rule in Turquand* s 
Case that the board had delegated to him the powers which
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he pretended to possess without being required to prove 
whether the board had actually held out the director as 
having those powers^. However, later cases^ have shown 
that the rule in Turquand* s case does apply in this 
s i t u a t i o n .  96 Thus a mere power of delegation cannot be 
construed so as to bar a company from denying that it has 
been used. As Sarget L.J in Houahton & Co v. Nothard Lowe 
and Wills Ltd. said97;
"I know of no case in which an ordinary director, 
acting without authority in fact, has been held 
capable of binding a company by a contract with a 
third party, merely on the ground that the third 
party assumed that the director had been given 
authority by the board to make the c o n t r a c t " . 98
Furthermore, it is argued that unless before entering 
into the transaction the third party was aware of the 
articles enabling the board to delegate its powers, he 
cannot say that he relied on the power of delegation at 
all99# This is the view in Rama Caser in which the facts 
may be summarised very briefly as follows:
By the articles of association of the defendant company 
the board of directors had power (except as regards 
borrowing and making calls) to delegate its authority to a 
committee consisting of one or more of its members. Without 
the authority of the board, one of the directors purported 
on behalf of the company to enter into an agreement with an 
agent of the plaintiff company. Under the agreement the 
parties were to subscribe to a fund for the financing of a 
telephone directory holder to be manufactured by a third
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company. The plaintiff company had no knowledge at the time 
it purported to enter into the agreement of the defendant 
company's articles of association or the power of 
delegation therein contained. Slade, J after a full 
discussion of the authorities, dismissed the action brought 
by the plaintiff company for enforcement of the agreement 
and decided that actual knowledge of the power of 
delegation was necessary. He argued that the failure on the 
part of the plaintiff company to consult the defendant 
company’s articles of association, under which power to 
conclude the contract in dispute could have been conferred 
on the director, precluded it from invoking the protection 
of the doctrine of estoppel, and expressed the rule
"The doctrine of constructive notice of a company's 
registered documents, such as its memorandum of 
association, its articles of association, its 
special resolutions, etc. does not operate against 
a company, but only in its favour. Put it in the 
converse way, the doctrine of constructive notice 
operates against the person who has failed to 
inquire, but does not operate in his favour. There 
is no positive doctrine of constructive notice; it 
is a purely negative one" . 100
However, this view was criticised on the basis that it 
is not practicable and may stand as a stumbling block in 
the way of business life. This led the learned editors of 
Palmer's Company Law^Ol to postulate an alternative view 
that a director's authority to bind the company must depend 
not on the doctrine of estoppel, but rather on the wider
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principle expressed in the maxim Ominia praesumuntur rite 
ac solemniter esse acta, i.e. all necessary formalites and 
procedures are presumed to have been properly carried out.
It is quite clear that in the case of a managing 
director little doubt may arise regarding the validity of 
his delegated powers to act on behalf of the company since 
his position entitles him to commit the company to almost 
anything that relates to its commercial activities.102 This 
is surely due to his key position in the company and his 
usual investment with most powers of the company. This 
situation, however, differs where a director who purports 
to represent the company is an ordinary director i.e., (not 
being appointed as managing director). In the latter case 
more convincing evidence will be necessary to support the 
assumption that the board delegated the power in question 
to the director in addition to his ordinary power s. 03 This 
is because an ordinary director as such has no authority 
over the management of the company's affairs.104
In respect of the second assumption, if there is no 
power under the articles to delegate the board's power to 
an individual director, then third parties, being deemed to 
have notice of the fact, cannot hold the company to the 
contract. However, if under the terms of the articles it 
was legally possible that the director concerned might have 
had such authority conferred upon him, and the other party 
relied upon this, then the latter may be able to hold the 
company liable under the rule in Turauand’s Case^Q^ This
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view was expressed in Kreditbank Cassel v. Schenkers 
Ltd. -*-06 in which Atkin L.J said that:
"If you are dealing with a director in a matter in 
which normally a director would have power to act 
for the company, you are not obliged to inquire 
whether or not the formalities required by the 
articles have been compiled with before he 
exercised that power. Those are matters of internal 
management which an outsider is not obliged to 
investigate."
For the pusposes of this rule it is submitted that it 
is quite irrelevant whether or not the party purporting to 
contract with the company even had sight of the 
a r t i c l e s . T h i s  is because the company is bound not by 
virtue of an estoppel, but instead by the exercise of an 
agency power^-^. However, apart from two cases^-^, it has 
been generally held that were the articles do not contain a 
power to delegate, a company will not be bound by a 
transaction entered into by an individual director. This is 
so even where the board has led the outsider to believe 
that it has a power to delegate and that it has exercised
itiio.
Finally, it is clearly established that where a 
director has been empowered to enter into a particular 
transaction on behalf of the company or where the company 
has held him out to a third party as having such authority 
the company will unquestionably be bound by his acts. 
However, as Rice^-^ suggests, business relations could not 
function on these two principles alone. He submits that
132
"whether or not a director enjoys actual power, the company
will be bound by any act of his that falls within the usual
. 119 , , 1 1 oauthority of his position".
This view seems to be logical and practically important 
since its application will facilitate business 
transactions, particularly for thirds parties dealing with 
the company as they are not required to check the company's 
constitution whenever they are interested in a contract 
with the company. Indeed, this view has received judicial 
support in Freeman's Case114 which established the 
principle that where acts purporting to be done in the name 
of the company lie within the usual authority of the 
particular agent performing them, the company is bound 
without any necessity for the contracting party ever to 
have studied the company's memorandum and articles.
In the light of the above discussion, it appears that 
delegation of directors' powers and duties became a 
necessity in the modern corporate management and probably 
no company could function or cope with business life 
without providing for such delegtion in its constitution. 
As a result of this, modern commercial companies in 
different legal systems often include a provision in their 
article of association empowering the board of directors to 
delegate some of its functions to other subordinate bodies 
or individuals to assist them in running the day-to-day 
company's affairs. However, as seen earlier, British 
directors have no inherent power to delegate as their
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American counterparts do. Their power of delegation depends 
primarily upon an authorisation of the shareholders. This 
appears to be inconsistent with the status accorded to the 
board of directors as a primary organ of the company. Thus, 
it is suggestedH6 that the board should be regarded as 
possessing inherent powers of delegation although the 
investment of such a power in the board must not result in 
a total abdication or relinquishment of its office in 
favour of others.
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Chapter Four
Pirectorg-!-Ptttieg AtL-C.gnmpn.Latt
The company directorship is not a mere honorarium or a 
simple sinecure as it is sometimes treated. It is attached 
to a body of obligations, duties and responsibilities. 
Indeed it can be described as a coin with two sides. One 
side is rights, powers and discretion which are vested in 
directors. The other is the liabilities, duties and 
responsibilities that face directors when their duties 
appear to be breached or neglected, or when their powers 
are abused.
Having discussed the vesting of wide powers in the 
board of directors, it would be necessary to highlight the 
legal means of controlling the directors in the exercise of 
these extensive powers. In order to prevent directors from 
abusing their managerial powers, a body of rules are 
imposed on them by common law designed to ensure certain 
minimum standards of behaviour from directors. The breach 
of these rules renders the directors legally liable. In 
Company law directors’ duties means "The obligations and 
the standards of conduct and performance imposed on 
directors mainly by Common law developed through cases", 
but in recent times augmented by Statutory Prescriptions.
As previously noted^, a company director can to some 
extent be regarded as a trustee and as an agent. This
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analogy is relevant because both have a fiduciary duty to 
those for whom they act which requires them to act in an 
honest and disinterested fashion. Furthermore, the case law 
on the duties of directors has been developed by applying 
to the special circumstances of company directors, as 
"officers" of their company, by borrowing the same 
standards as mutatis mutandis apply to agents and to 
trustees.3
The directors' duties are wide and diversified. The law
does not impose an all-embracing code of conduct on
directors. Therefore, some duties are laid down by statute
(statutory duties) i.e. restrictions and prohibitions which
are imposed on directors by the Company Act 1985 and other
legislation, but many are found only in common law.
Moreover, a director may also have some specific duties to
the company by virtue of his contract of employment or
where he is acting as a professional adviser 4. However,
the established rule is that a director owes two types of
duty to a company, a fiduciary duty and a duty of skill and 
4 (a)care.
Section 1: Fiduciary Duties
Director's fiduciary duties are described as "The body 
of duties invented and elaborated by the court of chancery 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to ensure that 
persons who had assets or exercise functions in a 
representative capacity for the benefit of other people act 
in good faith and conscientiously protect the interests of
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those they represent^. Before exploring the fiduciary 
duties owed by the directors to their companies in detail, 
it would be very useful to mention briefly the general 
principles from which these duties are derived.
a - The duties of good faith are owed by each director 
individually.
b - The fiduciary duties are owed to the company and to 
the company alone^. Clearly, no such duties are owed by 
the directors to the individual members as such, or to 
a person who has not become a member, such as a 
potential purchaser of shares in it (company). 7
c - The fiduciary duties are imposed on directors by 
virtue of the nature of the work they perform. For this 
reason, that the same duties (although less rigorous 
depending on the particular circumstances of the case) 
apply to any officials (other than directors in the 
usual sense) of the company who are authorised to act 
on its behalf, particularly to those in a managerial 
capacity
As a result of the fiduciary relationship between a 
director and his company, a number of duties and 
obligations are imposed on him. Although in practice, these 
duties tend to blend together, it would be convenient to 
categorise them into three important groups as follows:
Firstly, the directors must act bona fide, that is, in 
what they believe to be the best interests of the company.
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Secondly, they must exercise their powers for the 
particular purpose for which they were conferred and not 
for some extraneous purpose^. Thirdly, the directors must 
not, without the consent of the company, place themselves 
in a position in which there is a conflict between their 
duties and their personal interests-^.
i. i. - D.uty ,tQ—act .frcna £ide.
One of the established rules in company law is that 
directors when acting as a board have a duty to use their 
powers and act in good faith in what they consider to be 
the best interests of the company, which means the 
shareholders as a whole-*-! . This is the view of Lord Green 
M.R. in Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd^. He stated that "Directors 
must exercise their discretion bona fide in what they 
consider is in the interests of the company, and not for 
any collateral purpose". Accordingly, directors cannot 
justify the exercise of their powers for the benefit of 
themselves or only some of the shareholders. Further, what 
is the interest of the company is subject to the judgement 
of the directors which is applied as the (subjective 
opinion) of the board of directors, and the court will not 
interfere with a decision which the directors honestly 
believed to be the right one. For example, in relation to 
the payment of dividends, the question whether there are 
profits available is left to the subjective judgement of 
the board of directors based on bona fide appraisals of
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. . . • • 1 ? valuations, stock-takes, depreciation provisions, etc.-1-0 .
The courts will interfere only if no reasonable director
could possibly have concluded that a particular course of
action was in the interests of the company^, i.e. the
courts interfere only if there is evidence of bad faith on
the part of the directors, or if their decision is one
which no reasonable board could have reached. In addition,
it is submitted that a director acting honestly but not in
the interests of the company, is in breach of duty. In Re W
& M Roith Ltdl5. A director (of two companies) who was in
poor health entered into a service contract with one of the
companies providing for a generous widow's pension (pension
for life) in the event of his death. The court held that he
was not acting bona fide in the interests of the company
and therefore the contract (transaction) was not binding on
the company.
1 .2 .-  Act_for a Proper Purpose
In addition to acting in good faith, directors are 
under duty to exercise the powers vested in them by .the 
company's memorandum or articles of association for the 
purpose for which the powers were conferred. However, a 
subsidiary purpose, albeit improper, will not invalidate 
the exercise of the power, as long as the main purpose for 
which the power has been exercised is a proper one^. For 
example, some incidental benefit obtained by a director 
will not invalidate the exercise of the power unless his 
self interest was the substantial purpose for the exercise
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of the power^ . The use of directors' powers for other 
purposes constitutes a breach of duty, and renders the 
directors liable to compensate the company for any loss 
suffered. Besides, their decision will be voidable by the 
company. The impropriety of the purpose may arise because 
of illegality or contravention to public policy^® or in 
cases where it is not that contemplated by the articles 
conferring it^ -9. The rule that they must not exercise their 
powers for an improper purpose applies of the exercise by 
the directors of any of their powers, this includes, making 
calls on shares^, ordering the forfeiture of shares2 -^, 
refusing to register transfers^ or expelling a member22. 
However, the problem that arises more frequently concerns 
the exercise of the directors' powers to allot shares 24. 
The director's powers to issue shares has been considered 
by the court in a number of cases. In Piercy v. S. Mills & 
Co. Ltd.22, Patterson J submitted that:
"Directors are not entitled to use their power of 
issuing shares mainly for the purpose of 
maintaining their control or the control of 
themselves and their friends over the affairs of 
the company, or mainly for the purpose of defeating 
the wishes of the existing majority of 
shareholders".
The same issue was raised again in Hogg v. Cramphorn 
Ltd26 where the directors issued shares with special voting 
rights to the trustees of a scheme set up for the benefit 
of the company's employees, in order to forestall a 
takeover. It was held by Buckley J that although the
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directors had acted in good faith they had breached their 
duty to the company by making improper use of their power 
to issue shares. In reaching this decision, Buckley J was 
influenced by the directors taking into account the staff's 
interests - Thus he said "I am satisfied that Mr. Baxter's 
offer, when it became known to the company's staff, had an 
unsettling effect on them. I am also satisfied that the 
directors and the trustees of the trust deed genuinely 
considered that to give the staff through the trustees a 
sizeable, though indirect, voice in the affairs of the 
company would benefit both the staff and the company. I am 
sure that Colonel Cramphorn and also probably his fellow 
directors firmly believed that to keep the management on 
the company's affairs in the hands of the existing board 
would be more advantageous to the shareholders, the 
company's staff and its customers than if it were committed 
to a board selected by Mr. Baxter".27 Yet, supposing that 
the decision in Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd.is the right one, and 
by adopting it, the directors may not allot shares to 
defeat an attempt to gain control of the company. This is 
so even if they believe that is the best interest of the 
company. However, this leads us to a view which is 
inconsistent with the established rule in Re Smith & 
Fawcett Ltd.28f expressed by Lord Green M.R.: "They (the
directors) must exercise their discretion bona fide in 
what they consider - not what a court may consider - is in 
the interests of the company, and not for any collateral
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purpose". Therefore, it is quite clear that the directors' 
right to exercise their powers and consider the company's 
interest are restricted. A clear example for this is the 
director's power to issue shares. In exercising this power, 
directors cannot in any circumstance issue shares in order 
to maintain their own control. Surprisingly, this is so 
even if they believe that is in the best interest of the 
company - this according to Hogg v. Cramphorn.29
This view which is adopted by U.K. courts, however, is 
criticised as too rigid. In addition, to its contradiction, 
to the rule in Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. As a result of this, 
a number of commonwealth authorities3^, (particularly 
Australian), seem to be unconvinced by the U.K courts' 
view. Hence, they rejected the breadth of the principle in
HQ-g.g. v. .Cramphorn Ltd 34 . For example, in Teck Corpn v.
Millar3^. The supreme court of British Columbia permitted 
an allottment to defeat a takeover, despite the fact that 
the allotment was made against the wishes of the existing 
majority shareholder and deprived that shareholder of 
control of the company. This decision was regarded as a 
departure from the prevailing British view (Hogg v. 
Cramphorn Ltd); Bamford v. Bamford33 which holds that the 
share issue power is properly to be exercised for limited 
purposes only33. Similarly, the High Court in Australia, in
Haxlowe 1 S nominees Pty, V. Woodside (Lake Entrance) Oil
£3.*34 permitted an allotment of shares which was made in 
order to secure the financial support of a large oil 
company although the consequence of the allotment was to
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block a would-be takeover by an existing shareholder. 
However, despite the rejection of Hogg v. Gramphorn by 
Berger J in the Teck C a s e 3  5 , he admitted that this 
rejection might cause more abuses by directors of their 
powers or weaken the protection of shareholders. He, 
consequently, proposed to resolve this problem by 
introducing a "reasonable grounds" factor into the Smith & 
Fawcett test:
"I think the court should apply the general rule in 
this way: the directors must act in good faith.
Then there must be reasonable ground for their 
belief. If they say that they believe that there 
will be substantial damage to the company's 
interests, then there must be reasonable grounds 
for that belief. If there are not, that will 
justify a finding that the directors were actuated 
by an improper purpose."
Finally it is necessary to note that the power to 
issue shares is not confined solely for the purpose of 
raising capital. Indeed, it can be used for other purposes 
as well.36 For example, for maintaining the minimum 
necessary membership^ or fostering desirable business 
relations.38 clearly, as Birds put it, the use of such a 
power, if given to directors, is primarily a matter for 
them to decide, a matter of management.39
1.3.- Duty to avoid a conflict of interest and duty
By virtue of the fiduciary relationship which a 
director has with his company, he is under obligation to
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avoid placing himself in a position where there is an 
actual or potential conflict between his own personal 
interest and his duty to the company. This general 
principle applies to all persons who are subject to 
fiduciary duties. Furthermore, it is not confined to 
contracts directly with directors but it includes those in 
which they are in any way interested.^ In Aberdeen Rly Co. 
v. Blaikie Brothers^  Lord Cranworth L.C stated that: "no- 
one having such duties to discharge, shall be allowed to 
enter into engagements in which he has, or can have a 
personal interest conflicting, or which possibly may 
conflict, with the interest of those whom he is bound to 
protect."
However, this view seems to be very wide indeed. Thus, 
it has been suggested that it is too broad a principle to 
be strictly applicable in all situations,^2 anci its 
application without any exception would be unworkable.
Following the general principle cited above, Directors 
must avoid any act or transaction that may give rise to a 
conflict between their duty and their interest. Yet the 
source of conflict may be ascertained to a number of acts 
performed by the directors during their directorship term 
(mandate) . This includes contract with the company, 
competition with the company, using corporate property, 
information or opportunity... However, we will confine the 
discussion to contracts with directors as creating the most 
reason for conflict.
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1.4.- Contracts of Directors With their Cflmpang
As previously noted^, the legal position of a company 
director vis a vis his company, is that of an agent who 
may not himself contract with his principal, or a trustee 
who is not allowed to let the position arise where his 
interest and that of the trust may conflict. Yet, at Common 
law, and in the absence of a liberating provision in the 
articles, a director could not safely contract with his 
company unless a general meeting, after full disclosure, 
approved the contract^ . Nowadays, most modern company 
articles of association relax a director from the general 
prohibition (that he may not contract with his company) by 
permitting directors to contract with their companies.^ 
However, this permission is subject to a number of 
provisions contained in section 317 of the Companies Act 
1985 and to be found also in article 627 of the Algerian 
Commercial Code 1975.
Under section 317 (CA 1985), any director of the 
company who is in any way, whether directly or 
indirectly^6, interested in a contract or proposed contract 
with the company is under a statutory duty to declare his 
interest at a meeting of the board (and not to a committee 
of the board)47 which the contract, transaction or
arrangement is first considered, or if his interest does 
not arise until after that time, at the first board meeting 
after his interest does arise. The meaning of the term 
'contract' under section 317(5) is extended to include any
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transaction or arrangement (whether or not constituting a 
contract) made or entered into on or after 22 December 1980 
(section 317 (5) CA 1985) . The other safeguard to the 
company, imposed as a condition of permitting directors to 
be interested in its contracts is a rule (table A article 
94) which prohibits a director from voting at a board 
meeting on any matter in which he has an interest, with 
certain exception. The same safeguard is provided by the 
Algerian legislature. Article 627(6) of the commercial code 
1975 provides "interested directors may not participate in 
a vote, and their shares are not taken into account in the 
calculation of the quorum and the majority."48 Furthermore, 
it is submitted that a mere declaration of the directors 
interest is not enough to validate the contract (ie, 
disclosure must not simply be of the directors interest) . 
Therefore, the nature of that interest must be specified as 
well. In Imperial Mercantile Credit Association v. Coleman 
^Lord Cairns pointed out " a director...must show that he 
has in letter and in spirit, complied with the provisions 
of the clause...A man declares his interest, not when he 
states that he has an interest but when he states what his 
interest is". Similarly, in Gray v. New Aucrarita Procupine 
Mines Ltd.50, Lord Radcliffe stated:
"there is no precise formula that will determine 
the extent of detail that is called for when a 
director declares his interest or the nature of his 
interest ... If it is material to their (the 
directors) judgement that they should know not 
merely that he has an interest, but what it is and
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how far it goes, then he must see to it that they 
are informed".
Section 317 of the Companies Act 1985 applies with 
equal force to shadow directors, i.e., "certain persons in 
accordance with whose directions or instructions the 
directors are accustomed to act" 51. However, since a 
shadow director may have no right to attend board meetings 
he must declare his interest by notice in writing to the 
directors^. This notice must either be a specific notice 
given before the date of the directors1 meeting at which, 
if he had been a director, he would have been required to 
make a declaration in accordance with section 317 (2), or a 
general notice under section 317 (3) . According to section 
382(3) such a specific notice is to be minuted as if the 
declaration had been made at the meeting in question and a 
general notice is to be minuted as if the declaration had 
been made at the next directors' meeting after the notice 
is given. In the event of the director failing to disclose 
his interest in a contract with his company in accordance 
with section 317 (CA 1985), the contract is prima facie 
voidable by the company53; and the director must account to 
it for any secret profit he has made out of the contract^ . 
In addition, section 317 (7) provides that a director who 
fails to make proper disclosure of his interest is liable 
to a fine.
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1.5.- The position in Algerian lax
With the exclusion of the prohibited transactions and 
acts (conventions prohibees)55f an  transactions between 
commercial companies and their directors and shareholders 
are subject to precise regulations. Indeed, the possible 
conflict that may occur between the personal interests of 
the directors and the interest of the company led the 
Algerian legislature to subject some agreements 
(conventions) to a prior authorisation of the general 
m e e t i n g ^ ,  similar regulations exist in all modern legal 
systems; although the precise form naturally differs from 
one country to another^ . From the regulations, the 
commercial code appears to distinguish between three 
categories of conventions, namely, conventions subject to 
prior authorisation by the general meeting, normal 
conventions and prohibited conventions (conventions 
interdites).
Like British law, Algerian law permits company 
directors to enter into agreements and transactions with 
their companies provided that they comply with the 
formalities and conditions set out by law. In fact apart 
from the normal conventions relating to the operations of 
the company with its clients^® ( i.e., those in the
ordinary course of business) any agreement between the
company and one of its directors must be submitted, on 
penalty of nullity, to prior authorisation by a general 
meeting, following a report by the auditors (commissaire 
aux c o m p t e s ) 5 9 .  This applies to any agreement in which a
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director is directly or indirectly interested or in which 
he deals with the company through an intermediary or 
nominee^O. in other words, article 627 (1) applies to three 
types of conventions:
1- Conventions entered into directly between the company 
and a director acting personally.
2- Conventions in which a director has an indirect
interest, entered by a third person on his own
account.
3- Conventions between the company and a director 
entered by an intermediary, notably - a parent- a 
friend - figurehead, in which a director will 
benefit^!.
Furthermore, agreements between a company and another 
enterprise shall also be subject to a prior authorisation 
if one of the directors of the company is a manager, 
administrator or director of the enterprise, whether he is
a shareholder or not. A director who finds one of these
cited cases applicable to himself is obliged to make a 
declaration to this effect to the board of directors*^. 
Since article 627(2) does not require a particular form of 
declaration, a verbal declaration will suffice. The content 
of the declaration is also not determined by article 
627(2). Consequently, it would be sufficient for a director 
to indicate the nature of the contract into which he 
intends to enter with the company or to mention the 
existence of a personal interest in the enterprise 
contracting with the company. This declaration is required
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in all circumstances, whether a director is acting directly 
or through an intermediary .63
Unlike French law64/ power to give the prior 
authorisation in Algerian law is reserved exclusively to 
the general meeting. However since commercial transactions 
require speed and flexibility and according to article 
627(6) the director who is interested in the contract with 
the company cannot take part in the vote, and his shares 
shall not be taken into account in determining the quorum 
and the majority. Therefore, it is impractical to convene a 
general meeting every time one director is interested in a 
contract with the company; a prior authorization by the 
conseil d 'administration (board of directors) followed by 
the ratification of the general meeting seems to be 
sufficient. Indeed, The requirement of a prior 
authorization by the general meeting may appear to be an 
excessivety elaborate procedure especially when balancing 
the financial and other costs of such a meeting which are
in many cases infrequent.65
The authorisation required by the legislature in 
article 627(1) must be prior, and follow from a general 
meetings deliberations.65 must be given without fraud.^ 
The sanction is the nullity of the transaction or 
agreement.68 a nullified action is prescribed for three 
years counting from the date of the agreement.69. However, 
failure to obtain an authorization does not nullify the 
agreement except when it has damaging effects on the
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company. This can be seen in article 62 9(1) which provides 
that "without prejudice to the liability (responsibility) 
of the interested director, the agreement cited in article 
627, paragraphs 2,3,4 and 5, and concluded without prior 
authorization of a general meeting, may be annulled if they 
had had damaging effects on the company". Furthermore, even 
in this case, the nullity may be cured by a vote of a 
general shareholders' meeting after an auditors report 
which describes the circumstances causing the failure to 
follow the correct authorisation procedure.
Finally, it is worthy of note that the agreements 
approved by the shareholders' meeting, as well as those 
which it does not approve, shall be effective with respect 
to third parties, unless they are annulled by fraud.7 1 
However, even in the absence of fraud, the administrator 
(administrateur) or general manager (directeur general) 
concerned, and possibly other members of the administrative 
board, may be held liable for the consequences of a 
disapproved agreement where such consequences are 
detrimental to the company.72
Section 2: Common Lax Duties of Care. Diligence and
Skill;
In addition to the fiduciary duties of loyalty and good 
faith imposed on company directors, the common law further 
provides an additional body of obligations under which a 
director is required to show proper skill, diligence and 
care in the performance of his duties. These duties are
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described to be less onerous, more broadly formulated than 
the fiduciary duties. They are owed to the company and not 
to individual members'^.
The leading case on the nature and extent of the duty 
of skill and care is Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Cq_._ 
Lt d .7 4 . in which Romer J, after reviewing the early 
authorities formulated three basic principles which are 
still regarded as expressing the law on duties of care and 
skill.
2.1.- Degree of skill:
Since a director is not an expert, he need only display 
skills he actually possesses."A director need not exhibit 
in the performance of his duties a greater degree of skill 
than may reasonably be expected from a person of his 
knowledge and e x p e r i e n c e . I t  follows from this, that 
the test of skill required by a director is a subjective 
one, since he is not expected merely by virtue of his 
office to possess any particular skills. The exercise of 
his duties must be judged by the way he applies any skills 
which he actually has^. on the other hand, any objective 
test of skill may be imposed. For example, if a director 
who is employed by a company in a professional capacity, he 
must attain the standard of a reasonably competent member 
of that profession, and also if a director is employed 
under a service contract. It will in any event imply a 
requirement to display an objective level of skill in the 
performance of his duties^. Moreover, in the case of an
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insolvent company, a director faces liability for wrongful 
trading, if he fails to display both the general knowledge, 
skill and experience that he actually has and also that 
which might reasonably be expected of someone carrying out 
his function within the c o m p a n y . ^ 8
2.2.- Attention t£ Company Business and attendance
&£ board meetings;
"A director is not bound to give continuous attention 
to the affairs of his company. His duties are of an 
intermittent nature to be performed at periodical board 
meetings... He is not, however bound to attend all such 
meetings, though he ought to attend whenever in the 
circumstances, he is reasonably able to do so".^ This 
dictum is clearly more relevant to the circumstances of a 
non-executive director from whom nothing more is expected 
than attendance at meetings. In Re Cardiff Savinas Bank; 
the Marquis of Bute’s C a s e ,80 the Marquis of Bute became 
president of a company by succeeding his father (he had 
been appointed to this post when he was only six months 
old) he attended one board meeting in 38 years. As a result 
of this he failed to prevent the active director conducting 
the company's business improperly. Nevertheless, Stirling, 
J held that he was not liable for losses resulted from 
irregularities which had occurred during his absence. 
Stirling, J said "Neglect or omission to attend meetings is 
not, in my opinion, the same thing as neglect or omission
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of a duty which ought to be performed of those meetings". 
However, this view seems to be unlikely to be adopted in 
future judgements. On the face of it, executive directors 
are required by their service contracts to devote their 
full attention to the business of the company. In the 
Ssouth African case of Fisheries Development Corps of SA 
Ltd. v. J u r g e n s e n , Margo, J. suggested that the old rules 
as formulated by Romer, J. are relevant only to non­
executive directors and new rules must be formulated for 
executive directors.
2.3.- Reliance on other executives (officials):
"In respect of all duties that, having regard to the 
exigencies of business, and the articles of association, 
may properly be left to some other official, a director is, 
in the absence of grounds for suspicion, justified in 
trusting that official to perform such duties honestly."®® 
As previously noted in chapter three, company's business 
cannot be carried out in an efficient manner unless its 
directors are permitted to be assisted by other persons 
(officials & executives) who posses more skill and 
experience. Furthermore, the fact that directors as such 
are not required to possess any particular accomplishment®^ 
shows clearly their necessity of relying on expert 
officials. The directors are not required when relying on 
other officials, to supervise those to whom tasks have been 
delegated. Further, they are not responsible vicariously 
for their wrongful acts since they are (officials) the
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agents and servants of the company, not of the directors®^. 
In D o v e y  v. C o r y 86f the director of a banking company 
agreed to certain irregularities in reliance on the advice 
of the chairman and general manager. The House of Lords 
held that was not liable in negligence for breach of his 
duty of care because it was reasonable for him to rely on 
these officers. Lord Halsbury L C said:
"I cannot think that it can be expected of a 
director that he should be watching either the 
inferior officers of the bank or verifying the 
calculation of the auditors himself. The business 
of life could not go on if people could not trust 
those who are put into a position of trust for the 
express purpose of attending to details of 
management."
Having said that, directors are still under duty to 
exercise a reasonable amount of care. In other words, they
are not entitled to accept blindly all documents placed
before them^.
However, it appears that the judgements of the Re City 
Equitable and other old cases can no longer be regarded
as safe guides to the standard of care and skill
required.87 This is because the commercial climate 
under which they were formulated differs from the current 
commercial practice. Consequently, a new formulation
updating the rules regulating the duty of care and skill 
should be presented in a way that reflects the true 
position and real role of a modern company director.
After this brief discussion of the three propositions
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expressed by Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance,
it would be important to throw some light on the current 
situation regarding the duties cited above,
2.4.- Standards of Care and Skill
The law at present requires all company directors to 
display some degree of care and skill when discharging 
their duties. However, to understand the two duties, it is 
necessary to highlight two important points. The first one 
concerns a definitionary problem. In one attempt to draw a 
line between the duty of care and skill^, it is submitted 
that care refers to any duties concerning factors that 
might be employed by the layman in dealing with issues that 
he is called upon to consider as a director (in his 
capacity as a director). Conversely, duties of skill relate 
to specific areas of expertise and specialty. This 
distinction appears to have a practical importance. This is 
so because the standard applicable to directors when 
limiting (deciding the degree) of their liability differs 
from one duty (care) to another (skill).
The second important and most controversial question 
facing courts over the years is that: How much of care and 
skill can be expected of them? Clearly, what is the 
standard of care and skill expected from a company 
director? Although the judgement of Romer J., in Re City 
Equitable Fire Insurance^  lays down that, in discharging 
his duties, a director must act honestly, and must also 
exercise "some degree of care, skill and diligence".
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However, as to what particular degree he submits that the 
authorities do not give any clear answer. Furthermore, 
despite the fact that business administration has become a 
specialised task, there are not yet any signs that the 
courts are attributing to directors the standards of any 
profession^O. Currently, British law does not provide an 
objective standard of skill and care that can be applicable 
to all company directors^!. Instead, there is a general 
principle whose application in each- case calls for a 
personal assessment of the individual director^. This 
shows clearly the personal character of the duty of care 
and skill under British Company Law. The absence of a 
professional standard as Professor Pennington argues is 
that "because directors do not form an homogeneous category 
and they require different degrees of skill and application 
to do their work efficiently, depending on the size of the 
company they serve, the complexity of its operations, the 
form of its management structure and the relative 
importance to the company of the transactions in respect of 
which negligence is alleged"^. This view seems to be 
logical and reasonable. Indeed, the fact the British 
legislature does not require any qualification for the post 
of company director means that skill and qualification may 
differ from one director to another. Thus, any attempt to 
establish an objective standard applicable to all directors 
appears to be a very difficult task if not impossible. In 
addition, many boards of management (especially large 
companies) include outside directors (non-executive
167
directors) . This category of directors do not devote all 
their time and energies to one company only. Therefore, it 
can be said that it is quite difficult and unrealistic to 
frame a standard (professional standard) which is precise 
enough to be effective and flexible enough to comprehend 
many different directors in many different situations9^ . 
Furthermore, the law cannot really measure business 
efficiency, and courts are always reluctant to be involved 
in the investigation of the internal management of the 
company^ or intervene with the director’s business 
judgement96 (particularly after the event). This ig known
in America as "the business judgement rule” which means 
that it is not the function of the court to intervene in 
the matters regarding the business judgement of the 
company9 .^ As Professor Ballantine96 pointed out:
"The [USA] courts will not in general undertake to 
review the expediency of contracts of other 
business transactions authorised by the directors.
A large discretion is lodged in them. Questions of 
value and policy are for their business judgement, 
although their errors may be so gross as to show 
their unfitness to manage corporate affairs. But it 
is presupposed in this business judgement rule that 
reasonable diligence and care have been exercised."
The lightness of the duties of care, diligence and 
skill may be noticed in a number of British cases. For 
example, in Re Forest of Dean Co.99, Jessel M.R. said:
"...(Directors are) to use reasonable diligence 
having regard to their position, though probably an
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ordinary director, who only attends at the board 
occasionally, cannot be expected to devote as much 
time and attention to the business as the sole 
managing partner of an ordinary partnership, but 
they are bound to use their fair and reasonable 
diligence in the management of their company's 
affairs, and to act honestly."
It is also submitted that a director cannot be expected 
to display skill that he does not possess. Thus, in 
Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd.100, Neville J 
said:
" (A director) is, I think, not bound to bring any 
special qualifications to his office. He may 
undertake the management of a rubber company in 
complete ignorance of everything connected with 
rubber, without incurring responsibility for the 
mistakes which may result from such ignorance."
It was also pointed out in the Government White Paper 
"The Conduct of Company Directors"^^^- that a director is 
only required to exercise that degree of skill which may 
reasonable be expected of a person of his knowledge and 
experience. The same provision can be found in the 
Companies Bill 1978 (Cl. 45 ( 1 ) ) is clear from this 
that the standard of skill is a subjective one. However, 
this view may be criticised on the grounds that it makes 
the directors' duties of care and skill very low and may 
exonerate incompetent directors on the basis that he can do 
no betterl03 indeed, this may be used as an excuse by 
directors to escape from liability for their negligence. As 
a result of this it is suggested that this low standard
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applicable to directors' duties of care and skill must be 
increased. It is argued-^^ that the main reason for that is 
that the reported cases on this question were all decided 
before the existence of 'professional' company directors. 
In addition, a director of a modern company may be an 
employee of the company with a service contract, in this 
case he will subject to greater standard. Furthermore, the 
unreported case of Dorchester Finance Co. Ltd. v. Stebbing 
(22 July 1977) noted in(1980) 1 Co. Law 38) recognises the
need for a higher standard besides it can be noticed that 
certain provision of the Insolvency Act 1986 such as 
(Section 214 regarding wrongful trading) seem to require 
higher standards of a director.
From the discussion above, it can be said that both 
objective standard and subjective standard are unable to 
provide a convincing solution to frame the extent of 
directors' duties of skill and care, although as Mr 
MacKenzie noted "Both formulae have their advantages and 
many drawbacks"^ 5. indeed the application of subjective 
standard may lead to strange consequences, such as the 
protection of incompetent directors at the expense of other 
directors which constitutes a breach to the established 
rule that the board of directors should be seen to act 
uniformly in the benefit of the company. In addition, this 
may discourage the well qualified directors from accepting 
directorships, and this, consequently result in creating 
incompetent Companies Boards. Similarly, the objective
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standard is not free from disadvantages. The reason is that the 
impracticality of applying the same standard to different types of 
directors with different tasks to do e.g. it is not fair to judge an 
outside director (non-executive director) by the same standard as a 
full time director (executive director) since the former is not 
expected to have the same amount of knowledge and experience of the 
company's affairs as the latter.
The third view suggests the combination of the two opposing 
theories stated above. This is by setting out a number of different 
objective standards. The application of each depending on the 
particular role the director is occupying in the company. For 
example, separate standards for expert directors, executive directors 
(with no speciality) and non-executive directors (with no specialty). 
Therefore, every director will subject to one objective standard 
within the area of his specialty or competence. In other 
circumstances the normal lax rules would be a p p l i e d 1 ^ .  The last view
is that of Professor Pennington. He submits that:
"The most the courts can do in seeking to establish 
objective criteria is to require a minimum degree of 
specialised competence from directors whose recognised 
qualifications or experience in the company's area of 
business make it reasonable to expect them to exhibit a 
certain level of professional or practical skill. This is a 
less exacting criterion that the standard of performance 
expected of a professionally qualified practitioner, namely 
the level attainable by the average competent practitioner 
in his f i e l d . .
This view seems to be more balanced and more 
acceptable in practice.
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Chapter Five 
Liability Qf-Cgngany-Directorg.
Section 1 : Separate legal personality of a company.
and its ....effects on Directors liability.
Both British law and Algerian law expressly recognise 
the separate legal entity of the company. Under Algerian 
law both civil and commercial companies, if properly and 
validly formed enjoy a separate legal identity (la 
personality morale) and full legal capacity. In other 
words, an Algerian company is deemed by the fact of its 
constitution, to be a juristic person. Such juristic 
personality is, however, effective as regards third parties 
only upon completion of the formalities of publication 
required by law.l This is provided by article 417(1) of the 
Civil Code 1975: "Par le fait de sa constitution, la
societe est consideree comme personne morale. 
Toutefois, cette personality morale n 1est opposable 
aux tiers qu'apres 1'accomplissement des formalites 
de publicite prescrites par la loi."
Moreover, the law provides in article 444 (of the civil 
code) that the juristic personality persists in so far as 
is necessary, for and up to the end of the liquidation. 
"...mais la personality de la societe subsiste pour les 
besoins et jusqu'a la fin de la liquidation". This is again 
confirmed by article 766 of the commercial code (1 9 75) 2. in
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fact, once the company acquired its juristic personality
(personality morale) it becomes an independent separate
body distinct from its founders. Indeed, it will be similar
to any other individual person in a number of aspects. The
authority for this is article 50 of the Civil Code 1975
(modified 1986) which provides that "A juristic person
enjoys, within the limits established by law, all rights,
with the exception of those rights which are inherent in
the nature of a natural person." In this respect Dr.
4Mahrez submits that there are limitations imposed upon 
juristic personality (la personality morale) of the 
company. One derived from its nature and formation, the 
other is by virtue of its purpose. Regarding the first one, 
it is clear that there are some rights which are confined
to natural persons only and cannot be enjoyed by an
. . .  Sartificial person such as a company. Examples for this
are: Familial rights that follows from marriage, divorce or 
rights that result from (kinship of affinity) such as 
rights of inheritance and aliment etc. The second" 
limitation results from the fact that companies are limited 
to (restricted to) the purpose for which they are formed 
for. In other words, a company is empowered only to the 
extent necessary to enable it to carry out its objects or 
purposes; unlike the natural person who is entitled to 
acquire any rights and assume any obligations. 
Nevertheless, apart from these two restrictions, the" 
company is very akin to a natural person. It has a) its own
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name^ that distinguishes it from other legal persons and 
under which it can sue and be sued; b) its own patrimonium 
(property), assets and liabilities (un patrimoine propre) 
distinct from those of its members. They are to be used 
exclusively for its own purposes. In addition, its 
creditors cannot obtain satisfaction from the assets of its 
members, since the liability of the latter is limited to 
the capital invested by them; c) legal capacity (la 
capacite juridique) within the limits fixed by its 
constitution or established by law; d) its own domicile 
(siege social) which is the place where its direction is
. 7 • ■ .centralised. In addition, it has the right to sue and a
• . ftrepresentative to express its will.
Similarly, under British law a company is treated as a 
person quite distinct from the individuals who are its 
members.  ^ It can own property, have rights and duties and 
incur liabilities. Indeed, the two prime advantages of a 
incorporation are the creation of a separate legal entity 
and the limited liability. As Professor Gower^ noted "It 
is from this fundamental attribute of separate personality 
that most of the particular advantages of incorporation 
spring". It is the main characteristic that distinguishes a 
registered company from a partnership, which is defined by 
the Partnership Act 18 90 as "the relationship which 
subsists between persons carrying on a business in common 
with a view of profit". Unlike a registered company it has 
no legal existence but is merely the association of two or 
more persons carrying on business together. The property of
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the firm belongs to the partners and the firm's debts are 
the debts of the partners. ^  On the other hand, the 
registered company holds property and enters into 
contractual relations with outsiders. Thus, it is the 
company which will primarily be liable to such activities 
and not the members or directors.
Section 13(3) of the Companies Act 1985 expressly 
recognises the separate legal identity of the company. It 
provides that: "From the date of incorporation mentioned in 
the certificate, the subscribers of the memorandum, 
together with such other persons as may from time to time 
become members of the company shall be a body corporate by 
the name contained in the memorandum."
This fundamental principle of company law of 1 separate
legal personality of a company was established by the House
of Lords in the leading case of Salomon v. Salomon & Co. 
19L_L&. where it was decided that however large the 
proportion of shares and debentures owned by one man, the 
Company's acts were not his acts nor were its liabilities 
his liabilities; and it is not otherwise even if he has 
sole control of the affairs of the company as its governing 
directors-^ # In the words of Lord Macnaghten: ^
1 The company is at law a different person 
altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum; 
and, though it may be that after incorporation the 
business is precisely the same as it was before, 
and the same persons are managers, and the same 
hands receive the profits, the company is not in 
law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for
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them. Nor are the subscribers as members liable, in 
any shape or form, except to the extent and in the 
manner provided by the Act."
A support for this rule can be found in a number of 
cases.15For example, in Booth v. Helliwell16, Shearman J 
s a i d ^ :"A company must be regarded as a separate entity 
from any one of its shareholders, no matter how many shares 
he may hold." Similarly, in Macaura v. Northern Assurance 
Company Ltd'.^r ^  was held that the largest shareholder
had no insurable interest in the property of the company.
19Lord Wrenbury said: "My Lord, this appeal may be disposed
of by saying that the corporator even if he holds all the 
shares is not the corporation, and that neither he nor any 
creditor of the company has any property legal or equitable
in the assets of the corporation." Again in Tunstall v.
• 9 n . .Steigmann^  the same view was confirmed. Ormerod L.J.
. 9 1said:^-1-
"It was decided in Salomon v. Salomon Co that a 
company and the individual or individuals forming a 
company were separate slegal entities, however 
complete the control might be by one or more of 
those individuals over the company. That is the 
whole principle of the formation of limited 
liability companies and it would be contrary to the 
scheme of the Companies Acts to depart from that 
principle".
It appears that Scots Law also adopts the same view and 
the principle of separate personality applies equally to 
companies incorporated in Scotland.^2 Indeed, it is 
submitted that the principle stated in the Salomon's case
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was forcefully stated in the earlier Scots case of Thomson.
v. Incorporation of CandLemakers of Edinburgh (1855) 17 D.
7 65 23 Furthermore L.P. Inglis in Muir et al v. City of 
9 4Glasgow Bank^ ;  stated that a:
” Corporation being a separate person has its own 
estate and its own liabilities and the corporators 
are not liable for the corporation but only to the 
corporation within the limit of the obligations 
they have undertaken to subscribe to the corporate 
funds. "Si quid Universitati debetur, singulis non 
debetur; nec quod Universitas debet singuli 
debent. "
From the line of cases cited above it is quite clear 
that the principle of separate personality became a real 
phenomenon and a fully recognisable principle in British 
Company l a w . 25 This is so despite a strong criticism from 
some writers^ .
One of the geatest advantages of the principle of 
separate entity of a company is that its members 
(shareholders) are not as such liable for its debts. In 
other words, a shareholder in a company incorporated with 
limited liability is liable only for the amount, not 
already paid, of the capital represented by the shares in 
his name. He is also under no further liability in the case 
of fully paid shares.Consequently, the assets of the 
company are the only source upon which the creditors can 
depend for payment of their debts. The same rules apply to 
directors. Hence they incur no personal liability for the 
debts of the company. This is because the protection
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provided by the veil of incorporation includes both 
shareholders and directors alike although this rule does
o n ,
subject to exceptions as regards the directors. This
veil of incorporation is described as "a barrier interposed
between the company as a legal person, on the one hand, and
its shareholders and its directors and managers on the 
2 8other." However, despite the advantages of the principle 
the courts began to be faced with situations where the 
concept of corporate personality was being used as a 
curtain (mask) to hide the real facts. This includes the 
use of corporate form to commit fraud, avoid personal civil 
of criminal liability or evade contractual or other legal
obligations. One good illustration for the latter case is
• 2 Q . •to be found in Jones v. Lipman ^ . Lipman had entered into
a contract to sell his house to Jones. He sought to escape 
his obligation by saying that he had sold the house to a 
company called Alamed Ltd. (in which it was revealed that 
he and a clerk of his solicitors were the directors and 
only shareholders). He considered himself to be in breach
of contract and offered damages. But Jones refused to
. . 3 0accept this and sought specific performance. Russel J,
in granting a decree of specific performance, described the
company as "The creature of the first defendant, a device
and a sham, a mask which he holds before his face in an
attempt to avoid recognition by the eye of equity". The
same view was recognised by the House of Lords in the
Scottish case of Woolf son v. Strathclyde Regional 
> 3 1Counc i 1° , where it was laid down that the veil of
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incorporation could be lifted but only where special
circumstances indicate that the corporation is a mere
fagade concealing true facts. Indeed, the abuses of
corporate personality and the injustice that may result
from the rigid application of Salomon rule have convinced
the courts to review the principle in order to find some
32ways to prevent this negative effect. This has led to
the creation of a procedure known as lifting or "piercing"
3 3 .the corporate veil by which the legal personality of the
company is disregarded. This enables the creditors to get
at the human persons behind the company, against whom they
sought some remedy for some wrongdoing. ^  Where the veil
is lifted, the law either renders other persons, usually
members or directors, jointly liable with the company for
its debts or to identify them with a company as a single 
35person.
Various courts and commentators list different factors 
that will justify piercing the corporate veil.^ That is 
to ignore or set aside the separate legal personality. 
These may be categorised into three classes.^ Firstly, 
case where the veil has been lifted by Act of Parliament 
(Statutory c a s e s ) s e c o n d l y ,  cases under the Trading 
With the Enemy Act where the veil has been lifted by the 
courts in carrying out the intention of the Act (Trading 
with the Enemy Cases) ^9, thirdly, cases where the courts 
have lifted the veil at common law and without statutory 
authority (common law cases) . However, the decided cases do 
not provide a general principle under which the courts
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permit the veil to be lifted. In fact some of these cases 
are difficult to reconcile with others where the courts 
have refused to lift the veil.^^ In Algerian law article 
224 of the commercial code seems to be the only article 
that mentions the lifting of the corporate veil. This is by 
holding those who control the company responsible for the 
company's debts when the company goes bankrupt. It provides 
as follows:
" En cas de reglement judiciaire ou de faillite d'une 
personne morale, peut etre declare personnellement en 
reglement judiciaire ou faillite tout dirigeant de droit ou 
de fait, apparent ou occulte remunere ou nom, qui a:
- Sous le couvert de la personne morale masquant ses 
agissements, fait des actes de commerce dans un interet 
personnel, ou dispose des biens sociaux comme des siens 
propres;
- ou poursuivi abusivement, dans sont interet 
personnel, une exploitation defiaitaire" qui ne pouvait 
conduire qu'a la cessation des paiement de la personne 
morale."
In the light of the above discussion, it seems that the 
piercing of the corporate veil is a necessary legal 
procedure and a sufficient weapon in the hands of the 
courts. It is also the only effective device before the 
courts to reach the wrongdoers that hide behind the
corporate curtain. Indeed, as Palmer put it:
"The ability to chose between the application of 
the rule in Salomons case and the jurisdiction to
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pierce the veil of corporateness gives the courts a 
considerable degree of discretion and enables them 
to do justice and to decide individual cases in 
accordance with equitable considerations."^
Finally, it can be said that once the veil is pierced, 
directors will personally face the third party seeking 
remedy against their action.
Section 2: Directors_'__Personal__Liability
2.1.- general Immunity
• 4 2As previously noted directors duties are owed to the 
company and to the company alone. In other words, they owe 
no duties to the shareholders^ and are not personally 
liable for the company's debts or other obligations to its 
creditors or other persons with whom they deal on its 
behalf. This is so even if the directors acts cause the 
company to incur a legal liability.^ This general immunity 
of directors from liability to the company's shareholders, 
creditors, persons with whom the company contracts and to 
third persons is legally justified by the fact that
directors act as agents of the company, which is a distinct
>
legal person from themselves and from shareholders and 
• 4 Screditors. ■ Indeed, by consulting case law it can be 
noticed that Company directors have bendfitted from this 
general principle of immunity in a number of -cases. For 
example, it was held in Wilson v. Lord Bury^  and in 
Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd.4"7 that
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directors are not liable at common law or in equity for 
debts which they incur on the company's behalf at a time 
when they know that their company is insolvent and cannot 
pay the new debts incurred by them. Similarly, they are not 
liable to the company's creditors or persons with whom it 
has contracted, if they manage the company's affairs 
negligently and therefore make it incapable of fulfilling 
its contracts or paying its debts.However, despite this 
general immunity, directors may be held liable either alone 
or concurrently with their company wherever there is ground 
for liability.
This section deals with the two ways in which 
directors' acts create a liability in the company: Firstly, 
where directors are treated as the company's agents and act 
for the company. Secondly, where directors acts are treated 
as the company's acts, and finally discusses who is the 
alter ego of the company.
2.2.- Directors acting for the company (Agents)
It has long been established that directors are, in 
the eyes of the law, agents of the company for which they 
act. ^  Indeed, the relationship of the company and its 
directors in many respects is regulated by the general 
principles of the law of agency and vicarious liabilty. For 
example, when a director acts on behalf of the company as 
its agent with authority^ such as concluding a contract or 
entering an agreement or transaction, he will not be 
personally liable for these agreements and contracts, but
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the liability will be attributed to his company alone which
is his principal. Furthermore, even if a director acts
without authority he is still only liable in the same way
as any other agent. Indeed, it was held, that directors who
have duly acted on behalf of the company are not liable to
the contracting party even if the company could not, at the
time the contract was made, fulfil it.^ The authority for
this established principle can be clearly noticed in a
number of cases where the British courts applied the agency
rules to the relationship between the company and its
directors. As early as 1866 in Ferguson v. Wilson^  Cairns
L J. tried to clarify the position of directors and their
53relationship with their company by saying:
"What is the position of a director of a public 
company? They are merely agents of a company. The company 
itself cannot act in its own person, for it has no person; 
it can only act through directors, and the case is, as 
regards those directors merely the ordinary case of 
principal and agent. Whenever an agent is liable those 
directors would be liable; where the liability would attach 
to the principal, and the principal only, the liability is 
the liability of the company". As to the general principle 
that a master is liable for every such wrong of his servant 
or agent as is committed in the course of his service, and 
for the masters benefit. Lord Selbourne in Houldsworth v. 
City of Glasgow Bank and liquidators^  stated that "It is a 
principle, not of the law of torts, or of fraud or deceit,
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but of the law of agency equally applicable whether the
agency is for a corporation (in a matter within the scope
. . 55of the corporate powers) or for an individual". The same 
view was expressed by Lord Hatherly^  who believes that a 
corporation is bound by the wrongful act of its agent "no
less than an individual", and that the result of such
misrepresentation must take effect in the same manner
against a corporation as it would against an individual.
. . . .  . 57Again m  Citizens' Life Assurance Company Ltd. v. Brown
Lord Lindley in his statement regarding the principle that
C O
governs a corporate liability. He said:
"If it is once granted that corporations are for 
civil purposes to be regarded as persons, i.e., as 
principals acting by agents and servants, it is 
difficult to see why the ordinary doctrines of 
agency and of a master and servant are not to be 
applied to corporations as well a to ordinary 
individuals."
However, the insuficence of these principles (doctrine 
of agency) in certain situations to provide a clear answer 
on how to impose liability on a company led the courts to 
search for alternative principles that may solve this 
problem. This consequently paved the way to the development 
of the organic theory.
2.3.- Directors acting as the company
Despite the fact that the application of the law of 
agency to the relationship between a company and its 
directors played an important role in preventing the
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company from escaping liability both in civil and criminal 
law by exposing the company to liability whenever justice
eg
so requires. There are some situations where agency
principles could not provide an adequate solution or help
the courts impose liability on a company particularly where
personal fault alone was an ingredient in that 
finliability. In other words there are some circumstances 
where personal fault is a requirement for liability. 
However, according to the general rule, the company is 
fictional person, it has no mind or body or other physical 
attributes and therefore cannot be held liable for any 
delict / tort that prerequisites actual fault on the part 
of the wrongdoer or any crime that requires proof of mens 
rea or any act requiring evidence or, for example, 
intent.61 But since the strict application of the principle 
in some cases may lead companies to escape liability. It 
was necessary to find some exceptions to the principle 
whereby the company itself may be held responsible. The 
leading case in this respect is Lennard's Carrying C . v. 
Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd.62, where a company which was the 
owner of the ship that caused damage was seeking the 
protection provided by section 502 of the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1894, under which the owner of the British ship will 
not be liable to make good claims for "any loss or damage 
happening without his actual faults or privity". To take 
advantage of this section, the company submitted that the 
fire loss of a cargo of benzine happened without its 
personal fault or privity. In fact, the loss was caused by
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the default of Lennard, the managing director of the 
company. The House of Lords in this case was faced by a new 
situation where the application of agency rules (doctrine 
of agency) cannot do justice. As a result of this, in order 
to impose liability on the company, the House of Lords had 
to find some justifying arguments. This is by finding a 
device of identifying certain categories of person 
(officer) with the company or, in other words, of treating 
them as the human embodiment of the company in order that 
their acts or omissions can be attached to the company, and 
consequently holding the company liable. The judgement of 
the House of Lords was delivered by Viscount Haldane who
"My Lords a corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of 
its own any more that it has a body of its own; its active 
and directing will must consequently be sought in the person 
of somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, 
but who is really the directing mind and will of the 
corporation, the very ego and centre of the personality of 
the corporation. That person may be under the direction of 
the shareholders in general meeting; that person may be the 
board of directors itself, or it may be, and in some 
companies it is so, that that person has an authority co­
ordinate with the board of directors given to him under the 
articles of association...It must be upon the true 
construction of that section in such a case as the present 
that the fault or privity is the fault of somebody who is 
not merely a servant or agent for whom the company is liable 
upon the footing respondeat superior, but somebody for whom 
the company is liable because his action is the action of 
the company itself".
This judgement seems to have received a great support.
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This is reflected in a number of cases in different areas
of law 64, although its formulation has tended to differ
depending on the branch of law in which it was employed.65
The example for Merchant Shipping Law is H.M.S Truculent.
The Admirality v. The Divina66 where Willmer, J applied
the same principle so as to impose liability on the
Admiralty for a fault committed by a commanding officer of
a submarine. Likewise, the above principle appeared in law
of Landlord and Tenant. In H.L Bolton (Engineering) Co.
Ltd, V.T.J Graham & Sons Ltd.67, in applying the principle
Denning L.J expressed his dictum by likening the company to 
6 8a human body. According to his view there are some 
persons who constitute the company's brain and therefore he 
suggests that the company would be liable for their acts 
because their acts are those of the company itself. On the 
other hand, he described the other category of persons as 
merely the hands which hold the tools, and the company's 
liability for their acts could be only upon the footing 
respondeat superior.
As stated earlier the adoption of the organic theory 
was not confined to delict or tort but extended to include 
criminal acts as well. This is reflected in the 
introduction of a general principle whereby (under which) 
the company would be personally liable for the acts of 
certain officers. This principle is clearly shown in three 
different cases . The first one is D i r e c t o r  of Public
P.rosecution v. Kent & Sussex Contractor Ltd.69 where the
company and the transport manager were prosecuted for a
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contravention of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939 in
that (1) 'They with intent to deceive, made use...of a
document which was false in a material particular'; and (2)
'they made a statement which they knew to be false in a
material particular'. The local justices dismissed the
information, on the basis that a body corporate could not
in law be guilty of the offenses charged. However, this
decision was reversed by a Divisional Court. Macnaghten J
said:"It is true that a corporation can only have knowledge
and form an intention through its human agents, but
circumstances may be such that the knowledge and intention
7 0of the agent must be imputed to the body corporate" • In 
the same year this decision was approved by the Court of 
Criminal Appeal in the case of R.V.I.C.R Haulage Ltd.71 
where the appellant Company was charged, along with its 
managing director and nine other persons with common law 
conspiracy to defraud. The Court held that the Company 
could be convicted despite the fact that mens rea was an
, 7 2
essential element of the offence. In the third case,
73Moore v. Bresler Ltd a company was prosecuted, for
contravening section 35(2) of The Finance (No.2) Act 1940, 
which provides: "If, with intent to deceive, any person for 
the purposes of this Act...makes use of...any document 
which is false in a material particular, he shall be liable 
to a penalty of £500." The Company was convicted despite 
the fact that the acts were not those of its directors but 
merely of its secretary and a branch manager.
In Scotland, however, the first case where corporate
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criminal liability for common law crimes was considered is
E&an V  John Menzies (Holdings) Lid. 74 in which a limited
company that operates a chain of bookshops in Scotland was 
charged with the common law offense of " shamelessly 
indecent conduct" in that they were alleged to have sold or 
exposed for sale various indecent and obscene magazines.
The High court held that a company could not commit a
i . 7 5 . • <crime of shameless indecency. This is because ,according
to Lord Maxwell, there was no clear single fiction
7 6recognised by Scots law for these purposes. In addition, 
Lord Stott said:77
"It is I think self-evident that there are certain 
crimes and offences which cannot be committed by a 
corporate body. Murder is such a crime , not only, 
as the Advocate-Depute conceded, because a company 
cannot be imprisoned but because it is incapable of 
having that wicked intent or recklessness of mind 
necessary to constitute the crime of murder .Other 
examples which come to mind are reset and perjury.
In my opinion the offence of conducting oneself in 
a shamelessly indecent manner falls into the same 
category."
The very recent case is that of Purcell Meats
(Scotland) Ltd. v. McLeod 78 which is the first case in a
Scottish Common Law prosecution where it is decided that
the actions and knowledge of "individuals of the necessary
7 9status" can be ascertained to a company. Here, the 
company was charged with attempted fraud arising from an 
incident in which the premium certification stamps from 
nine carcases of beef were obliterated and an Intervention
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Board for Agricultural Produce Exemption Stamp applied
instead. As a result of this the company was exempted from
the repayment of the beef premium clawback amounting to
£411. At first instance, the sheriff repelled the pleas to
the competency and relevancy of this amended complaint. In
its appeal to the High Court against the decision the
company produced two arguments. The first one is that the
complaint was incompetent as a limited Company was
incapable of forming the requisite mens rea for the
offence, and the second argument is that it was lacking in
specification in that the person or persons through whom or
by whom the limited company had acted (operated) were not
identified and that it was not possible to impute the
mental state of a natural person to the company if the
identity of that person was unknown, and accordingly the
action should be dismissed. In delivering the judgement of 
8 0the Court , The Lord Justice Clerk quoted the dictum of 
Lord Reid in the case of Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v.
Ol
Nattras which his Lordship apparently accepted in its
entirety. He concluded that the charge was sufficient in
competency and specification. That is to say that it is
competent to charge a limited company with the common law
crime of attempted fraud, even though the crime has a
82prerequisite of mens rea. However it is worthy of note 
that although the general principle of imputing directors' 
acts to the company is normally applied in cases involving 
delict or tort and crime, there are limits to its
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application. For example, it has been held that a company 
cannot be indicted for an offence of violence84 or for 
conspiracy with a director who is its only responsible
oc (
officer. Furthermore, there are some offences which
86 ,cannot be committed by companies such as bigamy, perjury, 
rape or murder .
2 .4 .- The__ alter eao of .the Company.
Although as seen above the alter ego doctrine (organic
theory) has been applied to both delict/tort and criminal
law. This is by treating certain persons as the company
itself and their acts are the company's acts and their
will, the company's will. However, it remained unclear as
to exactly whose acts and intentions could be attributed to 
87the company. In other words, at what point in the company 
hierarchy will individuals cease to be treated as servants 
or agents and start to be treated as the company itself? 
The question seems to be tied in with the issue of 
delegation of managerial powers within the company88 and
how the level of the officer or employee in the corporate
• fi Qhierarchy affects liability of the company In fact the
answer for this question can be derived from different
statements and authorities in a number of cases. For
example, in J.C Houghton & Co. v. Nothard. Lowe and Wills 
90Ltd m  an attempt to clarify the category of persons
whose acts may be imputed to the company. Viscount Dunedin 
. 91said "The knowledge of the company can only be the
knowledge of persons who are entitled to represent the
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company. It may be assumed that the knowledge of directors
is in ordinary circumstances that of the company". However,
this view seems to be rather general and broad. Thus in
H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd V. T.J. Graham and Sons. 
9 2Lt d . , Lord Denning went further trying to be more
specific. This is by drawing a line between the acts of
those directors and mangers who control what the company
actually does and the acts of mere servants who simply
carry out orders from above. His Lordship said:93 "Others
are directors and managers who represent the directing mind
and will of the company, and control what it does. The
state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the
company and is treated by the law as such".
Similarly, Judge Chapman, in R.V. Stanley Haulage 
94LJldL. decided that a corporation could be held liable
where the authority held by the officer in question was
managerial, and where his decisions over the relevant
aspect of corporate affairs could be made without further
reference to any superior. Again in Magna Plant Ltd v. 
95  ■
Mitchell it was pointed out by Lord Parker _C.J. That a
corporation could only be held liable for the knowledge and
"acts of the responsible officers forming the brain, or in
the case of an individual, a person to whom delegation in
the true sense of delegation of management has been 
96passed." This view was adopted again in Tesco Supermarket
97Ltd. v. Nattrass. In the light of the above cases Dr. 
Leigh suggested that there are two circumstances in which 
criminal liability may be imposed." It may be imposed in
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respect of actions commanded by the board of directors as
the brain, or by a responsibile officer enjoyng managerial 
98functions" In Canada the doctrine of identification seems
to be wider and extends beyond directors to include high
managerial persons who have been given autonomous
responsibility and an extensive authority over a particular
. . 99area of corporate activity. In a recent case, R.V. Spot 
Supermarket Inc^ ^  It was held that the acts of a Company
Supervisor and auditors were the acts of the corporation.
. . .  101In delivering his judgement Lamer, J.A said "One must
not lose sight of the fact that the board of directors had 
delegated to the company auditors complete latitude to 
decide on all accounting questions with the company 
supervisor."
On the other hand, the position in Britain as Mr. Fien
102 put it is slightly more conservative than in Canada.
This can be clearly noticed in the recent leading case
103Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass where the House of 
Lords held that a branch manager, one of a several hundred, 
was not sufficiently superior to be the alter ego of the 
company. This is because the persons or delegates who could 
be identified with the company as Viscount Dilhorne noted, 
must have control and management, with full discretionary 
powers, of some sections of the company’s business.
Finally, it is worthy of note that even in the 
circumstances where directors acts and mind are treated as 
the acts and mind of the company. They are not the company
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as such. Consequently, it can be said that the principle of 
separate personality remains the norm and indeed one of the 
strongest rules in modern Company law.
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Not es
1- Article 549(1) of the Commercial Code 1975 provides that 
"A company does not have a juristic personality until 
its enrollment in the register of commerce".
2- Article 7 66 of the Commercial Code 1975 provides: "La 
personality morale de la societe subsist pour les 
besoins de la liquidation, jusqu'a la cloture de celle- 
ci."
3- Article 50(1) of the Civil Code 1975 (modified 1986) "La 
personne morale jouit, dans les limites determinees par 
la loi, de tout les droits, a l'exclusion de ce qui sont 
propres a la personne physique".
4- Mahrez, A., Droit Commercial en Aloerie (Societes 
Commerciales), 2nd edition, 1980, at p.68.
5- Similar view was expressed by Pickering, M.A., "The
company as a separate legal entity", (1968), 31
M . L . R . 481 at p. 509. He noted that the company as an
artificial person differs from a natural person in two 
main respects. Firstly," the extent or range of the 
capacity with which it may be endowed is very much more 
restricted that that of an individual. Secondly, its 
ultimate motivation is not that of one person but of an 
association of persons, who usually act by majority 
rule, and who customarily delegate the exercise of their 
powers of control over many of the company's affairs to 
others. "
6 -  Article 593 of the Algerian Commercial code 1975
provides : "La societe par action est designee par une
denomination sociale qui doit etre precede au suivi par 
de la mention de la forme de la societe et du montant 
du capital social."
7- Article 547 of the Algerian Commercial code provides
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"The domicile of the company is at the firm's 
headquarters. Companies which operate in Algeria are 
subject to Algerian law".
8-  Article 50 of the Civil Code 1975 (modified 1986)
9- See Pennington, R,R., Company law, 5th edition 1985, 
p.46; See for example section 13(2) of the Companies Act 
1948 which provides: "From the date of incorporation
mentioned in the certificate of incorporation, the 
subscribers of the memorandum, together with such other 
persons as may from time to time become members of the 
company, shall be a body corporate by the name contained 
in the memorandum, capable forthwith of exercising all 
the functions of an incorporated company, and having 
perpetual succession and a common seal, but with such 
liability on the part of the members to contribute to 
the assets of the company in the event of its being 
wound up as is mentioned in this Act."
10- Gower, L.C.B., Principles of Modern Company Law, 4th 
Edition, 1979, p. 100.
11- Unlike English partnership, Scottish Partnership is " a 
legal person distinct from the partners of whom it is 
composed." (Partnership Act 1890 section 4(2) i.e It has 
a separate legal existence and is not merely the 
association of two or more persons. The property of the 
firm belongs to the firm and the firm's debts are the 
debts of the firm, although each partner may ultimately 
be made personally liable for the firm's debts; See also 
Hemphill,P.C ., "The Personality of the Partnership in 
Scotland", (1984), Jur.Rev, 208
12- [1897] A.C.22
13- See Silvertown, A.H., "Piercing the Corporate Veil", 
(1989) 133, 346.
14- [1897] A.C.22 at p.51
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15- Some of these cases existed before Salomon's case such
as Farrar v. Farrar Ltd [1888] 40 Ch.D. 395; North-Wes.t.
Transportation Co. v. Beatty [1887] 12 App.CAS. 589. For
more details see Schmitthoff, C.M.f Palmer's Company Law, 
24th edition, 1987, p.202.
16- [1914] 3 K.B. 252; also see Lee v. Lees Air Farming Ltd. 
[1961] A.C. 12
17- [1914]3 K.B. 252 at p. 254
18- [1925] A .C . 619
19- At p.633
20- [1962] 2 All E.R. 417
21- Ibid, at p. 420
22-  see Ruthven, E.K.B., "Lifting the Veil of Incorporation 
in Scotland” (1969) Jur.Rev. 1 at p.2
23- Ibid
24- (1878) 6 R. 392 at p. 401
25- See Samuels. A.,"Lifting the Veil" (1964) J .B .L .107. Her 
noted "Ever since Salomon v. Salomon [1897] A.C.22 the
separate legal identity of a company from its members has 
stood as a fundamental principle of our law".
26- Kahn, F., "Some Reflections on Company Law Reform”, 
(1944), 7 M . L . R . 54 at p. 55 in which the decision in 
Salomon v.Salomon & Co. Ltd. was described as "calamitous 
decision" See also Wedderburn, "Company Law Reform" 
(1965) Fabian Tract. 363, at p.2
27- See Powell-Smith, V., The Law and Practice Relating to 
Company Directors.. 1969, p.143
28- Hunter, M., "The Civil Liability of Company Directors in 
United Kingdom" (1981) 9 int.Bus Lawy, at p.231.
29- [1962] 1 W.L.R 832; see also Gilford Motor Company v. 
Horne 11933] Ch. 935
30- Ibid, at p. 836
31- 1978 S.C (H.L) 90; 1977 S.C 84; 1978 S.L.T 159
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32- In this respect an American author submits that "on the 
one hand we wish to encourage development of our economy 
by allowing persons to invest their money in business 
enterprise without the risk of unlimited personal 
liability. On the other hand, we do not wish to allow the 
corporate entity to be used ’to defeat public convenience 
to justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime"; see
Prentice R.A., Law of Business Organisations and
Securities Regulation. 1987, p.179.
33- This is known in Germany as "Breaching of the wall of 
the corporation
34- Hunter. M., supra, note 28, p.231
35- Gullick. J.M, Ranking and Spicer’s Company Law 13th 
edition, 1987, p.5
36- See for example, Dobson, J.M., " 'Lifting the Veil' in
Four Countries. The Law of Argentina, England, France and 
the United States" (1986) 35 I.C .L .O . p.839
37- See Ruthven E.K.B, "Lifting the Veil of Incorporation in 
Scotland", (1969), Jur Rev, p.5
38- See the Companies Act 1985, section 24 (membership); 
section 349(4) (failure to use the correct company name); 
The Insolvency Act 1986, section 213 (Fraudulent trading) 
section 214 (Wrongful Trading)
39- Daimeler Company Ltd V. Continental Tyre and Rubber
Company (GB) Ltd [1961] 2 A.C. 307
40- See Bare and Bowen (editors) r Tolley's Company Law. 
1987, p. 571
41- Schmitthoff, C.M., (editor), Palmer's Company Law, vol 
1, The treatise, 24th edition, 1987, p.215
42- See chapter 4 supra
43- Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch.421.
44- Pennington, R.R., Directors Personal Liability, 1986, p. 
148
208
45- Ibid, at p.14 9
46- [1880] 5 Q.B.D. 518
47- [1983] BCLC 461 at p. 487 per Dillon, L.J; [1983] Ch.258
48- Ibid, see also Clark v . Urquart (1930) A.C. 28 where it 
was held that directors are not liable to the lender for 
the insufficiency of the assets of the company to repay 
the loan which caused by the directors negligent 
mismanagement, per Lord Sumner at p.53 of the report.
49- See chapter Two, supra; However, they are subject to 
section 35 of the Companies Act 1985 now amended by 
Companies Act 1989.
50- Actual authority may be expressed or implied. See 
Chapter Two, supra
51- Elkinaton & Co. V. Hurter [1892] 2 Ch.452
52- [1866] 2 Ch. 77
53- at p. 8 9
54- (1880) 5 A.C. 317
55- At p. 326
56- At p .331
57- [1904] A.C. 423;see also Mousell Brothers Ltd v. London 
and Nort-western Railway Company {1917] 2 K.B. 836 which 
has been long been regarded as the leading case on 
vicarious responsibility, see Gordon, The Criminal Law of
Scotland, 2nd ed., 1978, at p. 301 et seq
58- At p. 42 6
59- Gower L.C.B., Principles of Modern Company Law. 4th 
edition 1979, at p. 205.
60- Leigh, L.H., "The Criminal Liability of Corporations in 
English Law", 1969. p.97; see also Leigh, L.H., "The 
Alter Ego of a Company", (1965) 28 M.T,.R 584
61- Pickering, M.A., "The Company as a Separate Legal
Identity" (1968) 31 M.L.R 481 at p.503
62- [1915] A.C.705; see also Houghton and Co v. Nothard,
Lqwe and Wills [1928] A.C. 1 at p. 14 where Lord Dunedin
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submitted that a company is not...a being who has eyes 
and ears".
63- [1915] A.C.705 at p. 713
64- For example, Merchant Shipping, Landlord and Tenant, 
Tort Criminal Law
65- Leigh, L.H., The Criminal Liability of Corporations in 
English Law, (1969), p. 100
66-  [1951] 2 All E.R. 968; see also other cases where the
organic theory was applied such as, Royal Exchange 
Assurance Co. v. Kingsley Navigation Company [1923] A.C. 
235; Robin Hood Mills Ltd. v. Paterson Steamships _United 
[1937] 3 DLR 1
67- [1957] 1 Q.B. 159; also regarding the application of the 
principle see the Lady Gwendolen Case (1965) 2 All E.R.
283 where it was indicated by Wilmer and Winn L.JJ. that 
the person whose fault is to be taken as that of the 
corporation need not be a director .In the words of Winn 
L J : (P.302) "Wherever the fault either occurs in a
function or sphere of action which the owner has retained 
for himself or is that of a manager independent of the 
owner to whom the owner has surrendered all relevant 
powers of control, it is "actual fault of" the owner 
within the meaning of the section."
68-  [1957] 1 Q.B. 159 at p. 172 "A company may in many ways 
be likened to a human body. It has a brain and nerve 
center which controls what it does. It also has hands 
which hold the tools and act in accordance with 
directions from the center. Some of the people in the 
company are mere servants and agents who are nothing more 
than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent 
the mind or will. Others are directors and managers who 
represent the directing mind and will of the company, and 
control what it does. The state of mind of these managers
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the law as such. So you will find that in cases where the 
law requires personal fault as a condition of liability 
in tort, the fault of the manager will be the personal 
fault of the company.... So also in the criminal law, in 
cases where the law requires a guilty mind as a condition 
of a criminal offence, the guilty mind of the directors 
or the managers will reder the company itself guilty."
69- [1944] K.B. 146
70- At p.156
71- [1944] K.B. 14 6
72- Stable. J said at p. 559 " Where in any particular case 
there is evidence to go to a jury that the criminal act 
of an agent including his state of mind, intention, 
knowledge or belief is the act of the company and. . . 
whether the jury are satisfied that it has been proved, 
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position of the officer or agent and the other relevant 
facts and circumstances of the case".
73- [1944] 2 All E.R. 515
74- 1981 S.L.T. 50; See also Stuart, S.L., "The Case of the 
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High Court of Justiciary, 3/10/80", (1981)26 J .L .S . 176
and 222
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348 at p. 349
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Chapter Six 
Grounds of Liability of Company Directors
Section 1: Personal Liability  Directors 211
Contracts,
Since a company is an artificial person its contracts 
are made on its behalf by its agents. As seen earlier, the 
principal agents of the company are its directors to whom 
wide powers of management are delegated, including the 
power to make contracts. The general rule in company law is 
that a director owes no fiduciary or contractual duty to 
third parties, dealing with his company^-. Subject to the 
provisions of section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
(previously section 332 of 1948; section 630 of the 
Companies Act 1985 Act) he is never liable for the payment 
of the company's debts even if it is insolvent nor is he 
liable for breach by the company of contracts made by the 
company even though he has been instrumental in the 
company's entering into the contract concerned. Moreover, 
directors are not liable if the company cannot or fails to 
perform a contract due to some other default, such as 
negligence, on their part^. However, there are certain 
circumstances in which a director becomes personally liable 
on a company contract^ . This is by accepting personal 
liability either expressly or impliedly.  ^ The liability is 
express where a director contracts with a third party so as 
to make himself rather than his company liable. This
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liability arises by a voluntary act of the director such as 
guaranteeing the company's overdraft or accepting goods for 
use in the company's business on his own name. 5 on the 
other hand, the implied liability will arise when a 
director signs a contract in his own name without 
mentioning the name of the company or mentioning the name 
without the word 'Limited' or its abbreviation^. Clearly, 
if the director enters a contract with a third party 
without disclosing that he is acting as an agent for his 
company, the agency rule of the undisclosed principle will 
apply and therefore the director will be held personally 
liable on the contract. Thus a director should make it 
clear to the other party that the contract will be entered 
into by the company, and not by the director personally. 
Furthermore, a director may become personally liable even 
in the case where he has expressly contracted as an agent. 
This is provided by section 349 of the Companies Act 1985: 
"Every company shall have its name mentioned in legible 
characters... in all bills of exchange, promissory notes, 
endorsements, cheques and orders for money or goods 
purporting to be signed by or on behalf of the company... 
(3) (a) if an officer of the company or any person on its 
behalf... issues or authorises of any business letter of the 
company...(4) signs or authorises to be signed on behalf of 
the company any bill of exchange promissory note 
endorsement, cheque or order for money or goods in which 
the company's name is not mentioned as required by 
subsection (1), he is liable to a fine, and he is further
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personally liable to the holder of the bill of exchange, 
(etc.)...for the amount of it (unless it is duly paid by 
the company)" .
This section shows clearly that the intention of the 
legislation is to provide a sufficient protection for third 
parties dealing with the company. This is by emphasising on 
the use of the real name of the company and especially of 
the word "Limited"^. The reason is that to make third 
parties realise that they are dealing with limited 
companies. Any breach of this enactment involves heavy 
penalties and may impose personal liability on the 
directors. In fact, directors have been held liable under 
this provision 349 (Formerly section 108 CA 1948) in a 
number of case. For example, Atkins & Co. v .Wardle^ . The 
directors were held personally liable on the bill as a 
result of a misdescription of the company in a bill of 
exchange as the "Salt Water Baths Co. Ltd" instead of its
true name "The South Shields Salt Water Baths Co. Ltd. In
addition, directors were held personally liable only 
because they.omitted the connecting ampersand, by writing 
"L.R. Agencies Ltd." instead of "L. & R. Agencies Ltd."^
This really shows the strictness of the legislature with 
the use of the name.
Similarly, when a director acts without authority or in 
excess of his authority, he will be held personally liable 
to the other party to the contract for the loss suffered by 
the latter (third party) as a result of entering into the 
contract. This is so even though he expressly contracted
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in the company's name or on its behalf. However, in this 
situation the director is not liable as a party to the 
contract, but for breach of warranty of authority-^. This 
is the same rule applicable in the law of agency under 
which the agent can only bind his principal when he acts 
within his authority. But when he exceeds his authority his 
principal is not bound, and the agent will be held 
personally liable for breach of his warranty of authority. 
There are a number of circumstances in which a director may 
be held liable for breach of warranty of authority. For 
example, if he concludes a contract beyond the company's 
powers or ultra viresf and the implied warranty of 
authority given to the other party by the director embodies 
a promise that the contract is within the company's lawful 
powers^. He may also be liable if the contract entered is 
beyond his powers although it is within the company powers 
and made in its name. But simply because e.g the power in 
question is reserved by the company's memorandum or 
articles of of association to its shareholders in general 
meeting. Likewise he will be held liable for breach of 
warranty of authority if he contracts without delegated 
authority by the board of directors to act on its beh a l f .12
Section 2: P.e r s.o.n a 1 Liability af Directors in Delicts/Torts
A company, like any other employer, is liable for 
Delicts committed by its servants in the course of their
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e m p l o y m e n t .12 Thus, the general rule is that directors as 
such are not liable for delicts or civil wrongs of their 
company or its servants or agents. This is on the principle 
that whoever commits a wrong is liable for it himself1^ . 
For example, if a director himself commits a delict/tort in 
the course of the performance of his duties for the company 
he will be held personally liable for it jointly and 
severally with the company. He may also be liable to the 
company for breach of duty. However, the commission of the 
delict/tort by the company does not make the director
automatically liable for that tort simply by reason of 
their being the directors of the company. English Authority 
in tort can usefully be cited to clarify this area. In
Rainham Chemicals WoxJts Ltd. V Bellevedece F.is.h Guano
C o m p a n y  ^ 2 n which a company was held responsible for 
damages resulting from an explosion and fire at the
company’s premises where it stored explosive and
inflammable goods. In that case an attempt to make two 
joint managing directors also responsible failed, although 
the storage must have been known to them. It was argued 
that the company was under their control and they were 
responsible for the work done by the employees of the 
company. However, Lord Buckmaster said that the directors 
would not be liable unless they expressly directed the
tortuous acts. In British Thomson Houston Co. v. Sterling. 
Accessories, Limited16 a company and its directors were 
sued for infringement of a patent. It was held that the 
directors of a company cannot be liable for an infringement
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of patent by the company merely by reason of their position 
as directors even though they were the sole directors and 
shareholders of the infringing company. In the words of 
Tomlin J17 "...It must be established that either [the 
defendant] himself is the tortfeasor or that he is the
employer or principle of the tortfeasor in relation to the 
act complained of, or at any rate the person on whose 
instructions the tort has been committed". This means that 
directors may be held personally liable for torts committed 
by the company. Indeed, if a director has expressly 
authorised the tort, or directed its commission by his
company, he will be just as liable as the company for the
consequences of this t o r t . i n  addition he cannot escape 
liability by showing that he didn't know the acts so
authorised were tortious or didn't care whether the acts 
were tortious or not19. In a recent case Evans '(C) & Sons
Lt^ i. V. Spritebrand Ltd20 Slade LJ referred to a Canadian
case Mentmore Manufact.uxing. v. Nationa l M e rchandising:
Manufacturing Co. Inc.21 which was also about patent 
infringement in which Le Dain J^2 said the following 
principle: "I do not think we should go so far as to hold 
that the director or officer must know or have reason to 
know that the acts which he directs or procures constitute 
infringement".
In short, it can be said that a director cannot be held 
personally liable for his company's tort such as 
trespasses, patent infringement, negligence, nuisance and
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defamation, merely because he is a d i r e c t o r ^  b u t  i t  must 
be shown that he participated in or ordered the tortious 
acts. However, the treatment of a director as a 
participator or instructor of the tort committed is a 
question of fact to be decided on the circumstances of each 
case. As L J Slade put it^4 »in every case where it is 
sought to make a director liable for his company's torts it 
is necessary to examine with care what part he played 
personally in regard to the act or acts complained of". 
Likewise, directors are not liable for the fraud of their 
co-directors unless they have expressly or impliedly 
authorised it^5
Section 3: Statutory Liabilities of Company Directors
In addition to their general management responsibilities, 
company directors are also subject to certain liabilities 
imposed upon them by the a c t s . 2 6 indeed there are a number 
of statutory provisions which the directors have to comply 
with and directors who have been or are in default shall be 
personally liable for breaches of the Companies Acts 
provisions to persons other than the company. There are 
altogether 202 criminal offences created by the Companies 
Act 1985 for contravention of its provision, some of which 
have now been re-enacted in the Insolvency Act 1986. All of 
these offences are punishable by a fine and 37 of them are 
also punishable by imprisonment with or without the option 
of a fine ^.In addition part X of the Companies Act 1985
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as amended by Companies Act 1989 provides a group of 
sections enforcing fair dealing by directors. These 
invalidate certain transactions which could be used by 
directors for improper purposes to confer personal benefits 
upon themselves. Other transactions are only permitted on 
compliance with approval of the general meeting. Examples 
are section 320 of the Companies Act 1985 which provides 
that subject to certain exceptions, a company shall not 
enter into an arrangement whereby a director of the company 
or its holding company or a person connected with such a 
director is to acquire one or more non-cash assets of the 
requisite value from the company; or the company is to 
acquire one or more such non-cash assets from such a 
director or a person so connected; unless the arrangement 
is first approved by a resolution of the company in general 
meeting. Similarly, according to section 319 a company may 
not include in a director's service contract or any other 
agreement a term by which the director will be employed by 
the company or any of its subsidiaries, whether as a 
director or in any other capacity, for a period exceeding 5 
years which cannot be terminated for any reason whatsoever 
by the company giving notice, unless the term is first 
approved by a general meeting by ordinary resolution or 
such other resolution of a general meeting as the articles 
provide. This section intends to highlight, although 
briefly, certain circumstances where this statutory 
liability arises.
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3.1.- Liability for (misrepresentation) Mis-gtatement
A frequently occurring instance of a director's 
liability for fraud or misrepresentation is in relation to 
the contents of a public company's prospectus^ which is 
defined by section 74 4 of the Companies Act 1985 as " Any 
prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, or other 
invitation offering to the public for subscription or 
purchase any shares or debentures of a company". Under 
Section 67 of the Companies Act 1985 the director of the 
company will be personally liable on a mis-statement in a 
prospectus to any person who subscribes for shares and 
debentures on the faith of the prospectus and who has 
suffered loss and damage. In other words, the directors 
liability will arise either when there is a false statement 
in the prospectus or there has been a wilful non-disclosure 
of material information. In such case the directors are 
liable to compensate any person who relied on the untrue 
statement in the prospectus when subscribing for any shares 
or debentures. The persons liable to pay the compensation 
are defined by section 67 (2) as follows:
(a) every person who is a director of the company at the 
time of the issue of the prospectus,
(b) every person who authorised himself to be named and is 
named, in the prospectus as a director or as having agreed 
to become a director (either immediately or after an 
interval of time),
(c) every person being a promoter of the company and
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(d) every person who has authorised the issue of the 
prospectus.
The plaintiff need only prove a mis-statement or 
omission and loss as a result to establish liability^. 
Once the liability is established the persons mentioned 
above are liable to compensate him unless they can prove 
one of the defences provided by section 68 CA 1985. Thus a 
director will not be liable under Section 67 if he can 
prove that the prospectus was issued without his knowledge 
or consent and that on becoming aware of its issue he gave 
reasonable public notice that it was issued without his 
knowledge or consent. Likewise, a director will not be 
liable after the prospectus is issued and before any
allotment or sale if, on becoming aware of any false 
statement, he withdraws his consent and gives reasonable 
public notice of the withdrawal and the reason for it. 
Furthermore, section 68(2) adds that a director will not be 
responsible as regards any false statement if he had 
reasonable ground to believe the statement was true.^O
Section 68(2) (a), or where the untrue statement was made on 
the authority of an expert^l reasonably believed to be 
competent who had given and not withdrawn his consent
before a copy of the prospectus was delivered to the
company's registry. Again, no liability to the directors 
where the statement was a fair representation of a 
statement made by an official person (e.g Minister or a 
member of the Government Service of the UK or an oversees 
Government) ^  or an extract from some public official
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document. However, failure to prove the above defences 
gives rise to both Civil and Criminal proceedings against 
those who are responsible for them.
3.1.1.- Civil liability
It appears that subscribers for shares1, rights like 
any other third parties rights dealing with the company are 
safeguarded by the law. This may clearly be deduced from a 
number of remedies provided by the legislature. For 
example, in respect of subscribers who relied on false 
statement when subscribing for shares the law provides 
various civil remedies to enable such persons to recover 
from the loss they have sustained as a result of their 
subscription. What is more is that these remedies are 
cumulative and thus, for example, the rescission of an 
allotment of shares or debentures by a subscriber to 
recover his money does not prevent him from pursuing a 
claim for damages for deceit or negligence or a statutory 
claim for compensation for false statements in a 
prospectus^ . A statutory claim for compensation is 
provided by sections 150 and 166 of the Financial Servicess 
Act 1986. Under these sections any subscriber for shares or 
debentures under a prospectus is entitled to recover 
compensation from directors who are responsible for issuing 
it for any financial loss which they suffer as a result of 
any untrue statement of fact contained in the prospectus. 
Furthermore, a subscriber if in Scotland may rely on the 
Law Reform (Miscellaneus Provisions) (Scotland) 1985, or if
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in England on the Misrepresentation Act 1967 which gives a 
person who is induced to enter a contract by reason of a 
negligent misrepresentation, a right to recover damages in 
addition to his right to rescind the contract.
The Common Law remedy against directors for untrue 
statements in a prospectus was an action for damage for 
fraud. It was held in Derry v. Peek^4 that in an action for 
fraud (deceit) the plaintiff must prove actual fraud. In 
this case a prospectus was issued by the directors stating 
that the company, under its special Act, had the right to 
use steam power instead of horses. The plaintiff subscribed 
for shares on the faith of this statement. The Board of 
Trade afterwards refused its consent, and the company was 
wound up. The plaintiff sued the directors for damages of 
fraud. It was held that directors were not liable as the 
statement had been made by them in the honest belief that 
it was true, and fraud is only proved when it is shown that 
a false representation has been knowingly, or without 
caring whether it be true or false. The same judgment was 
adopted in Akerhielm v. De mare where the subscriber 
brought an action for fraud on the ground that untrue 
statement in the prospectus had induced him to subscribe 
for share. However, his action was failed and the court 
held that the representor was not liable for fraud because 
he honestly believed the representation to be true in the 
sense in which he understood it. The measure of damages for 
fraud is the difference between the actual value of the
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shares at the time of allotment and the sum paid for 
them.35
3.1.2.- Criminal Liability
The criminal liability of directors for mis-statement 
in a prospectus is stated in a number of statutes. Indeed, 
the offences which arise when inducing persons to subscribe 
for shares seem to be serious and may be punished by a fine 
or by long prison sentences. For example, under the 
Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, it is a criminal 
offence (triable on indictment only) for any person to 
induce or attempt to induce another person to enter into, 
or offer to enter into any agreement for acquiring or 
subscribing for shares by:
(a) using a statement, promise or forecast that he knows to 
be misleading,
(b) by recklessly making (dishonestly or otherwise) a 
statement, promise or forecast that is misleading, false or 
deceptive. Similarly, section 15 of the The Theft Act 1968 
make it an offence (triable on indictment only) dishonestly 
to obtain by deception (whether deliberate or reckless) 
property belonging to another with the intention of 
permanently depriving the other of it. Section 19 of the 
same act (which replaces section 84 of the Larceny Act 
1969) provides that an officer of a body corporate or 
unincorporated association ( or a person purporting to act 
as such) who, with intent to deceive members or creditors 
about its affairs, publishes or concurs in publishing a
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written statement or account which to his knowledge is or 
maybe misleading, false or deceptive in a material 
particular, is liable to seven years imprisonment. This 
provision of the Theft Act does not apply to Scotland^. 
In addition, under section 47 of the Financial Services Act 
1986 it is an offence for a person either to make a 
statement, promise of forecast which he knows to be 
misleading, false or deceptive, or if he dishonestly 
conceals any material facts, or if he recklessly makes 
(dishonestly or otherwise) a statement, promise or forecast 
which is misleading, false or deceptive if that statement 
etc...is for the purpose of inducing another to enter into 
any investment agreement. The maximum sentence under this 
provision is seven years imprisonment. The Companies Act 
1985 also deals with the issue of criminal liability of 
directors for false statements in prospectuses. Section 70
(1) provides that any person who authorised the issue of 
the prospectus with an untrue statement included in it is 
guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment (up to two 
years on conviction on indictment) (CA 1985, Sch. 24) or a 
fine, or both. However, this section provides two statutory 
defences that enables the accused to escape conviction, 
which are:
1- That the fact mis-stated was immaterial
2- That the accused has reasonable ground to believe
and, up to the time of the issue of the prospectus,
believe that the statement was true.
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3.2.- Liability for Fraudulent Trading
As noted previously directors are required to act bona 
fide and show a reasonable standard of care and skill 
while running the company's business. Otherwise they will 
be in breach of their managerial duties. In addition, the 
management of the company in a negligent manner gives rise 
to directors liability to the company and it's 
shareholders. This principles apply equally whether the 
company is solvent or in insolvent liquidation. Indeed they 
may apply more strongly in the later case by reason of the 
director's liability to the company's creditors, who may be 
suffered by his acts. Section 630 of the Companies Act 1985 
(previously section 333 of the Companies Act 1948) grants 
rights of action to the liquidator or any creditor or 
shareholder, to sue any officer of the company for 
misfeasance or breach of duty, as well as misapplication of 
funds or for an account of his dealing with the company's 
property. Similarly, liability may be imposed by an order 
of the court under section 213 and section 214 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986, for the negligent management of a 
company's affairs by its directors resulting in its 
insolvency. According to section 213 Insolvency Act if in 
the course of a winding up a company, it appears to the 
court that the company's business has been carried on with 
intent to defraud it's creditors or the creditors of any 
other person, or for any fraudulent purpose, the court, on 
the application of the liquidator, may declare that any
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person who were knowingly parties to the fraudulent trading 
shall make such contributions to the company's assets as 
the court thinks proper. This section shows clearly the 
intention of the legislature in protecting the creditors 
rights from the abuses and misconduct of company 
directors.As Professor Gower put it^7
"This section (formerly was 332 of the Companies Act 1948) 
represents a potent weapon in the hands of directors which 
exercises a restraining influence on over-sanguine 
directors... It is probably the most serious attempt which 
has yet been made to protect creditors generally (as opposed 
to the revenue) from the abuses inherent in the rigid 
application of the corporate entity concept".
In regard to what constitutes fraudulent trading, the 
courts have been reluctant to put forward a definition and 
it is difficult to formulate general principles from the 
decided c a s e s ^ . However, it appears that the crucial 
elements of fraudulent trading are that the business of the 
company has been carried on with intent to defraud 
creditors... or... for any fraudulent purpose. In the leading 
case Re_William C Leith Bros Ltd39 where further supplies 
of goods were ordered for the company by the directors on 
the advice of the managing director despite the fact that 
there was no prospect of the company paying for them. In 
holding the managing director liable Maugham, J said,
"If a company continues to carry on business and 
to incur debts at the time where there is to the 
knowledge of the directors no reasonable prospect 
of the creditors ever receiving payment of those 
debts, it is, in general, a proper inference that
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the company is carrying on business with intent to 
defraud".
However, this finding was narrowed in a subsequent case 
Re Patrick and Lyon Ltd40 where Maugham, J said that the 
words "defraud" and "fraudulent purpose" connote "real 
dishonesty involving, according to current notions of fair 
trading among commercial men at the present day, real moral 
blame". The meaning of the phrase 'intent to defraud' in 
the Companies Act 1985, section 458, and Insolvency Act 
1986, section 213 was considered by the Court of Appeal, in 
B^ .V. Grantham^ . The court noted a relevant dictum of Lord 
Radcliffe in Welham v. PPP^2
"Now, I think there are one or two things that can 
be said with confidence about the meaning of this 
word 'defraud'. It requires a person as its object: 
That is, defrauding involves doing something to 
someone. Although in the nature of things it is 
almost invariably associated with the obtaining of 
an advantage for the person who commits the fraud 
that ultimately determines its meaning."43
It is quite clear that to obtain an order making 
individuals personally liable under section 213 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986, it might be provided that the director 
or other person whom it is sought to make liable was guilty 
of fraud, and not merely of negligent mismanagement. Under 
section 458 of the Companies Act 1985, fraudulent trading 
is a criminal offence punishable by fine or imprisonment 
and may be committed whether the company is subsequently 
wound up or not. For this reason, the same high standard of
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proof of fraud is required to obtain an order imposing 
personal liability on them as is required for a criminal 
conviction.44 According to section 213 of the Insolvency 
Act 1986 applications for orders imposing personal 
liability on directors who are guilty of fraudulent trading 
can be made only by the liquidator and in consequence a 
creditor cannot intervene in order to secure a payment 
direct to himself, as happened in Re Cyona Distributors4^ . 
The wording of section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
differs from that used in earlier legislation (Section 332 
of the Companies Act 1948, and section 630 of the Companies 
Act 1985) . Under the latter (section 332) the application 
for the same order (imposing personal liability) could be 
made by a creditor or shareholder of the company, as well 
as by its liquidator. In contrast, under section 213 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986, all applications for the above orders 
must be made by the liquidator.
It has been established in a number of cases that a 
single transaction can constitute "carrying on business". 
For example, in Re Gerald Cooper Chemicals Ltd46 Templeman 
J said "It does not matter for the purposes of [S.S 458 and 
213] that only one creditor was defrauded, and by one 
transaction, provided that the transaction can properly be 
described as a fraud on a creditor perpetuated in the 
course of carrying on business". Indeed in R V T.ockwood47 
the defendant was held to have been rightly convicted under 
section 458 of the Companies Act 1985, on the basis of a
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simple transaction.
The expression "parties to" in section 213 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 involves some positive steps. In other 
words, it must be proved that individuals whom it sought to 
make liable took an active part in the management of the 
company during the period while debts or other liabilities 
were incurred fraudulently. In Maidstone Buildings 
Provisions L t d .48 it was held that a company secretary, who 
knew that the company was insolvent but failed to advise 
the company’s directors that the company should cease 
trading was not included among "parties to the carrying on 
of the business" with intent to defraud creditors and, 
therefore cannot be made liable under the section, although 
he is guilty of negligence in failing to advise the 
directors, and in such case he could be sued by the company 
for breach of duty as an officer of the company or for 
breach of a contract to advise it properly^9 similarly, a 
controlling shareholder or shareholders (including a parent 
company of a group) cannot be personally liable for a 
company's debts by an order of the court, merely because of 
their position but it must be shown that they gave 
instruction or took part in making management decisions 
which were intended to defraud creditors^®. On the other 
hand, it was held in Re Gerald Cooper Chemicals -Ltd51 that 
a creditor who, knowing of the circumstances, accepted 
money fraudulently obtained by the company may be liable to 
repay it even if he took no part in the fraudulent trading 
itself, in his judgement Templeman J said:^^^a^
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"A creditor is a party to the carrying on of a 
business with intent to defraud creditors if he accepts 
money which he knows full well has been procured by the 
company carrying on business with intent to defraud 
creditors for the very purpose of making the payment"
The extent of liability of those responsible for 
fraudulent trading,is subject to the court's discretion. 
When the directors are declared by the court to be 
responsible for fraudulent trading, it may change their 
liability against any securities which they hold against 
the c o m p a n y 5 2 # They may also be disqualified from acting in 
the management of companies for a period not exceeding 15 
years^3, and may be made criminally liable as well..54
3.3.- Wrongful Trading
In addition to the existing provisions regarding
fraudulent trading, the Insolvency Act 1986 introduced the
new concept of personal liability for wrongful trading in 
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section 214 • This section was enacted, pursuant to the
recommendation of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law 
and Practice chaired by Sir Kenneth_Cork5 6 to eliminate the 
need to prove fraud under the Fraudulent Trading Provision. 
This is because of the practical difficulties of 
establishing the fraud element of fraudulent trading which 
was an obstacle for a liquidator to succeed in an 
application for the imposition of a personal liability for 
fraudulent trading.57 The situation resulted in exemption
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for many directors who had carried on the business 
recklessly. Thus the purpose of this section (214) of the 
Insolvency Act 198 6 is to impose personal liability on the 
directors of an insolvent company for trading while 
insolvent but in the absence of fraud.^8 In other words, 
under section 214 of the Insolvency Act 198 6 civil personal 
liability could arise without proof of fraud or dishonesty 
and without requiring the full criminal standard of proof. 
To establish wrongful trading the liquidator of a company 
must show that the company has gone into an insolvent 
liquidation (i.e. its assets are insufficient for the 
payment of its debt and other liabilities and the expenses 
of the winding up) 59 that the director, prior to the 
liquidation knew or ought to have concluded that there was 
no reasonable prospect that the company could avoid going 
into insolvent liquidation, and that he did not take every 
step he ought o have taken to minimise the potential loss 
to the company's creditors^, what the director ought to 
know or have concluded or done depends on (1)- what a 
reasonable director carrying out similar functions in that 
type of company would know, conclude or do, and, (2)- the 
general knowledge, skill and experience of that director^!. 
However, in Ea Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd 6 1 Mr 
Justice Knox said that:
"The knowledge to be imputed in testing whether or 
not directors knew or ought to have concluded that 
there was no reasonable prospect of the company 
avoiding insolvent liquidation is not limited to 
the documentary material actually available at the
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given time. . .there is to be included by way of 
factual information not only what was actually 
there but what, given reasonable diligence and an 
appropriate level of general knowledge, skill and 
experience, was ascertainable".
Applications under 214 may only be made by the 
liquidator of a company, and only in respect of a person 
who is or has been a director or shadow director of the 
company62 unlike fraudulent trading wrongful trading is not 
also a criminal offence. In addition, it is worthy of note 
that wrongful trading provision catches not only the 
criminal and reckless, but the careless and incompetent63. 
Finally, once wrongful trading was established the court 
may require the director to make a contribution to the 
company's assets.^  The extent of this contribution is a 
matter for the court's discretion. Furthermore, a person 
who has been declared liable to make a contribution for the 
wrongful trading under S. 214 may also, if the court thinks 
fit, have a disqualified order made against him.65
3.4.- Disqualification of Directors;
A disqualification order is defined as an order of the 
court prohibiting a person, without leave of the court, 
from acting as a director of a company, or a liquidator or 
administrator of a company, or a receiver or manager of a 
company's property or, in any way, whether directly or 
indirectly, be concerned or take part in the promotion, 
formation or management of a company, for a specified 
period beginning with the date of the order. 66 The
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restriction on taking part in the management of the company 
is very wide. In particular the words " be concerned in " 
the management do not mean " take part in" and so include 
acting as a management consultant advising on financial 
management and restructuring of a company. 7^
3.4.1. Grounds for disqualification orders
1- Conviction of indictable offence:The court may make 
a disqualification order against a person who has been 
convicted of an indictable offence ( whether on indictment 
or summarily) in connection with the promotion, formation, 
management or liquidation of a company or with the 
receivership or management of a company’s property. (CA 
1985, S. 2 96 (1); now CDDA 198 6, S.2(l)); The court which
convicts the accused has jurisdiction to make the 
disqualification order, and so also has any court with 
jurisdiction to wind up the company in relation to which 
the offence was committed, and if the conviction was by a 
magistrate' court, any magistrates's court for the same 
petty sessions area(CA 1985, s.296 (2); now CDDA 1986, S.2 
(2)); The maximum duration of the disqualification imposed 
is 15 years if imposed in consequence of a conviction on 
indictment and 5 years if imposed by the sheriff court on 
summary complaint or if in England by a magistrates court 
(CA 1985, S.295(2); CDDA 1986, S. 2(3) ). An application
for such a disqualification order may be made by the 
secretary of state or (if in England by the official 
receiver), the liquidator or any past or present member or
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creditor of the company concerned. Such a person must give 
at least 10 days' notice of his intention to the person 
against whom the disqualification order is sought and that 
person may appear on the application and give evidence or 
call witnesses (CDDA 1986, S.16).
2- Persistent default in filling obligations under the 
Companies Act: A person may alternatively be disqualified 
from being a director of or being concerned in the 
management of a company if he has been persistently in 
default in complying with the provisions of the Companies 
Legislation (as defined by section 22(7) of the CDDA 1986) 
which require returns, accounts or documents to be filled 
with the registrar of companies or require notice to be 
given to him (CDDA 1986, S.3(l)) . Persistent default for
the purpose of disqualification may be conclusively proved 
by showing that a person has been adjudged guilty of three 
or more defaults in the previous five years (CDDA 1986, 
S.3(2) and (3)). A person is adjudged guilty if he has been 
convicted of any offence consisting in of any contravention 
of or failure to comply with any provision of the Companies 
Acts (whether on his own part or on the part of the 
company)or if a default order is made against him under any 
of section 244 or 713 of the Companies Act or sections 41 
or 171 of the Insolvency Act 1986. (S.3 (3) of the CDDA
1986) . However, it is not necessary to show three such 
convictions. For example in Re Art 1 c Engineering Ltd68 
failure to send 35 required returns to the registrar was
237
held to be sufficient evidence for the making of an order. 
The courts which have jurisdiction to impose a 
disqualification on this ground are are the courts which 
may order the company concerned to be wound up, which in 
the case of a company with a paid up share capital of not 
more than £120 000 includes the Sheriff court (if in
England the county court) in whose district the company's 
registered office has longest been situate during the 
preceding six months (CA 1985, S.297 (4) and S. 512(2); CDDA 
1986, S.3(4)) The maximum period of disqualification that
can be imposed under this head is 5 years (CA 1985, 
S.295 (2); now CDDA 1986, S.3(5) ).
3” Fraudulent trading, Fraud or Breach of Duty revealed 
in a winding up: If in the course of winding up a company, 
it appears to the court that a person has been guilty of 
fraudulent trading (Whether convicted thereof or not) or 
otherwise been guilty of fraud in relation to the company 
whilst acting as an officer or liquidator of the company or 
receiver or manager of its property or has committed a 
breach of duty in any of these capacities, the court may 
make a disqualification order (CDDA 1986, S.4(1) ) The term 
"officer" includes a shadow director (S.4(2)). The maximum 
period for which disqualification may be made is 15 years.
4 -  The Court has found in the winding up of a company 
that the person concerned has been guilty of fraudulent 
trading, or of wrongful trading. That is to say that he has 
been a director of a company which has gone into 
liquidation in an insolvent condition, and at some time
238
before its liquidation commenced while he was a director of 
the company he realised, or ought to have realised, that 
there was no reasonable prospect that the company would 
avoid going into an insolvent liquidation, and the court 
has in consequence of its finding declared that the person 
concerned shall be liable to make the contribution to the 
company’s assets which the court directs (IA 1985, S.15(1), 
(2), (6) and (7) and S.16; now CDDA 1986, S.10(1); and IA
1986, S. 214(1) and (2).The court which has jurisdiction to
impose a disqualification under this head is the court
which has made a winding up order against the company, or 
if is a voluntary liquidation, which could make a winding 
up order against it (CA 1985, S. 744 and IA 1985, S. 108
(1); IA 1986, S.251). The maximum period for which a 
disqualification order may be made is 15 years (CA 1985, S. 
295 (2) and IA 1985, S. 108; CDDA 1986, S. 10(2).
5- Summary conviction of an offence consisting in a
failure to comply with the provisions of the Companies Act 
requirements to file returns, accounts or other documents 
(CDDA 1986, S.5). The maximum period of disqualification 
under this head is 5 years.
The above five grounds are uncontrversial, they are 
enforcement/ anti-avoidance provisions reinforcing the 
Companies Act 1985. But the sixth ground is far reaching 
imposing duties of "care” or competence on the directors.
6-  Unfitness: If the court is satisfied that a person 
is or has been a director (including a shadow director) of 
a company which has become insolvent within the past two
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years, and that his conduct as such makes him unfit to be 
concerned in the management of a company, it may make a 
disqualification order against him for at least two years, 
the application for such an order must be made by the 
secretary of state (or the official receiver if the company 
is in compulsory liquidation) if it appears to him to be 
in the public interest, as the result of information 
received from a liquidator, administrator, administrative 
receiver or the official receiver. A company becomes 
insolvent for this purpose if: (1)- The company goes into
liquidation at a time when its assets are insufficient for 
the payment of its debts and other liabilities and the 
expenses of the winding up; (2)- and an administration 
order is made in relation to the company or (3) an 
administrative receiver of the company is appointed (CDDA 
1986 S. 6 (2) ) . Similarly, if the secretary of state
receives a report from inspectors under section 437 of the 
Companies Act or sections 94 or 177 of the Financial 
Services Act 1986 or obtains information under sections 447 
or 448 of the Companies Act or section 105 of the Financial 
services Act 1986 and as a result forms the opinion that it 
is expedient in the public interest that a disqualification 
order be made against any person who is or has been a 
director or shadow director of any company, he may apply to 
the high court or court of session for such an order (CDDA 
1986, S.8(1) ). The court my make a disqualification order
against a person if it concludes that his conduct in
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relation to the company makes him unfit to be concerned in 
the management of a company ( CDDA 1986, S.8 (2) ) .
In deciding whether a person's conduct makes him unfit 
to be concerned in the management of a company, section 9 
of the CDDA 1986 requires the court to have regard to the 
matters specified in schedule 1 to that Act. These matters 
are divided into those applicable in all cases, and those 
applicable where the company has become insolvent.
The first head comprises; (1)- misfeasance or breach of 
duty to the company, (2)- misapplication of the company's 
money or property, or any conduct giving rise to account to 
the company for money and property, (3)- the extent of 
directors responsibility for the company entering into any 
transaction liable to be set aside as being at undervalue 
and with the object of putting assets out of reach of
claimants; (4)- the extent of the directors responsibility 
for the company's failure to keep accounting records and 
retain them for the prescribed period; maintain the 
register of directors and secretaries, maintain a register 
of members and keep it in the prescribed location; make an 
annual return within the prescribed period; and register 
charges on the company's assets.
Where the company has become insolvent, the court is
required to have regard to:
(1)- The extent of the director's responsibility for 
the causes of the company's insolvency;
(2)- The extent of the directors responsibility for:
a- any failure by the company to supply any goods or
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services which have been paid(in whole or in part)
b- The company giving preference or entering into a 
preferential transaction liable to be set aside as such;
c- Any failure by the company to call a meeting of 
creditors in accordance with the statutory procedure 
including the production of a statement of affairs duly 
verified by affidavit by some or all directors.
(3)- Any failure by the director to comply with an 
obligation relating to a statement of affairs in a winding 
up.
(4)- Any failure to comply with the requirements 
relating to the first meeting of creditors in a voluntary 
winding up.
Section 6 of CDDA 1986 is described as one of the most 
important and controversial provisions of the 
Disqualification A c t .  69 its main purpose is to deal with 
what the Cork Committee called "widespread dissatisfaction 
at the ease with which a person trading through the medium 
of one or more companies with limited liability can allow 
such a company to become insolvent, form a new company, and 
then carry on trading much as before, leaving behind a 
trial of unpaid creditors, and often repeating the process 
several times"^^. In other words, section 6 intends to 
safeguard the general public against the perils of 
directors abuse of the privileges of limited liability, and 
to prevent the "phoenix syndrome" in which an insolvent 
company transfers its business to a new company under a 
similar name and management.
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Recent years have witnessed a growing body of case law 
on the principles which ought to govern the
disqualification of directors, although the majority of 
cases were brought under section 300 of the Companies Act 
1985, they seem to be appropriate to be used in 
interpreting section 6 of CDDA 1986 since the two sections 
are very similar(close) . For example, they both refer to 
directors of insolvent companies being unfit to be 
concerned in the management of a company. The main
difference between the two sections are that: First, s.300 
required two successive insolvencies before the director 
was disqualified whereas s.6 requires one insolvency
n -i
(although more may be considered). Secondly, the
discretion available to the court is different under
section 300 from that under section 6. In that under s.300
the court had a discretion as to whether to make a
disqualification order whereas s.6 provides that the court
"shall make a disqualification order... where it is
satisfied" the person unfit. That to say, once unfitness is
shown, disqualification is m o n d a t o r y . ^ 2
One of the important points dealt with (discussed) in
most disqualification cases is the interpretation of s.6(1)
and the use of the words "unfit to be concerned in the
management of a company" In Re Lo-line Electric Motors 
73
Ltd , The Vice Chancellor stated that "the primary purpose 
of the section is not to punish the individual but to 
protect the public against the future conduct of companies
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by persons whose past records of insolvent companies have 
shown them to be a danger to creditors and others" Thus, it 
is not fundamentally penal. Nevertheless, he did accept 
that application of the section would involve "a 
substantial interference with the freedom of the 
individual." Accordingly, he stated that ordinary
commercial misjudgment was by itself not sufficient to show 
that a director was unfit to be concerned in the management 
of the company. The vice-Chancellor added, however, that an 
extreme case of gross negligence could show that a director 
was unfit. In describing what will be regarded as unfitness 
Peter Gibson J in Re Bath Glass Ltd74 said:
"To reach a finding of unfitness, the court must be
satisfied that the director has been guilty of a serious 
failures, whether deliberately or through incompetence, to 
perform those duties of directors which are attendant on the 
privilege of trading through companies with limited
liability. Any misconduct of the respondent qua director may 
be relevant, even if it does not fall within a specific 
section of the Companies Acts or Insolvency Act."
In interpreting section 6 the decision in Re Bath Glass 
Ltd. two important points were raised: (1)- As to the
matters for judging unfitness listed in Sched 1 of the 
CDDA, the learned judge was of the view that they are not 
exhaustive and the court is not confined to looking at 
those matters. Thus, for example, the court can take 
account of a failure to comply with a provision of the 
Companies Act not actually mentioned in the Schedule.^5
(2)- It was held that for evidence of a director's
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unfitness the court may look not only to his conduct in 
relation to the insolvent company but also to his conduct 
in relation to other companies.
Another recent case on disqualification is Ee. Majestic 
Recording Studios7 6 where it was held that disqualification 
of director is appropriate though his involvement in the 
irresponsible conduct of company affairs was peripheral 
only, if he has shown himself to trade with the benefit of 
limited liability in that he shirked his duties as director
of more than one company by leaving everything to others.
In his judgement, Mervyn Davies J. referred to two
authorities. The first is in Drincqpier v. Wood77 where 
Byrne J said: "It should be understood that a director,
consenting to be a director has assumed a position 
involving duties which cannot be shirked by leaving 
everything to others". The second is Stanford Services
Ltd78 in which Vinelott. J. said:
"The public is entitled to be protected, not only
against the activities of those guilty of the more
obvious breaches of commercial morality,- but also
against someone who has shown in his conduct of
more than one company...a failure to appreciate or 
observe the duties attendant on the privilege of 
conducting business with the protection of limited 
liability"
Similarly, Horman J. in Re Douglas Construction 
Services Ltd. & Anor7  ^ described the limited liability as 
"privilege which must be exercised responsibly and cannot 
be abused and, if abused, the courts must prevent those who
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abuse it from so doing in the future".
Another important issue raised in a number of 
disqualification cases is that whether there is a
difference between Crown debts and ordinary trade debts.®®
The decisions show that there is a slight difference of
judicial approach to Crown debts. For example, in Re Dawson 
Print Group Ltd®l Hoffmann J on the facts of the case, did 
not draw any distinction between a failure to pay Crown 
debts and the failure to pay other trading debts. He stated 
" I cannot accept that failure to pay this [Crown] debts is 
regarded in the commercial world generally as such a breach 
of commercial morality that it requires in itself a
conclusion that the directors concerned are unfit to be 
involved in the management of the company". However, in Re. 
Wedaecroft Ltd®2 Harman J regarded the Crown debts as 
"quasi trust" monies and the failure to pay them as being 
more morally culpable than failure to pay ordinary trade 
debts. Again in Re Stanford Services Ltd®® Vinelott J. 
treated the failure to pay the Crown -debts as more serious 
than the failure to pay commercial debts. He described the 
Crown as an involuntary creditor and regareded this as one 
of the reasons for the preference afforded to Crown debts. 
Thus, he expressed the view that the directors ought not to 
use money which is owed to the Crown to finance trading 
activities. If they did so,
"the court may draw the inference that the directors were 
continuing to trade at a time when they ought to have known 
that the company was unable to meet its current and accruing 
liabilities... It is, I think misleading (or at least
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unhelpful) to ask whether a failure to pay debts of this 
character would be generally regarded as a breach of 
commercial morality. A director who allows such a situation 
to arise is either in breach of his duty to keep himself 
properly informed with reasonable accuracy ...or is acting 
improperly in continuing to trade at the expense and jeopardy 
of money's which he ought not to use to finance the company's 
trade."
In Re lo-Line Electric Motors84, the Vice-Chancellor 
agreed with Vinelott.J. that Crown debts are different from 
ordinary trade debts. He added that although the Crown 
debts were not strictly trust moneys, "the failure to pay 
them over does not only prejudice the Crown, as creditor, 
but in the case of PAYE and national insurance may also 
have a prejudicial effect on the company's employees". He 
considered that the use of this money which should have 
been paid to the Crown to finance the trading activities of 
an insolvent company more culpable than the failure to pay 
commercial debts.
From the above cases it can be deduced that directors 
are now more exposed to legal liability than before and the 
circumstances under which they could be held personally 
responsible are far greater. Indeed, the scope of 
disqualification has been widned by the new provisions on 
company insolvency, introduced by the Insolvency Act 1985 
and consolidated in the CDDA 1986. Thus, the threat or 
actual penalty of disqualification may now operate not only 
against a dishonest director but includes directors who are 
irresponsible or incompetent.
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Contravention of orders
If a person against whom a disqualification order is 
made contravenes it, he commits a criminal offence, for 
which he may be punished, if convicted on indictment, by 
not more than two years' imprisonment or unlimited fine or 
both, or if convicted summarily, by not more than six 
months' imprisonment or a fine not exceeding £1,000 or both 
(CA 1985, S.295 (7) and Sched.24; now CDDA 1986, s.13 ).
Apart from the disqualification noted above the 
articles may include any provision for disqualifying a 
director from office.A typical article is article 81 of 
the Table A which provides that a director shall be vacated 
if he ceases to be a director by virtue of section 291 or 
section 293 of the Companies Act 1985. Section 293 refers 
to the age limits. section 291 refers to share 
qualification. A director who is required by the articles 
to obtain qualifying shares within a given time and who 
does not (or who sells all the qualifying shares which he 
is required to hold), vacates office on the expiration of 
the period allowed. Other grounds included in the articles 
upon which the director vacates his office include: (1)- if
he becomes a bankrupt or makes any arrangement or 
composition with his creditors generally; (2)- if he 
suffers from a mental disorder and is either admitted to 
hospital under the Mental Health Acts or becomes the 
subject of a court order; (3)- if he is absent from 
directors' meetings for more than six consecutive months
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and the board resolves that he should vacate his office.
3.4.2.- Liability For Acting While Disqualified
Section 15 of the Company Directors Disqualification 
Act 1986 contains a further provision under which a person 
may be held liable for the company's debts. The personal 
liability arises if a person acts as a director of a 
company or takes part in its management while he is 
undischarged bankrupt or subject to disqualification 
order. 85 jn such a case, he is personally liable to 
creditors of the company for its debts and other 
liabilities incurred, while he acts as a director or takes 
part in its management, unless he acts with leave of the 
court. 8 6 The same thing applies to a person who, as a 
director or involved in the management of a company, acts 
or is willing to act on instruction given without the leave 
of the court by a person whom he knows at that time to be 
an undischarged bankrupt or to be subject to a 
disqualification order, and he (a person) is presumed to 
continue to be willing to act on those instructions unless 
the contrary is proved.^ Moreover, where a person is 
personally liable under this section for the relevant debts 
of the company, he is jointly and severally liable in 
respect of those debts with the company and any other 
person who, whether under this section or otherwise, is 
liable. 88 One of the advantages of section 15 of the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act is that it enables
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the individual creditors to recover their debts without the 
need for action by the liquidator or even for the company 
in question to be in liquidation.®9
Section 4: Relief From Liability
Having considered, although briefly, the various kinds 
of duties and liabilities to which company directors may be 
subject, it seems appropriate to throw some light on some 
of the practical measures that are available to relax 
company directors from the duties imposed upon them by the 
common law and equity and relieving them from the liability 
which may arise from their breach of their duties. This 
section focuses on a number of ways in which directors may 
be relieved from liability. This includes (1) ratification,
(2) relief by the articles (3) relief by the court.
4.1.- Ratification ;
It is generally agreed that ratification, either by 
ordinary resolution of the general meeting or by the 
approval of all members having voting rights at a general 
meeting9®, is one of the means that may "Cure" directors 
breach of duty and "absolve" the directors from 
liability®-1-. Indeed, in the absence of fraud, the 
ratification or authorisation validates what would 
otherwise be an unlawful act or transaction. ®2 The most 
frequently cited case in support of this rule is North-West 
Transportation Co. Ltd. V. Beatty.93 The facts of that case
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may be summerised as follows: The company contracted to
purchase a steamship from a vendor who was one of its 
directors at a reasonable price. At a general meeting the 
contract was approved, against the wishes of the minority 
of the shareholders, by reason of the fact that the vendor 
held one-third of the total votes in favour of the 
resolution to approve the contract. Nevertheless, it was 
held that the resolution was valid, and the vendor who was 
also a shareholder was merely using his voting power to his 
own advantage, and there was no fraud on the minority of 
the members since there was no unfairness of impropriety. 
If the directors use their votes to deprive the company of 
its property for their own benefit and prevent it from 
taking any action against them, their resolution to approve 
the transaction will be invalid. This was the case in Cook 
V. Peeks94 where the defendant who were the controlling 
shareholders and directors of the company had negotiated a 
contract on behalf of the company, then took it for 
themselves by passing a resolution in the general meeting 
that the company had no interest in the contract. It was 
held that the contract belonged in equity to the company. 
Hence, the directors must account to the company for the 
benefit gained from it. Furthermore, their ratification was 
regarded as fraud on the minority and ineffective. Lord 
Buckmaster said: "If, as their Lordships find on the facts, 
the contract in question was entered into under such 
circumstances that the directors could not retain the 
benefit of it for themselves, then it belonged in equity to
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the company and ought to have been dealt with as an asset 
of the company. Even supposing it be not ultra vires of a 
company to make a present to its directors, it appears 
quite certain that directors holding a majority of votes 
would not be permitted to make a present to themselves. 
This would be to allow a majority to oppress the minority". 
Again in Regal (Hastings) Ltd V. Gulliver.95, the house of 
Lords in its decision observed that if the directors, who 
were also controlling shareholders had summoned a general 
meeting to approve their action they would have been 
relieved of their duty to account to the company, although 
it would have been a mere formality since the directors 
were also the only shareholders. In the words of Lord 
Russel, 95 "They [directors] could, had they wished, have 
protected themselves by a resolution (either antecedent or 
subsequent) of the Regal shareholders in general meeting. 
In default of such approval, the liability to account must 
remain". At this stage, it appears that if an act or a 
transaction can be validly ratified, so that it becomes 
binding on the company, the directors will be relieved from 
liability from any breach of duty. However, what may be 
ratified is still to some extent unclear, since the 
distinction between ratifiable and unratifiable acts 
appears to be difficult to d r a w . 97 Nevertheless, it is 
established in a number of cases that certain types of 
directors' acts may be ratified merely by an ordinary 
resolution of the general meeting. This includes, for 
example, an allotment of shares for an improper purpose9®,
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a failure to disclose an interest in a contract to which
the company is a party^, the obtaining of a secret profit
not available to the company^^. And a failure of skill and
101care; if not fraudulent .
Indeed it is suggested that directors must act in a 
bona fide manner in all the circumstances mentioned above. 
In this respect Professor Gower^^ argues that it is 
impossible to ratify when directors do not act bona fide 
in the interests of the company. He cites in support of 
this proposition the case of Attwool v. Merryweather.^-^ 
where a shareholder was permitted to bring an action 
against the directors of a company who had, sold to it a 
mine for an excessive price. On the other hand, Gower adds 
that the general meeting can validly ratified the 
directors' act if they have acted honestly in that they 
believe to be the best interest of the company although 
they have acted for an improper purpose. He supported his 
argument by citing Hogg v. Cramphorn L t d .104 which was a 
case on the improper issue of shares. The directors issued 
shares with special voting rights to the trustees of a 
scheme set up for the benefit of the company's employees, 
in order to forestall a take-over. The court held that 
although the directors had acted in good faith they had 
breached their duty to the company by making improper use 
of their power to issue shares. However, it was also held 
that the directors' breach of duty could be ratified by the 
company in general meeting (with the newly issued shares
253
not voting) . This decision was approved by the Court of 
Appeal in Bamford v. Bamford105 where the directors had 
allotted shares to create additional votes in order to 
resist a take-over bid. This breach of duty was held to be 
ratifiable by the ordinary resolution passed in general 
meeting. Harman L.J. described this case as a tolerably 
plain case and stated that it was trite law105 that 
directors can, through full and frank disclosure to the 
general meeting, obtain "absolution and forgiveness of 
their sins", whether this take the form of procedural 
irregularities (e.g. lack of quorum, defective appointment) 
or improper purpose, provided "the acts are not ultra 
vires the company as a whole". His lordship added "If the 
majority of the general meeting will not forgive and 
approve, then the directors must pay for it." This 
judgment, however, was described by Lesser, in his 
article10  ^ as »«a substantial encroachment on minority 
protection". In his view, the judgment "would deny the 
possibility of a minority action in cases of contravention 
of the articles or "Fraud on the minority" both of which 
are established 'exceptions' to the rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle."
In contrast to the above category of acts there are 
some breaches of directors' duties that cannot be ratified 
by an ordinary resolution of the general meeting. This 
includes (a) breach of duty involving infringement of the 
individual rights of shareholders, such as an improper 
refusal to register a share transfer 1 0 8 , or a ciaSs of
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shareholders (e.g cases of fraud on the minority); (b) an 
act which is ultra vires the companylO^, (C) acts which 
are fraudulent or dishonest'*’^ ,  (d) acts which are 
performed without following a required procedure such as 
obtaining a special resolution.
Finally, it is worthy of note that unlike British 
Company Law, which relies on common law principles, 
American and other European countries laws provide 
expressly for the release of directors from liability for 
fully disclosed breaches of duty by the shareholders 
passing a resolution by a simple majority vote at a general 
meeting or in the case of many states in the USA by the 
board of directors resolving to release individual 
directors.m
4.2.- Relief— by  the,.Articles
Prior to the Companies Act 1929, the insertion of a 
provision in a directors service contract or in the 
memorandum or articles of association of the company in 
order to exclude any liability of breach of. directors' 
duties, except that which was wilful and dishonest, was 
valid and could be relied upon by the directors who were 
in breach of their fiduciary or statutory d u t i e s . ^  
clear example of this situation can be found in Re Citv 
Equitable Fire Insurance Co.^^ where one of the company's 
articles provided that none of the directors, auditors, 
secretary or other officers of the company should be 
answerable... for any loss misfortune, or damage which might
255
happen in the execution of their respective offices or 
trusts or in relation thereto, unless the same should 
happen by or through their own wilful neglect or default. 
This type of article was described by the Green 
C o m m i t t e e H 4 as giving "a quite unjustifiable protection to 
directors". They recommended "the proper course in our view 
is to prohibit articles and contracts relieving directors 
and other officers from their liability under the general 
law for negligence and breach of duty of breach of trust. 
These recommendations led to the introduction of what is 
now section 310 of the Companies Act 1985 115. Section 310 
of the Companies Act 1985 makes void "any provision, 
whether contained in a company's articles or in any 
contract with the company or otherwise for exempting any 
officer of the company or any person (whether an officer or 
not) employed by the company as auditor from, or 
indemnifying him against, any liability which by virtue of 
any rule of law would otherwise attach to him in respect of 
any negligence, fault, breach of duty or breach of trust of 
which he may be guilty in relation to the company".
However, the relationship between this section and the 
articles is not clear. Indeed, the wording of this section 
renders it very difficult for academics to define the exact 
scope of section 310 (formerly 205 Companies Act 1948) 
which gave rise to an extensive academic discussion. ^ 6 
The main issue considered was about the effect of section 
310 on articles 85 and 94 (formerly 78-84). In other words, 
are articles 85 and 94 and similar provisions caught by the
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invalidating terms of section 310 of the Companies Act 
1985. In answering this question various views and
arguments were expressed. In an attempt to define the
extent of section 205 (now 310) it is submitted that the 
correct construction of the section is more narrow and that 
some exclusion clauses can be valid. Both Gower and
Gore-Brown take the view that, literally interpreted
section 205 permits the modification or abrogation of the 
directors duty by the articles, but not the exclusion of 
liability which may arise for breach of that duty.
Professor Gower^S puts the point as follows:
"Notwithstanding this [section 205] waiver clauses 
have... continued to be inserted in articles and, 
since they appear in table A, they must be regarded 
as permissible and, at any rate to some extent, as 
effective. Presumably that is so because the 
articles permit a director to place himself in 
certain situations and to retain the benefits he 
derives thereby, it can no longer be said that the 
situations are ones in which there could be a 
conflict with his duty in the light of permission".
Another statement found in Gore-Brown^^ "It is open 
to a company, subject to certain limits, to include in its 
articles provisions which render one or more of the general 
duties... Inapplicable to its directors. Any such provision 
must, however, take the form of a reduction or abrogation 
of the relevant duty, as opposed to an exemption of the 
directors from liability for breach of the duty" . 1 2  0 
Similar view was expressed by P a r k i n s o n ^ 1. He noted that
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"On a strict reading, section 205 does not invalidate 
provisions which are duty-releasing, but only those which 
exempt liability for breach of duty. Birds-*-22 took a 
different approach. He suggested that articles 78 and 84 
are inconsistent with section 205, but valid because of 
their statutory character. Another view was presented by 
G r e g o r y .  ^23 j j e  submits that the literal effect of section 
205 is to avoid all forms of exclusion from liability, 
without making any distinction between exemptions from the 
scope of the duty and exemptions from consequences of a 
breach of duty. He reconciles this view with the Table A 
provisions by holding that there is nothing in them which 
can be said to authorise directors to commit breaches of 
duty. This view, however, was criticised by Instone-*-2  ^
his article. He argues that if Mr Gregory’s submission 
above was true, no absolution could be effectually obtained 
by means of a shareholder’s resolution. The reason for this 
was that section 205 applies to "any provision, whether 
contained in the articles of a company... or otherwise", 
and the words appear to cover such a resolution. That it 
can be effectively so obtained is illustrated by Bamford V. 
Bamford. 125
However, all the views and arguments mentioned above 
were expressed in the absence of any judicial guidance-'-2 ,^ 
due to the lack of any case-law dealing with the issue. 
Until recently the only reported case on section 310 is 
Movitex Limited V. Bulfield & others. 127 In that case, the 
company's articles were similar to but slightly more
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extensive and went a little further than article 84 of the 
1948 Table A. These articles allowed a director to be a 
party to or otherwise interested in a contract with the 
company and declare that the transaction shall not be 
voidable, and the director not accountable for any benefit 
that he may derive from it, provided that his interest is 
disclosed to the rest of the board and that in most 
instances, the director also abstains from voting. In this 
judgment Vinelott J held that such articles were valid and 
did not infringe section 205 of 1948 Act (New Section 310). 
He said-^® that "it would at the very lowest paradoxical to 
find that section 205 conflicts with articles 78 and 84. 
The legislature in enacting the 1948 Act must have 
contemplated that the modifications of the self-dealing 
rule in articles 78 and 84 do not infringe section 205". 
Another important point which was raised in connection to 
duty-releasing articles, was about excludable and non­
excludable duties. This is resolved by drawing a 
distinction between the directors duty which may be 
released and the duty that may not. It is suggested that 
while the no-conflict duty may be released by a provision 
in the articles, the duty to act in good faith, the duty of 
care and the duty to act for a proper purpose may n o t . 12 9 
The reason for this distinction may be attributed to the 
fact that the breach of the latter duty may be harmful to 
the company, since these non-excludable duties represent 
the range of obligations imposed upon directors in order to 
prevent them from damaging the interest of the company.130
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Finally, it is interesting to note that although the 
Companies Act 1985 invalidates exoneration and indemnity 
clauses in articles of association and directors' service 
contracts, section 310(3) of the Act empowers a company 
which has such a clause in its articles, or which is party 
to a contract which contains such a clause, to indemnify a 
director against costs which he incurs in defending any 
civil or criminal proceedings brought against him in which 
judgment is given in his favour or he is acquitted, or 
against the cost incurred by a director who successfully 
applies to the court for relief from liability.131
4.3.- Relief by the court;
Directors application to the court for relief is 
another way of releasing directors from their liability. 
This is provided by section 727 of the Companies Act 1985. 
Under this section the court has a discretionary 
jurisdiction to relieve an officer (including a director, 
manager or secretary (section 744) or an auditor of the 
company, wholly or partly, from liability which he has 
incurred by "his negligence, default, breach of duty or 
breach of trust." This relief can, however, be granted only 
if it appears to the court that the applicant director "has 
acted honestly and reasonably, and that having regard to 
all the circumstances of the case (including those 
connected with his appointment) he ought fairly to be 
e x c u s e d . . . "  The court may give a relief to a director
even though the company's shareholders or creditors (if the
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company is in liquidation) are opposed to such relief if it 
(tjhe court) considers that the director should be 
excused.^33 Qn the other hand, directors cannot be relieved 
by the court from liability which they incur personally to 
persons other than the company. Thus, it would seem that 
directors cannot be relieved in those cases where they 
incur personal liability to shareholders or creditors of 
the company, although they may be relieved from liability
to the company on the same f a c t s .  ^ 4  in Excise
Commissioners v. Hedon Alpha Ltd^^, it has been held that 
the section applies to actions brought by or on behalf of
the company against its directors for breach of duty and
to penal proceedings for the enforcement of the Companies 
Acts. In explaining the circumstances in which the section 
cannot apply, Lord Stephensen s a i d : -*-36
"I would...hold that [s.727]...is inapplicable to 
any claim by third parties to enforce any liability 
except a director's liability to his company or his 
directors duties under the Companies Acts. Wide and 
general though the opening words of [s.727] are, 
read in their context they do not allow an officer 
or auditor of a company to claim relief in "any" 
legal proceedings which may be brought against him 
in his capacity as an officer or auditor of a 
company by the rest of the world".
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4.4.- Directors Liability in Algerian Law
Under Algerian Law, like other legal systems that treat 
a company as an entity separate from its shareholders and 
directors, directors are not personally liable for the acts 
performed in the name of the company in the ordinary 
discharge of their duties, such acts are exclusively 
imputed to the company. Their liabilities, however, stem 
from the breach of certain standards of conduct which may 
make them civilly or criminally liable. In addition to the 
general principles that govern civil and criminal 
liability, the Algerian legislator set forth a number of 
provisions dealing specifically with the responsibility of 
company directors. 1-37
4.4.1“ Civil Liability
Article 693(1) of the commercial code 1975 provides 
that "Directors shall be liable, individually or jointly 
and severally, as the case may be, to the company or to the 
third parties, for the violation of the legislative or 
regulatory provisions applicable to companies, for 
violations of the provisions of the companies statutes, or 
for faults committed in their management.11138 it is quite 
clear from this article that the main basis of civil 
liability are:
A- violation of the law on companies (Infractions aux 
dispositions legislative, ou reglementaires applicables aux 
societes par actions); The Commercial Code 1975 regulating 
companies lays down strict rules, any breach of which
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results in the liability of directors. Examples of these 
rules are : The obligation to keep books of account in
accordance with the provisions of the commercial code-^ -39, 
to convene the ordinary annual shareholders meeting and any 
extraordinary shareholders meeting that, may be necessary, 
and to draw up the agenda for these meetings; to submit 
correct balance sheets, to distribute dividends; to obtain 
a necessary authorisation before doing any business with 
the company.
B- Violation of the statutes of the company (bylaws) 
(violation des statuts); Non-compliance of the company's 
articles might result in the civil liability of the company 
director. Examples for such violations are: Failure to call 
shareholders meetings as prescribed, making contracts that 
are prohibited by the company's statutes (statuts); 
granting of loans when unauthorised, or grafting loans 
without obtaining the security called for in the articles 
of association.
C- Faulty management (Faute de gestion): As seen earlier, 
directors are under duty to exercise care and due diligence 
in their management of the affairs of the company. 
Furthermore, their position entails the common law 
fiduciary obligation to manage the company as would a "good 
family father" (bon pere de f a m i l l e ) 1 4 0 .  That is to say, in 
the same way as a diligent and honest person would manage 
his own affairs. As a result of this, any negligence or
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mismanagement, even slight, may expose the director to 
liability. As a matter of fact, the faults that can be 
committed by directors when running the day to day 
management of the company are numerous and varied. They 
include all acts or omissions contrary to the obligation to 
manage the company in the way described above. For example, 
negligence or incompetence of the directors in management 
and in the supervision of the staff, which may cause losses 
to the company, abuse of their position as directors such 
as obtaining a loan from the company without following the 
prescribed procedure, heavy purchases by a company in 
financial difficulties or buying goods or property at a 
price completely disproportionate to their value; granting 
loans to insolvent individuals; concealing the true 
situation of the company from the shareholders by knowingly 
presenting an inaccurate financial statement; fiscal frauds 
that may lead to the payment of heavy penalties which force 
the company to borrow money in order to make such payments.
Any director who commits the cited violations is liable 
in damages to the company, its shareholders and third 
persons for any loss sustained as a result of his acts and 
omission. As a general rule the directors liability is 
individual and each director is only personally liable for 
his own acts and omission. However, since the board of 
directors is a collegiate body, and acts giving rise to 
liability may be done by the directors acting together, in 
which case they are collectively liable. -*-41 jn addition,
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where several directors are jointly liable as participants 
in the same acts, the court shall determine the degree of 
responsibility and the contributive share of each one in 
reparation for damages. 1^2 ^ 0  directors may be sued by 
anyone who has been prejudiced (damaged) by their acts or 
omissions: The Company, the shareholders and third parties.
1- Individual Action_ (Action individual le).
Any shareholder who has been directly prejudiced by the 
action of a director of the company may bring a suit for 
damages because of the loss caused to him^4^  i>he general 
foundation of this action is article 124 of the civil code 
1975 "Every fault which causes injury to another, imposes 
an obligation to make reparation upon the person by whom it 
is committed." Thus, all shareholders in different kinds of 
companies are entitled to bring that action. Here the 
shareholder acts on his own behalf and his action is in 
respect of the damages sustained by him personally which 
may be different from the damages caused to the company-*-44 
This led some writers to call it a personal action (action 
personelle)-*-4  ^ although it may happen that one fault by a 
director or directors gives rise to both a c t i o n  s o c i a l e  and 
action individuelle if it affects both the interests of the 
company and the individual shareholder at the same time-*-4 .^ 
In all cases, a shareholder cannot be deprived from his 
individual rights of action whether by a provision in the 
statutes of a company, a resolution of a general meeting or 
by subjecting the action to a prior authorisation or any
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other procedure.14  ^ In addition to the shareholders'
action, third parties, generally creditors, may sue any
director for damages suffered by them as a result of
directors breach of duty.
According to the general principle of civil liability,
it is necessary to prove an error (Faute) made by the
directors of the company, damage sustained by a shareholder
. I ,or third party, and finally a link of causation between the
i
error and damage.
2- SLompanyJs Action (Action Socialel
The fact that a company is a legal person enables it to 
bring an action against any director or directors who may 
cause loss to the company, (e.g actions for negligent 
management, actions for misuse of the company's assets, 
action for damaging the company's financial reputation or 
quality of its production). It is submitted that the basis 
of this action is a contractual one.^® This is because the 
board of directors acts as an agent (mandataire) for, the 
company. Therefore, its faults which cause damage to the 
company constitute a breach of its duties as an agent. 
Another view argues that this action is based on violation 
of legal obligations (obligations legales) .14 9 However, 
some writers suggest that the search for the nature of this 
action has no practical importance since the responsibility 
is founded on the fault (faute) that must be proved in all 
circumstances. Mr. Tunc noted "On remarquera que nous 
passons entierement sous silence les discussion relatives a
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la nature contractuelle ou delicutelle de la responsabilite 
des organes. Ces discussion ne peuve aboutir, parce 
qu'elles ont trait a un faux p r o b l e m e . ^ O
An action by the company has in principle to be brought 
in its name by its legal representatives (ie it board of 
directors). However, in practice it seems impossible for 
such action to be brought if all or several of the 
directors are guilty of the breaches of duty complained of, 
since they are unlikely to initiate an action against 
themselves.151 a result of this, the law permits the 
shareholders to bring action sociale instead of the 
company's legal representatives (les represents legaux).
. . iThis is known as action social exercee lint singuli" •
Article 694 of the Commercial Code 1975 provides that "In 
addition to the action for damages suffered personally, the 
shareholders may, either individually or as a group bring a 
corporate action (action social) against the directors. The 
plaintiff shall have the right to claim compensation for 
the full injury suffered by the company, to which the 
damages shall be awarded." It is worthy of note that unlike 
French law, Algerian law does not impose any condition on 
shareholders to exercise action sociale "ut singuli". In 
French Law, however, the requirement is to hold a certain 
percentage of the issues capital of the company which is at 
least one-tenth (1/1 0) of the capital in the case of 
societe a responsabilite limitee^-^^, and at least one- 
twentieth (1/2 0) in the case of societe par actions!^.
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The persons who are authorised (permitted) to act in 
this action, are those who are still shareholders when the 
Naction is brought, in other words, they must be in actual 
possession of shares at the time the suit is brought 
"seules sont authorises a agir les personnes qui ont la 
qualite d'associes au moment de 1'action".155
According to the commercial code, no clause in the 
statutes of a company may validly subject the enforcement 
of a right of action vested in the company to the prior 
opinion or authorisation of the general shareholders 
meeting, and no renunciation of the rights of shareholders 
to sue in the company's name or their own names is 
v a l i d . In addition, no decision adopted at a
shareholders meeting can terminate or exclude a liability 
suit brought against the directors for their errors in the 
performance of their functions.1^7
Finally, a right of action for damages against the 
directors, whether brought by the company or by a 
shareholder individually, must be sued upon within three 
years after the right of action arose or, if the existence 
of the right of action has been concealed, within three 
years of the discovery of the relevant facts. However, if 
the act constitutes a crime, the action shall be barred 
after ten years.158
A number of attempts has been made to draw a line 
between the two actions cited above. Firstly, it is 
submitted that the difference between company rights of
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action (actions sociales) and individual rights of action 
(actions individuelles) lies in the purpose of the suit and 
in the nature of damages sought. A suit belongs to the 
company if the company or all of its members have an 
interest in it and its purpose is to maintain, reconstitute 
or augment company assets. An action is personal if not all 
shareholders have an interest in it or if all have an 
interest but of different degrees, and if its purpose is to 
make each interested individual whole for personal damages 
suffered. 15 9 The second view attributes the above 
difference to the nature of the duty of whose breach gave 
rise to the action. This is to say that the right of action 
belongs to the company whenever the contractual duties of 
directors are at stake, on the other hand the action is 
personal if it is based on a misdemeanour (delit) or a 
technical misdemeanour (quasi-delit)160# The third view 
argues that while the action sociale results from a breach 
of a contractual obligation the individual action arises 
from breaches which are not contractual.161
4.4.2- Criminal Liability
Like French law, the criminal liability of directors 
under Algerian law is wide and extensive. This may be 
deduced from the fact that most of the breach of directors 
duties and defaults regarding most statutory prescriptions 
concerning the management of the company may make a 
director civilly as well as criminally liable. This is in 
addition to certain crimes set forth in the penal code
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which may be committed by directors in their capacity as 
such viz., fraud, (escroquerie) and embezzlement (abus de 
confiance) . The most important examples of criminal 
liability are laid down by article 811 of the commercial 
code under the title "Violations relating to management 
and administration of companies". It states as follows "The 
following shall be subject to imprisonment for one to five 
years and a fine of AD 2 000 to AD 20 000, or to either of 
such penalties:
1- The president, the administrators, or the general 
managers of a company who, in the absence of a book of 
account balances (inventory of the company's assets and 
liabilities) or through fraudulent books of account 
balances, knowingly distribute fictitious dividends to the 
shareholders;
2- The president, the administrators, or the general 
managers of a company who, even though no dividends were 
distributed, knowingly publish or submit to the 
shareholders inaccurate balance sheet in order to conceal 
the true financial situation of a company;
3- The president, the administrators, or the general 
managers of a company who, acting in bad faith, use the 
company's property (assets) or credit in a manner which 
they know to be contrary to the interest of the company, 
for personal ends (gain) , or for the benefit of another 
company or enterprise in which they have a direct or 
indirect interest;
4- The president, the administrators, or the general
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managers of a company who, acting in bad faith, use powers 
which they possess or votes which they dispose, in such 
capacity in a manner which they know to be contrary to the 
interests of the company, for personal ends (gains) or for 
the benefit of another company or enterprise in which they 
have a direct or indirect interest."
In addition to the above criminal sanctions, article 
812 of the commercial code imposes liability on a director 
(the president or administrator) presiding over a meeting 
who fails to have the deliberations of the board of 
directors (conseil d 1administration) set down in minutes 
forming a special record kept at the company's registered 
office. The penalty is a fine of AD 500 to AD 2 000 1^2#
From what have been said it appears that the directors
liability has received a great deal of attention from both 
the British and Algerian legislature. This is reflected in 
a large number of provisions and regulations dealing with 
directors and executives, especially in Britain where 
private sector companies constitute a cornerstone of the 
British economy. Thus, the proper control of the national 
economy can only be achieved through the control of its 
leaders, ie, directors. Indeed, the recent increase in a 
number of fraud cases, bankruptcies and insider dealings is 
a clear sign that shows the need to enact more strict rules 
that can prevent such acts, and to fill up any loophole
that may be used by director to escape liability. Although
this general increase of directors liabilities may be seen
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as rendering company's directorship as a risky task which 
may discourage persons from holding managerial offices in 
fear of personal liability that may attach to them. The 
shareholder, creditors and the general public as large, 
however, will be encouraged to invest their money in 
companies and commercial projects since they are assured by 
the law that their rights are safeguarded. Finally, it 
seems to me that the directors liability will continue to 
increase as the economy and commercial world continue to 
develop.
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Les demandeurs sont habilites a poursuivre la reparation 
de l'entier prejudice subi par la societe, a laquelle, 
le cas echeant, les dommages interets sont alloues"
144- see Omneshaughe, P.V., Le regime de societes oar 
actions et leurs administration en droit compare., 1960
at p. 545, "Les administrateurs peuvent d'autre part
subi un prejudice distinct de celui qui result de 
l'atteinte portee au patrimoine social"; see also 
Berdah, J.P, Fonction et responsabilite de diriaeants.d£ 
societes par actions, 1974, p. 144
145- Escarra et Rault, Traite theorique et practique de 
droit commercial: Les Societes Commercialese 4th edition 
1959, p.327
146- see Salah. M., Les Prerogative des associes et des
organes sociaux dans le fonctionnement des societes._a
responsabilite limite et des societes par action en 
droit Francais et en droit Algerien, Thesis (Doctorat 
D'etat) 1984, p. 452; see also Omneshaughe, P.V., 
supra, note 144, p. 545
147- see article 695 of the Algerian commercial code 1975
148- see Omneshaughe, P.V., supra, note 144, p. 505, "On 
admet tres generalement que la responsibility des 
administrateurs envers la societe est de nature 
contractuelle."
149- Berdah, J.P., supra., note 144, p. 157
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150- Tunc, A., " La responsabilte civile des organes de 
societes et les regies generales de la responsabilite 
civile en droit Francais", (1967), vol. 15, Travaux de 
1 Association Henri Capitant pur la culture Juridioua, 
27 at p. 28; see also Escarra and Rault, supra, note 8, 
p. 309; Mezeaud et Tunc, Traite Theoretique et practioue
de la responsabilite civ ile, delict vie lie £_t
contractuelle, 5th edition, 1957, p. 103
151- Le Gall, J., French Company Law. 1974, p. 174
152- Salah .M., supra, note 14 6 at p.451
153- article 41 of the decree N° 67-236, 1967
154- article 200 of the decree N° 67-236, 1967
155- This rule was established by the French Chambre 
Commerciale de la Cour de Cassation, January, 26th, 
1970, J.C.P. (juris classeur periodique), 1970, II, 16 
385; see also Abu Zeid R., "Commercial Companies in 
Egyptian and Comparative Law, 198 9, p. 641 (Arabic text)
156- see article 695(1) of the Algerian commercial code 
1975
157- see article 695 (2) of the Algerian commercial code 
1975
158- article 696 of the Algerian commercial code 1975 
provides "L’action en responsabilite contre les 
administrateurs, tant sociale qu’induviduelle, se 
prescrit par trois ans a compter de fait dommageable ou 
s ' il a ete dissimule, de sa revelation. Toutefois, 
lorque le fait est qualifie crime, l’action se prescrit 
par dix ans."
159- Church, E.M., Business Associations Under French Law, 
1960, p. 507; see also Hamel et Lagarde, Traite de droit 
commercial, 1954, vol. 1 para 663, p. 793, ”Un prejudice 
subi directement par la societe donne overture a une 
action sociale; celle-ci sera exerce uL universi ou nL
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sinauli. Seul un prejudice special a un actionnaire ou
certains actionnaires est sanctionne par une action
individuelle"
160- Church, E.M., supra, note 21, p. 507
161- Berdah, J.P., supra, note 144, p. 172
162- article 812 of the Algerian commercial code 1975, see 
also article 813 on directors liabilty for violations 
relating to financial statements.
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Conclusion
The management of commercial companies and the 
protection of their assets constitute one of the most 
important problems in contemporary company law. The 
increase in a number of bankruptcies and misappropriation 
of corporate funds, frauds and scandals witnessed over the 
last decade show clearly the extent of risk and danger that 
can face companies when they are managed and directed by 
incompetent or negligent directors. As a result of this, 
the issue of directors’ powers and responsibilities have 
recently received constant attention and pressures for 
reform are increasing. These pressures for change are due 
to a number of factors such as: The European harmonisation 
programme embodied in various directives; the general 
development of economic life, and the techniques relating 
to the governance and management of companies.
The foregoing discussion has shown that shareholders as 
such have lost all genuine control over the affairs of 
their companies. The general tendency in modern company law 
is to recognise the reality caused by the separation of 
ownership and control. The net result is that nowadays all 
managerial powers and privileges are conferred upon the 
board of directors, while very few powers are retained by 
the company in general meeting. Moreover, while the 
articles normally envisage that the collective board is the 
competent and appropriate body to act they also permit 
extensive delegation of power to a committee of directors
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(consisting either of a single director or several 
directors), or to a managing director. This general vesting 
of wide powers and discretion in the directors seems to be 
necessary and expedient for directors to cope with the 
exigencies of business life and to enable them to carry out 
their job properly. In addition, it provides the company 
with sufficient legal status such that third parties 
dealing with the company will no longer be required to look 
outside the Acts and Memorandum and Articles of Association 
to make sure that the directors are competent to enter into 
a particular transaction. However as we have seen directors 
powers are not absolute but subject to an array of 
obligations and restrictions designed to ensure certain 
minimum standards of behaviour from directors and to 
prevent them from misusing their privileges or abusing 
their position. In this respect, the law does not impose an 
all-embracing code of conduct on directors. Some of their 
duties are laid down by statute but many are found only in 
common law. However, it is established that a director owes 
two types of duty to the company, a 'fiduciary' duty and a 
duty of skill and care. Firstly, the fiduciary duty 
requires a director to act honestly in his dealings with or 
on behalf the company. That is to say that the director 
must act in good faith in the best interests of the 
company, and ensure that the powers of a company are used 
in a bona fide manner in the company's interest and not 
for any collateral purpose. He must not place himself in a 
position where his duty to the company and his personal
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interests conflict, nor must he derive any personal profit 
from his position beyond that which the company pays him, 
for example, by diverting corporate opportunities to 
himself. Secondly, a director must exercise whatever skill 
he possesses and reasonable care and diligence when 
discharging his duties.
An examination of the case law regarding directors’ 
duties appears to show that while their duties of loyalty 
are very strict their duties of care, diligence and skill 
are quite lax. This phenomenon may be explained primarily 
due to the fact that the company directorship is not yet a 
recognised profession with its own professional standards. 
As already indicated the British legislator adopts the 
attitude that directors need have no special qualification 
at all for the office of directorship. In other words, 
anyone can be a director. This is clearly illustrated by a 
very recent survey published by the Institute of Directors. 
The survey of 218 members of the institute found nine of 10 
had received no preparation for becoming a director other 
than "experience". Less than a quarter had any professional 
or management qualifications.  ^ This is despite the fact 
that the effectiveness of any board of directors and the 
success of any company depends mainly upon the abilities 
and professional competence of its board of directors. The 
second reason is that the principles established in the old 
cases^ particularly in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance are 
still regarded as expressing the law on directors'
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obligation of care and skill even although they were all 
decided before the existence of "professional" company 
director. Furthermore, the commercial circumstances under 
which their judgments were formulated differs greatly from 
present commercial practice.
The lightness of the obligations of care, diligence and 
skill may result in exonerating incompetent directors. 
Indeed, it can be used as a justification to escape from 
liability in case of negligence by directors. Thus, in 
order to fill up this loophole it is proposed that the 
degree of care and skill must be increased, and must be 
measured by what is reasonably expected of a director in 
the current business community. Further, they should be 
made expressly liable for negligence if they have failed 
to exercise the degree of care and skill which is 
reasonably required for the proper performance of the 
functions for which they are appointed. In addition, it is 
proposed that the director (with exception of worker 
directors) should be required to possess some professional 
qualifications or at least attend training courses in 
management or business administration before he is 
appointed to a managerial office. This may provide 
companies' boards with competent directors and may assist 
the legislature in setting out a fair objective standard 
applicable to all executive directors' duties of care and 
skill. Moreover, such training may familiarise directors 
with the regulations governing the management of companies 
and make them more aware of their legal obligations and
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their responsibilities to their company, its shareholders, 
its employees, to the public at large.
As to the legal liability, directors seem nowadays to 
be more vulnerable than they have ever been. This is shown 
by a rapid increase in the number of cases involving the 
legal liability of directors. Directors can no longer rely 
for protection on the separate personality of their 
company as the lifting of the corporate veil has become a 
more common practice. Accordingly, they are now more 
exposed to legal liability than before and the 
circumstances under which they could be held personally 
liable are far greater. This can clearly be noticed in the 
increasing number of statutory provisions dealing with the 
directors personal liabilities embodied in different 
statutes such as the Companies Act 1985, Insolvency Act 
1986, Companies Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
Indeed, the Insolvency Act 1986 provisions have increased 
the risk for those who participate in the management of a 
company which ultimately goes into insolvent liquidation, 
by introducing the new concept of personal liability for 
wrongful trading in section 214 of the Act. Under the 
latter section, the personal liability could arise without 
proof of fraud or dishonesty and without requiring the full 
criminal standard of proof. Similarly, the extent of 
directors1 disqualification has been widened by the new 
provisions on company insolvency. Particularly by section 6 
of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 which is 
intended to prevent directors from abusing the privilege of
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limited liability, and protect the general public against 
the irresponsible behaviour of directors.
The recent failures of companies due the misconduct of 
directors show that there is a need for legislative reform 
in this area. It is fair to say that both section 214 of 
the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Company Disqualification 
Act 1986 have a wide indirect effect, carrying back an 
obligation to the very incorporation of the company to 
ensure that it is initially adequately capitalised, that 
proper accounting and control systems are set up and that 
the company's progress can be (and actually is) regularly 
reviewed. For otherwise the directors will not be able to 
discharge their obligations under section 214 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 to assess the need for preventative 
measures against insolvency and its consequences for trade 
creditors and also avoid unfitness under the Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986.
However, whilst academic writers may appreciate this, 
the average small company director does not. For effective 
public protection the working director needs education and 
information to tell him of the need for compliance. Thus, 
it is recommended that the duties and responsibilities of 
directors should be spelt out more clearly in future 
legislation, and that the rules governing them ought to be 
changed so as to be in accordance with the current 
commercial practice with a recognition that subsequent 
action must be supported through education as well as 
effective enforcement.
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1- Churchill, D., "Directors Lack training for role, says 
study " (1990) Monday, February 19th, Finacial Times at
p.10
2- Re Forest of Dean Co. (1878)10 Ch.D. 450; 40 LT 278; Re 
Brazilian Rubber plantations & Estates Ltd, [1911] 1 
Ch.425; 27 T.L.R. 109, see also the Conduct of Company 
Directors, 1977, Cmnd 7037, para 4; The Companies Bill 
1978, (Cl.45(1) )
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Appendix 
Some matters relating to companies according 
to the British companies Act of 1985 and the 
Algerian commercial code of 1975. 
Definition of a company
Algerian law.
Article 416 of the civil code 1975 provides "The company 
(societe) is a contract between two or more persons whereby 
they agree to pool assets in common with the object of 
sharing any profits that might accrue therefrom."
Article 417 of the civil code adds that "These assets may 
be money, property or services, contributed to the 
enterprise (societe)."
Like French law, in Algerian law there is a single word 
which comprises both partnerships and companies. This word 
is societe depends upon the context in which it is used, 
may refer to a partnership or to a company.
British Law
A company may be described as an association of a number of 
persons for a common object of mutual profit.
 governing- Companies
Algerian Law
Algerian companies (societes) are governed by the 
commercial code of 1975, and the civil code of 1975 
(articles from 416 to 449).
Commercial law governs merchants (commergants) who are 
principally engaged in commercial dealings or transactions
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(actes de commerce).
The commercial law rests upon and presupposes the civil 
law, which is applicable whenever the commercial law 
differs both substantively and procedurally from the civil 
law; it involves a different judiciary, the commercial 
courts or special section of the court (chambre de 
commerce) dealing with commercial matters: It employs
different rules of proof; it permits a higher rate of 
interest to be charged; and it includes the bankruptcy law, 
which does not apply to persons not engaged in commerce.
British law
Companies in British law are governed by companies Act 1985 
and case law.
British law does not recognise the idea of commercial law 
as a formally separate category. In general no distinction 
is made between commercial and other transactions, or 
between the trader and other individuals i.e. behind the 
acts is a general body of law applying to all companies 
irrespective of their nature.
Forms of business organisations (Classification)
Algerian Law : The most significant classification of
business organisation is the dichotomy between civil 
companies and commercial companies. This reflects the 
crucial distinction between the civil law and commercial 
law. Another fundamental classification is that between 
societes de personnes and societes de capitaux.
Article 544 of the commercial code of 1975 provides that
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"the commercial character of a firm is determined by its 
form or by its objects (purpose)". It follows from this 
that a partnership or a company which has neither a 
commercial form nor commercial objects is a civil 
partnership or company.
Article 544 (2) - "Stock companies (Societes en commandite); 
limited liability companies (societes a responsabilite 
limitee); and partnership companies (societe en nom 
collective) are commercial by reason of their form, 
whatever their purpose may be.
Corporate personality
Algerian law
Commercial societes (companies) shall possess legal 
personality as of the date of their registration in the 
commercial register.
Persons who acted in the name of a company in the course of 
its formation before it acquired legal personality shall be 
liable jointly and severally and without limitation for any 
acts so undertaken, unless the company, after having 
property organised and registered, assumes the obligations 
incurred. Such obligations shall then be deemed to have 
been incurred by the company ab initio (Article 54 9 of the 
Algerian commercial code of 1975).
British law
A company in British law is regarded as a legal entity 
distinct from its members. Hence, it is capable of enjoying 
rights and of being subject to duties which are not the 
same as those enjoyed or born by its members. In other 
words, it has a legal personality and is often described as
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an artificial person in contrast with a human being, a 
natural person.
Formalities of formation 
Algerian law
As a general rule commercial societe (companies and 
partnerships) are subject to more complex and stricter 
rules than civil ones.
After the signature of the statute the following steps must 
be taken:
1- Registration. The statute of the partnership or company 
(societe) and, where applicable, the other documents 
relating to the constitution of the company must be 
submitted for the purpose of the collection of registration 
tax.
2- Advertisement in newspaper publishing legal notices, 
after the constitution of any societe (partnership or 
company), a notice must be published in a newspaper in 
which legal announcements are published and in the 
department where the partnership or company’s registered 
office (siege social) is situated.
3- A contract of formation of a societe must be in writing 
(article 418 of the civil code 1975).
4- A societe is established by an authentic act, upon 
penalty of nullity (article 445 of the commercial code 
1975) .
5- The constitutive acts and acts of modification of 
commercial societes, on pain of nullity, be published at 
the national centre of the register of commerce , according 
to the modalities which are proper to each form of a 
company (article 548 of the commercial code).
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6-  A societe does not have a corporate personality until 
its enrollment in the register of commerce. Before the 
accomplishment of this formalities, persons who have made 
engagements in the name and for the account of the firm ( 
societe) are jointly and severally responsible without 
limit for the transactions they have entered into, unless 
the societe after being regularly constituted and 
registered assumes the obligations entered into by them in 
that case, those obligations shall be deemed to have 
entered in by the societe immediately after it is 
constituted (article 549 of the commercial code).
7 - The dissolution of the firm must be published under the 
same conditions and time periods as the constitutive act 
itself (article 550 of the commercial code).
British law
A company is brought into existence by the issue, by 
registration of companies, of a certificate of 
incorporation (section 13). The certificate is conclusive 
evidence that the requirements of the Act as to have been 
compiled with, and the corporate existence of the company 
cannot therefore be challenged.
Limited company (S.A.R.L. & L.T.D)
Definition
Algerian law ( societes a responsabilites limitees ) 
Limited companies SARL’S, by virtue of their forms, and 
regardless of the nature of their operations, treated as 
commercial companies.
The private company SARL is a mixed or hybrid type of
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company. It resembles a partnership (societes de personnes) 
in that the personal element in its membership is important 
and the shares (parts) held by its members cannot be 
represented by freely transferable securities (e.g. bearer 
share certificate). On the other hand, an SARL resembles 
(societe de capitaux) in that all its members are liable to 
contribute towards its debts and obligations only to the 
extent of their agreed contribution.
British law
Private limited company (LTD)
Section 1 (3) of the Companies Act, 1985, provides that "a 
private company is a company that is not a public company". 
A private company is the one which, by its articles of 
association, prohibits any invitation to the public to 
subscribe for its shares or debentures.
Membership 
Algerian law
The number of shareholders of limited liability company may 
not be greater than 20. If the company comes to include 
more than 20 shareholders, it must be transferred into a 
stock company ( societe en commandite) within a year. 
Otherwise it is dissolved, unless during that year the 
number of shareholders has become equal to or less than 20. 
(Article 590 of the commercial ,code) .
British law
A private company must have at least two members. A company 
having only one member is not admitted in British company
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law.
There is no maximum limitation on number of the members in 
a private company.
Capital and shares 
Algerian law
The company capital of an SARL may not be less than AD 30 
000. It is divided into shares value of equal nominal 
value of at least AD 100 . (Article 566 of the commercial 
code 1975) .
The share of the societe (SARL) are nominative, they may 
not be represented by negotiable instruments. Article 569 
of the commercial code.
British law
A private company needs no minimum capital either for 
registration or the commencement of business.
Management (Directors)
Algerian law
A limited liability company (SARL) is managed by one or 
more physical persons. Managers may be chosen from among 
persons who are not shareholders. They are named by 
shareholders, in the company statutes or by a subsequent 
act, under the conditions cited in Article 582 (1) -
(Article 57 6 of the commercial code 1975)
In meetings or at the time of written consultations, 
decisions are adopted by one or more shareholders 
representing more than half of the firm's capital. (Article 
582 of the commercial code).
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British law
Section 282 (3) of the Companies Act 1985 provides that
"every company shall have at least one director".
The articles of a private company sometimes vests the 
management in a small number of directors, or in a 
governing or permanent, or life director.
private company has no security of office but can be 
removed by the general meeting at anytime before the 
expiration of his period of office. (Section 103 (1) of the 
companies Ac t 1985).
Stock company ( soci6t6 par action)
Algerian law
"A stock company ( societe par action) is a firm ( societe) 
that is constituted among shareholders who support losses 
only to the amount of their company assets" (article 592(1) 
of the commercial code).
A stock company is designated by a company name which must 
be preceded or followed by mention of the type or firm and 
the amount of the firms capital.
The name of one or more of the shareholders maybe included 
in the name. (Article 593 of the commercial code).
Membership
The number of membership in societe par action (stock 
company) may not be less than nine (9) - Article 592 of the 
commercial code.
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Capital
The capital of a societe par action may not be less than AD 
300 000 (article 594). The capital must be wholly
subscribed.
Management
The management of the company's affairs is entrusted to 
three main organs, namely;
1- Board of directors (conseil d 'administration) article 
611 to 640 of the commercial code.
2- General meeting (assemblee general) articles 641 to 655 
of the commercial code.
3- Auditors (commissaire aux comptes) articles 678 to 684.
Board of directors
A societe par action is administered by a board of 
directors composed of at least three and at most seven 
members; however in case of merger; this number of seven 
may be exceeded up to the total number of directors who 
have been in their positions for more than six months in 
the merged companies without being permitted to exceed 
fourteen - article 611 of the commercial code 1975.
British law
Public company - PLC
Section 1 (3) of the companies Act 1985 provides "a public 
company is a company limited by shares or limited by 
guarantee and having a share capital, being a company".
- The memorandum of which states that it is to be a public 
company, and
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- in relation to which the provisions of this Act or the 
former companies Acts as to the registration or 
reorganisation of a company as a public have been 
compiled with on or after 22nd December 1980.
Membership
The minimum number of members in as public company is two. 
SS 1 (1) and section 24.
Capital
(Public companies): When a memorandum delivered to the
registrar of companies under section 10 states that the 
association to be registered is to be a public company, 
the amount of the share capital stated in the memorandum to 
be that with which the company proposes to be registered 
must not be less than the authorised minimum defined in 
section (118) Section 118 - "The authorised minimum". 
(Definition): In this Act the authorised minimum £50 000, 
or such other sum as the secretary of state may by order 
made by statuary instruments specify instead.
Management
Article 70 of table A "Subject to the provisions of the 
Acts the memorandum and the articles, and to any direction 
given by special resolution, the business of the company 
shall be managed by the directors who may exercise all the 
powers of the company.
Board of directors
The two main organs that govern the company management are;
- Board of directors
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- General Meeting
Every company must have a board of directors and the 
minimum number of directors who must hold office at any 
time, is two in the case of a public company.
Section 282 (1) public company on or after November 1st
192 9 (other than a private company) shall have at least two 
directors.
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